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1.1 Introduction
An important aspect of nowadays sustainable livestock production is farm
animal welfare (Keeling, 2005). Agricultural systems are sustainable, if
they are “in harmony with the environment, the animals, the workers and
the community and if they are efficient and economically competitive” (Mc-
Glone, 2001, p. 79). Thus, McGlone (2001) links animal welfare1 to other
issues reflecting the three dimensions of sustainability2. Another defini-
tion states that a livestock system is sustainable “if it is acceptable now
and if its effects will be acceptable in the future, particularly in relation to
resource availability, consequences of functioning, and morality of action”
(Broom, 2001, 2010; Broom et al., 2013). Hence, the time horizon also
plays a key role. Both definitions have in common that they consider pub-
lic acceptance, i.e. moral judgment as well as public evaluation. Animal
welfare is an indicator for acceptance of production systems and therefore
for the “external social sustainability” that addresses public’s demands (fig-
ure 1.1). These demands depend on values and norms (Lebacq et al.,
2013; Dirscherl, 2013).
Figure 1.1: Classification of social indicators
Source: Lebacq et al. (2013)
Thus, farm animal welfare (FAW) is an issue of increasing importance
in developed countries (Cornish et al., 2016; European Court of Auditors,
1Please note that for simplification I use the terms “farm animal welfare” and “animal
welfare” synonymously.
2Ecology, economy and social concerns (see von Hauff and Kleine, 2009, p. 15-23).
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2018). For Germany, this importance was pointed out by WBA (2015): the
(perceived) low level of farm animal welfare decreases acceptance for the
current status of animal husbandry. Driven by a rather negative media cov-
erage of a productivity-oriented agriculture (Kayser et al., 2012; Grossarth,
2014), today’s practice of German animal husbandry is associated with
terms like “factory farming” (Kayser et al., 2011; Salamon et al., 2014).
This is especially true for pig husbandry (Zander et al., 2013; Rovers et al.,
2017, 2019). Issues discussed are space per animal (Rovers et al., 2018)
as well as outdoor access and floor conditions3 (Rovers et al., 2019). Ac-
cordingly, German citizens state higher demand for farm animal welfare
(BMEL, 2017a, 2018).
As Grethe (2017) points out, there is an debate about the economic
conceptualization of animal welfare4. Nevertheless, there are good rea-
sons to consider animal welfare as a public good (Bennett, 1995; Fawaz,
1997; Harvey and Hubbard, 2013; Lusk and Norwood, 2011; WBA, 2015).
Following Lusk and Norwood (2011), FAW fulfils the two main criteria for
public goods: One’s benefit from knowing about good welfare of animals
doesn’t prohibit others from this benefit (non-rival) and no one can be
kept from benefits of animals’ good welfare (non-excludable). Moreover,
farm animal welfare is seen as plagued by market failure due to consump-
tion externalities (Harvey and Hubbard, 2013; WBA, 2015). Uehleke and
Hüttel (2018) address the problem of free riding behaviour, distinguish-
ing between individual and collective decision. The authors show that
the willingness to pay (WTP) in a collective situation exceeds individual,
voluntary WTP. The latter refers to the somewhat “classical” WTP, i.e.
the willignness to pay more money for animal friendly products. Several
studies show a stated willingness to pay more money for animal welfare
products (Lagerkvist and Hess, 2011; Clark et al., 2017). But this stated
WTP doesn’t transform into purchase behaviour. This refers to the citizen-
consumer gap: The share of people demanding more animal welfare is
higher than the share of people buying according products (Grethe, 2017).
Since markets fail to provide a sufficient animal welfare level, political
3This reflects two animal welfare frames identified by Deimel et al. (2012): Biological-
technical and behaviour oriented considerations.
4One argument against animal welfare being a public good is that the former is a re-
lation between farmer and animals. Even if considering this relation as a good, it would
be a private good (Mann, 2005). Beyond this assumption, the argument of Mann (2005)
challenges the role of externalities. While animal welfare is not connected to a tech-
nological externality, there might be psychological externalities linked to FAW. They are
psychological effects that lead to good or bad feelings caused by a transaction (Mann,
2005).
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solutions are necessary. A classical way consists of regulation and laws
(Harvey and Hubbard, 2013), so “[p]ublic legislation is the main traditional
instrument to address farm animal welfare issues” (Grethe, 2017). This is
in line with the fact that consumers shift responsibility for animal welfare
to retailers and the state (Te Velde et al., 2002). Indeed, the German le-
gal framework is criticized by citizens (Schulze et al., 2006; Rovers et al.,
2017) as well as non-governmental organizations (NGO) as for example
Greenpeace (2017). Regulatory and legal questions discussed (beside in-
creased husbandry standards) are the collective right of action for animal
protection groups (see Kloepfer, 2016; Rossi, 2016; Schürmeier, 2017), a
standardized testing and approval procedure for mass-produced livestock
facilities (see Gauly et al., 2006; BMEL, 2017b) or the validation of compe-
tence regarding animal husbandry (WBA, 2015). Moreover, animal protec-
tion groups claim a ban of transport of living animals in non-EU member
states (Bündnis für Tierschutzpolitik, 2017). Accordingly, also for political
solutions, one has to know voters’ preferences. This holds for the policy
contents, but also for the financing of higher animal husbandry standards.
Here it is important to know peoples’ willingness to pay for higher legal
standards in general and not for animal based products.
Regarding politics, political science literature shows evidence for the
validity of the party difference hypothesis at the state level in Germany.
Ewert et al. (2018) show that coalition agreements with green participa-
tion state especially multifunctionality positions in agricultural politics. This
also includes animal welfare and animal protection. Accordingly, if the
green party is part of a government, the government focus on the topic
animal protection (Vogeler, 2017b). Hence, the party serves as driver for
enhanced animal protection. Parties matter also at the national level. Es-
pecially the green party stresses farm animal welfare policies (Vogeler,
2017a). Moreover, the level of social concerns drives parties’ animal wel-
fare agenda. Accordingly, parties in Germany and United Kingdom take
up these concerns in their platforms (Vogeler, 2019). Thus, parties matter
in German FAW policy.
But the question occurs, under which conditions political provision of
farm animal welfare can be efficient. Democratic policy making takes place
in a rather complex and dynamic environment (Henning and Hedtrich,
2018). This also applies for agricultural policy, especially when consid-
ering the question of sustainability and thus, farm animal welfare. Clas-
sical approaches of political economy model governmental policy making
as a political game between parties, interest groups and voters (Brock
and Magee, 1978; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Henning and Hedtrich,
2018).
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Figure 1.2: Framework of political decision making
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Source: Own presentation.
In representative democratic systems, the mechanism of voting (fig-
ure 1.2) is the most crucial since legitimacy of political agents’ actions
depends on voters’ support. Following Downs (1957), the former as well
as the latter are utility maximizing actors. In particular, voters vote for can-
didates whose programs they expect to bring the greatest benefit. Political
agents (candidates and parties), on the other hand, seek for the benefits
from governmental offices. Hence, they offer party platforms which they
consider as the vote maximizing ones (Downs, 1957). This idea has been
extended to the spatial models of voting (with the historical foundations in
the work of Hotelling (1929)), in which parties as well as voters are as-
signed along policy dimensions. Hence, a voter would decide for a party
that is next to his own position, i.e. the party with the smallest distance to
him (Enelow and Hinich, 1984; Adams et al., 2005). In real world, voting
behaviour is barely driven by pure policy oriented motives. Rather, as sug-
gested by the Michigan model (Campbell et al., 1960), voters’ decisions
at the ballot box are the result of a funnel of causality consisting of social,
psychological factors and issues. Accordingly, probabilistic voting models
13
(Adams et al., 2005) combine policy oriented with retrospective as well
as non-policy motivation. Retrospective voting (Fiorina, 1981) is an eval-
uational process which considers the past legislature(s): Voters evaluate
governmental performance using observable indicators of welfare. The
better the evaluation of the performance is, the higher the probability to
cast a vote for incumbents. Non-policy voting refers to several factors that
are linked to parties characteristics beside policy platforms. Accordingly,
loyalty to a party (Bartels, 2000) as well as characteristics of candidates or
party leaders (Schoenfeld, 1982) can drive voting behaviour. All of these
three components of voting behaviour enter a voter’s utility function.
As can be seen in figure 1.2, voting for parties is not the only channel
of political participation. Members of the society form organized interest
groups to influence politics (Olson, 1965; Becker, 1983). Group mem-
bers may share the same profession, age and/or social concerns (Gross-
man and Helpman, 1996). Political agents are interested in the support
of these interest groups. In models of political exchange, interest groups
provide political support resources in order to get control over certain pol-
icy issues (Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Henning, 2000, 2009). This is
reflected through lobbying in figure 1.2. Interest groups’ starting point here
is the non-policy voting component mentioned above. In particular, Gross-
man and Helpman (1996) argue that voters are at least partially swayed by
campaign spendings from interest groups to parties. Interest groups can
use this channel to support political agents. This reflects political campaign
actions’ influence (as for example advertisement or events) that mobilize
voters’ support (Henning and Hedtrich, 2018). A political agent’s political
support function in the equilibrium state of the political game then corre-
sponds the weighted utility functions of voters as well as interest groups
(Henning and Hedtrich, 2018). Accordingly, political failure in providing
sustainability goods is seen as caused by special interest group influence
(Anderson, 1995; Swinnen et al., 2000).
Moreover, empirical work shows that stakeholder organizations’ partic-
ipation plays an important role in African development policy (Stark, 2017;
Henning et al., 2017, 2019). For the European Common Agricultural Pol-
icy (CAP), previous research identified substantial influence patterns of
interest groups (Pappi and Henning, 1999; Krause, 2005; Henning, 2009).
Hence, it is straightforward to assume that stakeholder participation also
influences German livestock policy. Indeed, the national strategy for ani-
mal husbandry of German government includes stakeholder participation
(BMEL, 2017b) and follows scientific recommendation from WBA (2015).
This opens the door for interest groups to influence animal welfare policy.
So far, the role of policy beliefs has not been addressed. As argued by
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Caplan (2001, 2002, 2007), the relation between economic policies and
implied political outcomes, i.e. the “political technology”, is rather com-
plex. Laymen apply naive mental models to cope with this complexity
and to understand how policies translate into policy outcomes. These
heuristics determine the preferred policy position. Due to cognitive bi-
ases (Akerlof, 1989), these policy beliefs can systematically differ from
those of experts (Caplan, 2002). If voters’ weight is large in politicians’
support function and voters strongly vote policy oriented, policy decisions
would follow corresponding positions. Accordingly, strongly biased policy
beliefs of voters could cause basic democratic policy failure (Caplan, 2001,
2007). Hence, beside the classical questions regarding voting behaviour
and corresponding political support for party platforms, modern political
economy approaches have to address voters’ underlying beliefs. Interest
group representatives and politicians also apply policy beliefs. While politi-
cians may not be sure regarding the political technology, interest groups
mostly have the professional and technical expertise of those they repre-
sent. Accordingly, Henning et al. (2019) suggest “informational lobbying”
as an additional influence mechanism. It refers to the communication of
expert knowledge in order to affect political agents’ policy beliefs (see ar-
row communication in figure 1.2). Here the same argument as for voters
holds: If beliefs are biased and weight of interest groups for political agents
is large, political decisions would follow interest groups’ beliefs. Hence,
policies would not promote an optimal state of the world. Therefore, it is
interesting how interest groups are able to influence political agents’ be-
liefs.
Farm animal welfare is an issue that is especially vulnerable for biased
beliefs. While the meaning of the term “animal welfare” changed over the
time, it is a keystone of sustainable agriculture (Keeling, 2005). Thus,
there is a lack of the concept’s clear definition. Instead, all existing ap-
proaches address the three dimensions natural living, emotional state and
physiological functioning (Fraser et al., 1997; Fraser, 2008). These differ-
ent views are reflected by approaches of measuring animal welfare. For
example, the Welfare Quality® Protocol for pigs consists of four welfare
principles. They reflect the physical needs (e.g. hunger, thirst, health),
behavioural patterns (e.g. social behaviour) and emotional state of ani-
mals (Welfare Quality ®, 2009). Overall, the protocol suggests more than
30 assessment indicators. Hence, it illustrates the complexity of animal
welfare. Here the problem of biased policy beliefs can occur. Since there
is no singular definition of animal welfare’s concept, different voter groups
and/or stakeholder organizations might put emphasis on different aspects.
This holds not only for technical or legal aspects (e.g. space per animal,
15
management procedures, collective right for action), but also for financing
higher husbandry standards.
All in all, empirical investigation of animal welfare policy has to deal
with three main questions:
1. How important is farm animal welfare for voters’ decisions at the bal-
lot box and how much are they willing to pay for increased legal ani-
mal welfare standards?
2. How important are the policy beliefs and how can they be assessed?
3. Which role play stakeholder organizations in belief formation at the
political stage?
In order to answer these questions, this work consists of six essays, i.e.
six chapters. While the first part deals with citizens and their voting/paying
behaviour as well as their beliefs, the second part addresses stakeholder
influence on belief updating. The policy space of interest are financing
Table 1.1: Contribution of the Chapters
Part Voter Stakeholder
Chapter 2 3 4 5 6 7
Policy space Financing
√ √ √ √
Husbandry standards
√ √
Test procedure
√ √
Collective action
√
Certificate
√
Third country ban
√
Question Voting behaviour
√ √
WTP
√ √ √
Beliefs
√ √ √
Stakeholder
√ √
Level Theory
√ √
Empirical
√ √ √ √ √ √
Source: Own presentation.
animal welfare, standards of husbandry, a standardized testing and ap-
proval procedure for mass-produced livestock facilities (test and approval
procedure), the right for collective action (collective action), validation of
competence regarding animal husbandry (husbandry certificate) and ban
of living animals transport in countries outside the EU (third country ban).
Thus, the work contributes to empirical as well as theoretical research.
Table 1.1 presents the assignment of each chapter.
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1.2 Summary
1.2.1 Ecological Voting in Germany? Animal Welfare,
Climate and Water Protection as Drivers of Voting
Behaviour
Voters’ decisions in elections are not determined by one single issue.
Rather, several issues can influence voting behaviour according the pri-
orities of society. Hence, measuring animal welfare’s influence on voter
decisions only makes sense if it’s compared to other topics. Therefore,
this chapter quantifies not only the influence of animal welfare on voting
behaviour, but also contrasts it with the ecological topics climate and wa-
ter protection. In particular, the nitrogen surplus pollutes the groundwater.
A high concentration of reactive nitrogen compounds may not only lower
biodiversity, but also harm human health (Sachverständigenrat für Umwelt-
fragen , 2015, p. 33). As the UBA (2018) states, the biggest share of ni-
trogen emissions comes from the agricultural sector. Beyond sectoral and
national borders, climate change is in public’s focus nowadays. Driver of
the climate change are greenhouse gas emissions. Accordingly, the Ger-
man government wants to decrease emissions by 55% until 2030, i.e. 562
million tons of CO2 equivalents (BMU, 2019). Using data from a represen-
tative online survey among German citizens, a probabilistic voter model
is applied (see Thurner, 1998; Thurner and Eymann, 2000; Adams et al.,
2005). At an econometric level, we use a nested multinomial logit model
since the decision not to vote should be treated different to the decision
for a party (see Thurner and Eymann, 2000). Based on the estimation
results we calculate marginal effects, i.e. the amount the probability to
vote for an alternative changes by changing a variable by one unit. Be-
side the mentioned ecological issues, other issues might also drive vot-
ers’ decisions. Hence, we control for several social and economic issues.
Moreover, we also integrate retrospective voting and party loyalty as well
as socio-economic characteristics.
The results show that the climate protection effect is 1.09 times higher
than farm animal welfare while the estimate for N-surplus reduction is not
significant. We show that all ecological issues offset economic growth
(also having a non-significant estimate). Moreover, animal welfare and
climate protection are more important than education. No policy issue is
as strong as the party loyalty. But since this only applies for people who
identify with a party, parties only gain additional votes if they move along
policy dimensions. Especially climate protection and animal welfare are
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sensitive dimensions in this regard.
1.2.2 The Price for Happy Pigs: Private and Collective
Willingness to Pay for Animal Welfare in Germany
&
About Bus Drivers and Happy Pigs: Collective and
Private Willingness to Pay for Animal Welfare
Both papers address the problem of financing increased animal husbandry
standards. A problem of existing studies (see for example Liljenstolpe,
2008, 2011; Lagerkvist and Hess, 2011; Clark et al., 2017) corresponds
to the fact that they base on the assumption that animal welfare is (part or
attribute of) a private good. It is unclear how free riding is treated within
this setting. Thereby, we argue that markets fail to provide the appropriate
level of animal welfare. In particular, we first suggest a theoretical frame-
work of financing animal welfare. Following Uehleke and Hüttel (2016), it
considers the free rider problem and hence takes budget reallocation into
account. Accordingly, the empirical part consists of two discrete choice ex-
periments: First, the private WTP for three husbandry system components
(space per animal, play opportunities and climate regulation for stables) is
asked. Second, respondents have to decide which governmental budgets
(security, education or public transport) should be shortened in order to
finance additional animal welfare.
Results imply that WTP measurements are rather heterogeneous and
vary not only across socio-economic characteristics, but also across spe-
cific attitudes towards animal welfare. They also show clear patterns re-
garding husbandry standards and the source of financing: Most important
is the husbandry aspect of stable’s climate regulation, where the average
WTP is 3.03 Euro per kilogram carcass weight. Second important is space
per animal. Here, the mean WTP equals 2.25 Euro. Compared to these
measurements, playing opportunities (1.50 Euro) are rather unimportant.
Regarding collective WTP, respondents rather prefer to cut off public trans-
port than education or security. Interestingly, we identify a big gap between
estimated private WTP for financing certain husbandry components and
the collective WTP for financing animal welfare. Nevertheless, there is a
positive relationship between private and collective WTP. In this regard,
respondents who want to pay more for single husbandry components also
want to spend more money for overall animal welfare by budget realloca-
tion.
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1.2.3 Possible Democratic Policy Failure in Sustainabil-
ity?
Measuring German Voters’ Policy Beliefs
This paper is the attempt to link the approaches of the previous chap-
ters: It suggests a theoretical framework that combines voting behaviour
with economic analysis of willingness to pay (WTP). From this approach
we derive the measurement of policy belief parameters based on a Cobb-
Douglas production function of public good provision. Empirical founda-
tions are discrete choice experiments and voting behaviour data in issues
of ecology. This approach is motivated by the role of policy beliefs (Akerlof,
1989; Caplan, 2001, 2002, 2007). The relation between policies and the
intended outcomes is a complex one. In order to reduce this complexity,
laymen apply policy beliefs, i.e. naive mental models, to understand how
policies translate into outcomes. These beliefs can be biased due to psy-
chological factors and hence differ from expert judgements (corresponding
true political technologies).
The empirical results show that belief parameters vary. For example,
climate protection cost elasticities on average correspond 1.37, 2.83 or
4.3, depending on chosen cost elasticity for animal welfare. This pattern
in general holds for water protection. At the same time we measure nearly
proportional elasticities for this issue. A second finding is that we mea-
sure heterogeneity by gender: on average, men have higher climate cost
elasticity parameters. Moreover, results show evidence that voters of FDP,
SPD and UNION in general seem to have increased belief parameters.
Third, simulating new policy positions changing parameters gave interest-
ing results. Setting the fixed γ for animal welfare from 0.5 to 0.48, i.e.
increasing cost elasticity from 2 to 2.08, we observe decreased policy po-
sitions of voters regarding governmental spending for animal welfare (from
1.714 billion to 0.692 billion Euro on average). Hence, animal welfare
spending strongly depends on underlying parameters regarding costs and
efficiency. The study also shows that if beliefs change they strongly influ-
ence voters’ stated position regarding a public good. Therefore, one can
conclude that policy positions of voters seem to strongly depend on the
beliefs regarding the costs.
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1.2.4 Belief Formation in German Farm Animal Politics:
An Illustrative Example From A Stakeholder Net-
work Survey
Animal welfare is a complex concept that includes several aspects of health
and physically functioning, natural living as well as affective states (Fraser,
2008). Hence, policy beliefs play a key role in animal welfare policy. They
help political actors to cope with the issue’s complexity. If beliefs are bi-
ased, they may lead to political failure (Caplan, 2001). Existing studies
considering stakeholders (see for example Heise and Theuvsen, 2017;
Verbeke, 2009; Ventura et al., 2015) mostly focus on the comparison of
stakeholder views along the supply chain. Unfortunately, they do not con-
tribute to the belief building process in politics. Hence, how stakeholders
involved in animal welfare policy form these beliefs is unknown. We use
a framework of political participation and corresponding network data to
quantify communication effects within German farm animal politics. Fur-
thermore, we use stakeholders’ evaluation of a standardized testing and
approval procedure for mass-produced livestock facilities to illustrate these
effects.
The results show a dense expert communication network, where more
than 26 percent of possible ties are realised. Moreover, we see that agri-
culture and animal production as well as animal protection groups drive
the belief updating process and that the meat industry is the most open
to external expertise. At the same time, agricultural producers put the
most weight on their own expertise, i.e. having a mean own-control of
0.853. Finally, the structural effects lead to a slight convergence of posi-
tions regarding the standardized testing and approval procedure for mass-
produced livestock facilities. Overall, the stakeholders evaluate this policy
slightly more positive than initially, i.e. moving the median from 3 (which is
the middle point of the scale) to 3.2 (in the direction of “rather useful”).
1.2.5 Communicational Lobbying and
German Animal Welfare Regulation: A Network Ap-
proach
In principle, this study is an extension of chapter 6. Again, the theoretical
framework is the network based theory of informational lobbying (Henning
et al., 2019). At an empirical level, the study addresses three additional is-
sues of animal welfare regulation. As in the area of environmental law, fed-
eral legislators as well as the states have the right to implement a law that
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allows animal protection groups to sue in court against animal welfare vio-
lations (Kloepfer, 2016). Additionally, there is the question of a validation of
competence regarding animal husbandry, as addressed by WBA (2015).
The German farm animal husbandry strategy includes such a validation
(BMEL, 2017b). Another topic is the ban of living animals’ transport in
countries outside the EU as claimed by animal protection groups (Bündnis
für Tierschutzpolitik, 2017). As a methodological extension of the previous
chapter we check results regarding their robustness. Hence, a Bayesian
Exponential Random Graph Model is used to first identify drivers of the
network generating process. Based on the estimation results, we subse-
quently simulate 10,000 network configurations.
Our results imply that in the realised network agricultural producers are
the main drivers of expert knowledge in German livestock politics. Ani-
mal protection organizations seem to be their counterparts when it comes
to knowledge communication: Estimation results mirror these patterns
since they show significant positive impact if a sender of a tie belongs to
Agric_Animal or AniProt. Moreover, coefficients for political agent groups
as knowledge demander are also positive, confirming that legislative ac-
tors as well as executive branch seek for expert information. Regarding
policy beliefs, we show that empirical data in general capture the simulated
values. This is especially true for the certificate of animal husbandry as
well as the standardized testing and approval procedure where the means
are nearly perfectly matched. Only few means of the final beliefs are not
significant at group level, so we consider the interview based results to be
robust. Moreover, results imply that the group of public administration is
easy to move depending on the network configuration. In general, belief
change results showed that groups evaluating a policy with a neutral posi-
tion are groups that can be moved in both directions. Comparing the range
of delta means per group per simulation with the reported own control, the
study shows that range is wider for low own-control groups.
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Abstract
Farm animal welfare, water protection and climate protection are in the
focus of public’s attention. Especially the former two challenge agricul-
ture. But how do these ecological issues affect voter’s decision? Based
on a probabilistic voter model, we try to answer this question. In partic-
ular, we estimate a nested multinomial logit model and derive marginal
effects quantifying the influence on party probabilities. Effects of ecologi-
cal policies are compared to non-ecological issues in economic and social
dimension. In the ecological policy space climate protection overweights
farm animal welfare while the estimate for water protection is not signifi-
cant. Furthermore, party identification exceeds all policy motives of voting.
Keywords: farm animal welfare, climate, water protection, voting be-
haviour, Germany
2.1 Introduction
Questions of sustainability and ecology become more and more important
in the public debate. Especially agriculture is challenged by increasing so-
cial requirements. This is especially true for livestock production, where
animal husbandry is criticized due to a lack of farm animal welfare (FAW)
(WBA, 2015). In particular, husbandry systems are perceived as offer-
ing not enough space per animal (Rovers et al., 2018, 2019) or oppor-
tunities to express natural behaviour. Furthermore, painful management
procedures like piglet castration without anaesthesia are criticized. At the
same time, surveys show that German citizens want more animal welfare
(BMEL, 2017a,b). Economic studies suggest that the willingness to pay
more money for FAW (Clark et al., 2017; Lagerkvist and Hess, 2011) ex-
ists. Nevertheless, the scientific advisory board of the German ministry
of agriculture suggests a policy mix including three to five billion euro to
finance husbandry changes (WBA, 2015). Another sustainability issue
regarding agriculture is the nitrogen surplus, which pollutes the ground-
water. A high concentration of reactive nitrogen compounds may not only
lower biodiversity, but also harm human health (Sachverständigenrat für
Umweltfragen , 2015, p. 33). The biggest share of nitrogen emissions
comes from agricultural production (UBA, 2018): With a N-balance around
100 kilogram (kg) per ha surplus per year, the German government failed
to reach its reduction goal (Taube, 2016). An important ecological topic
beyond sectoral and national borders is climate change. Greenhous gas
emissions drive the climate change, i.e. an increasing earth temperature.
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In order to reduce global warming, the Paris Agreement was adopted in
2015: for Germany the goal is a decrease of emissions by 55% until 2030,
i.e. 562 million tons of CO2 equivalents (BMU, 2019).
Facing these environmental challenges, one might ask how they affect
the voting behaviour of German citizens. Political science literature sug-
gests that for example votes in presidential elections in United States of
America are only slightly influenced by “green issues” (Davis et al., 2008).
For Germany it was noted that environmental issues influence elections
and the political landscape as a whole (Fietkau, 1979). Hence, a new polit-
ical culture including environmental issues has overcome traditional class
voting (Achterberg, 2006). But to our best knowledge, there are no recent
studies investigating and comparing the magnitude of ecological issues’
effects on voting behaviour. Thus, we want to contribute to the literature
by quantifying the effect of these issues on voting behaviour using a prob-
abilistic model of voting behaviour which is briefly described in the next
section, followed by the description of the econometric approach and the
data in section 3. Subsequently, we show the main results. A conclusion
follows in the last section.
2.2 Voting Behaviour
Citizens are assumed to be rational utility maximizers. They vote for the
party from which they expect the highest utility V . Thus, if
Vij > Vij′ (2.1)
voter i would chose party j. Voting behaviour is driven by three moti-
vational components. Accordingly, we divide Vij into three sub-utilities
reflecting these components. First, voters decide policy-oriented. This
refers to the work of Anthony Downs (1957): Citizens evaluate the plat-
forms of competing parties regarding the expected utility, if the program
is transformed into policies. Based on Hotelling (1929), spatial models of
voting behaviour assign voters and parties along n policy dimensions (or
just one). A voter would decide for a party that is next to his own position,
i.e. having the smallest distance (Adams et al., 2005; Enelow and Hinich,
1984). Hence, the policy component corresponds
V POLij = −
∑
n
µn
√
(xin − cijn)2 (2.2)
with xin denoting voter position and cijn denoting party js position in policy
dimension nwhere µn denotes the weight of the policy dimension. Second,
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voters evaluate governmental performance using observable indicators or
state of satisfaction with situation in certain policy domains. This evalua-
tion process and its effect on voting behaviour are labelled as retrospective
voting (Fiorina, 1981)
V RETROij =
∑
k
θkzik (2.3)
with zik as the evaluation of issue k by voter i and θk as the corresponding
weight. Third, non-policy motives also drive voter decisions. In particular,
the identification with a party can influence the decision at the ballot box
(Bartels, 2000) as well as characteristics of candidates or party leaders
(Schofield, 2007). Although sociostructurally class voting (Schoen, 2014)
is seen as weakened through a new political culture (Achterberg, 2006)
social and economic voter characteristics can still influene the choice of a
party. If ris denotes the characteristics s of a voter i and wmj the non-policy
characteristics m of a party j, then
V NONPOLij =
∑
m
ϕmwmj +
∑
s
ϕsris (2.4)
where ϕm is voter’s weight of party characteristic m and ϕs is the weight
of voter’s characteristic s. If considering all kind of voting motives, overall
utility corresponds to
Vij = V
POL
ij + V
RETRO
ij + V
NONPOL
ij (2.5)
which corresponds to “a unified theory of party competition, which inte-
grates the behavioralist’s perspective on voting into the spatial-modeling
framework” (Adams et al., 2005, p.3). In the next section we first outline
how theory is transformed into an econometric model, derive correspond-
ing marginal effects and describe our data.
2.3 Modelling and Data
2.3.1 Econometric Model
We use the random utility framework to model the decision of voters. In
particular, we model the voting decision in a probabilistic fashion. Thus,
we do not predict voter’s choice precisely, but the probability of choosing
a certain party. Assume a voter i who has to choose between a set of J
parties, where J ≥ 2. The utility that i receives from party j consists of two
components (Hensher et al., 2015, p. 45): Vij refers to the deterministic
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part of voter i′s utility, which is based on observable characteristics. In
contrast, εij is the unobserved stochastic error component. Thus,
Uij = Vij + εij. (2.6)
The probability to vote for party j then corresponds to
Pij = Prob(Uij > Uij′) = Prob(Uij − Uij′ > 0). (2.7)
If assuming εij is independently, identically extreme value distributed, the
conditional logit (CL) or multinomial logit model (MNL) can be used (Greene,
2009). The former takes attributes of alternatives into account, while the
latter considers individual’s characteristics. Both kind of models are es-
tablished in studying voting behaviour (see for example Thurner, 1998;
Thurner and Eymann, 2000; Thurner and Linhart, 2004; Dow and Ender-
sby, 2004; Adams, 2006). Consider the voting motives mentioned above.
While the policy and (parts of) the non-policy component consist of varying
attributes of the parties, retrospective voting and non-policy voting include
voters’ characteristics. Thus, a mixture of both approaches is used (see
Greene, 2012, pp. 801-807). Hence,
Pij =
exp(Vij)∑J
j=1 exp(Vij)
(2.8)
where
Vij = αj + βxji + γzi. (2.9)
Note that xji here refers to a vector of party attributes while zi refers to the
vector with individual characteristics. The parameter sets β and γ as well
as the alternative specific constant (ASC) αj are estimated. The distance
between voter and party in a policy dimension xjin is treated as an attribute
(see Thurner, 1998; Thurner and Eymann, 2000):
xijn =
√
(xin − cijn)2. (2.10)
The model described relies on the assumption of independence of irrel-
evant alternatives (IIA), which states that ratio of two alternatives proba-
bilities are independent of the set containing both alternatives. If this as-
sumption holds only for subsets of all alternatives, the nested multinomial
logit model (NMNL) is more appropriate (Greene, 2009; Hensher et al.,
2015). This applies for the consideration of non-voting as an alternative,
since it differs from parties. Particularly, one can think of a nested deci-
sion: A voter not only decides which party to vote, but also whether he
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or she wants to participate at the election at all (Thurner and Eymann,
2000). We follow this approach and implement a nested model structure.
Thus, the probability to vote party j now depends on the corresponding
nest (Greene, 2012):
Pij = Pij|bPb (2.11)
where
Pij|b =
exp(αj + βxji|b + γzi)∑Jb
j=1 exp(αj + βxji|b + γzi)
(2.12)
and
Pb =
exp(λbIVb)∑B
b=1 exp(λbIVb)
. (2.13)
The term IVb refers to the inclusive value for nest b and corresponds
IVb = log(
Jb∑
j=1
exp(Vij|b)). (2.14)
As all other parameters, λb is estimated by the researcher.
We derived the marginal effects which quantify the effect of a change
in an independent variable by one unit on the probability to vote a party.
For variables with a generic coefficient (the attributes), we get:
∂Pj
∂xijn
=
∂Pj|b
∂xijn
Pb +
∂Pb
∂xijn
Pj|b (2.15)
= Pj(1− Pj)βn[
(1− Pj|b)
(1− Pj)
+ λb
Pj|b − Pj
1− Pj
]
2.3.2 Data
Data for the study come from an online survey regarding sustainability. It
was carried out by the company infratest dimap in November 2018 using a
representative sample of 1002 German people in the age of 18 – 93 years.
The following question sets up our dependent variable: Respondents had
to state for which party they would vote, if a national election would take
place on the next Sunday. According to the econometric model we set up
two nests: we assigned the parties to the nest "Participation (yes)" and the
alternative NOTVOTE to the "No participation (no)" nest (table 2.1).
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Table 2.1: Categories of Dependent Variable
Nest Alternative Answer
Participation (yes) AfD Alternative für Deutschland
FDP Freie Demokratische Partei
GREEN Bündnis 90/Die Grünen
LEFT Die Linke
SPD Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschland
UNION Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU)
Christlich-Soziale Union in Bayern e. V. (CSU)
No Participation (no) NOTVOTE Aussage: “Ich würde nicht wählen.”
Source: Own presentation.
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Subsequently, participants of the study were asked to state their posi-
tions in different policy issues as well as how they perceive the positions of
every party being part of the national parliament "Deutscher Bundestag".
From the stated own position and the party positions we calculated dis-
tances according equation 10. Moreover, we set up the negative of a
respondents’ minimal distance to the parties as the distance for the alter-
native NOTVOTE. This is due to the expected negative signs of estimated
parameters for distances and the assumption that people would rather not
vote if the distance to the party system (i.e. the minimal distance used)
increases. There are only perceived positions for the six parliamentary
groups in the federal parliament and the non-voting alternative available.
Thus, we removed 193 cases which stated that they would vote for other
parties or did not know which party they would vote for. The sample used
then consists of 809 cases. Table 2.2 presents all distance variables,
which we assigned to the three dimensions of sustainability. Please note
that the suffix ".percentage" labels the variables we converted into a per-
centage scale as described below since our variables have different scales
and different units.
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Table 2.2: Overview Policy Issues
Dimension Issue Variable
Ecology Farm Animal Welfare ANIMALWELFARE.percentage
CO2 Emissions CLIMATE.percentage
Water protection (reduce nitrogen surplus) WATER
Social Educational spending EDUCATION.percentage
Security SECURITY.percentage
Social policy SOCIALSECURITY.percentage
Development aid GROWTH.percentage
Economy Economic growth GLOBALJUSTICE.percentage
Source: Own presentation.
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Within the ecological policy space, ANIMALWELFARE.percentage deals
with the questions how much money the government should spend in or-
der to promote farm animal welfare. The original variable’s absolute values
range from zero (current) to 4.5 billion euro governmental spending for ani-
mal welfare improvements. This is in line with suggestions of WBA (2015):
the report states, that up to 3-5 billion euro per year are needed to change
livestock conditions. For the distances, we transformed animal welfare
positions into percentage of maximum value (4.5 billion euro). Moreover,
CLIMATE.percentage addresses reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.
The final unit of measurement is the reduction in percentage, with values
between 0 and 63.3 compared to the status quo. The reference here are
the 909 million tons CO2 equivalent in 2016 (BMU, 2019). Our third issue
of interest is reduction of nitrogen surplus in order to protect water which
is measured in kg of nitrogen (N) per hectare (ha). The corresponding
Variable WATER contains the distance in kg N per ha. Since the variable
describes the reduction and thus, has an equal numeric scale as percent-
age measured variables, we did not convert it. We also control for the
influence of the social and economic dimension. The corresponding is-
sues are listed in table 2.2 . With governmental spending for education,
security, social policy and development aid (social dimension) as well as
economic growth (economic dimension) we selected governmental key is-
sues. Note that we also converted the original variables into percentage
where we set the current spending as reference point.
Beyond policy voting, we also integrate a variable that measures the
identification with a party. The corresponding variable PI is a dummy
coded attribute of the parties with value 1 if a voter identifies with party
and 0 otherwise. We control for gender effects (dummy variable man) and
the age in years (variable age). These three variables and the alternative
specific constants ASC form the non-policy component.
The projects database provides a set of ten retrospective variables.
Each issue was evaluated from a current perspective as well as in com-
parison to situation five years ago (prefix "retro"), with a range from 1 ("very
good" or "much better") to 5 ("very bad" or "much worse"). The variables
• economic_situation,
• retro_economic_situation,
• evaluate_growth and
• retro_growth
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deal with the own economic situation as well as the state of economic
growth in Germany. Furthermore, evaluate_globaljustice and retro_global-
justice are judgements towards global justice while evaluate_socialpeace
and retro_socialpeace address the state of the social peace in Germany.
Finally, evaluate_ecology and retro_ecology are evaluations of the state
of ecology.
In order to reduce the dimensions, we conducted a principal compo-
nent analysis (PCA). We decided for a two component solution as parallel
analysis suggested. Figure 2.1 shows that all economic variables load on
one component. We label the corresponding variable Econ.
Figure 2.1: PCA Loadings
Components Analysis
evaluate_globaljustice
retro_globaljustice
retro_socialpeace
evaluate_socialpeace
evaluate_ecology
retro_ecology
evaluate_growth
retro_economic_situation
economic_situation
retro_growth
SocEcol
0.7368
0.7214
0.6742
0.6644
0.6198
0.5097
Econ
0.7295
0.7071
0.7048
0.6639
Source: Own presentation.
Furthermore, social related and environmental judgements load on the
same component, resulting in the variable SocEcol (social ecological con-
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cerns). Interestingly, we only have issue components, but no time compo-
nents. Hence, Econ and SocEcol set up our retrospective component. We
performed PCA, estimation and post-estimation analysis using the statisti-
cal environment R (3.6.1). In the following section we present our results.
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Estimation
We estimated the specified model for 809 cases (see table 2.3). The model
was selected based on Akaike information criterion (AIC). Compared with
other specifications, this model has the lowest AIC.
Table 2.3: Model fit
N Log-Likelihood AIC McFadden R2
809 -748.26 1578.52 0.481
Source: Own presentation.
Table 2.4 presents the generic and the party specific coefficients as
well as the lambda parameters for the nests. Note that we set the alterna-
tive UNION as the reference alternative. Hence, the party specific coeffi-
cients have to be interpreted in relation to this party. The estimated param-
eters of the attributes behave as expected. As one can easily see in table
2.4, all distances in the policy space have a negative sign. The effect of an-
imal welfare is highly significant. Moreover, the effect of climate protection
is significant on a five percent level. On the other hand, water protection
has no significant effect. The control variable GROWTH.percentage also
delivers a non-significant estimate. As expected, the identification with a
party increases the choice probability. Economic concerns increase the
probability to vote for AfD significantly, compared to the choice probability
of the alternative UNION (table 2.4). As table 2.4 show, this also applies
for LEFT and NOTVOTE. In contrast, only the positive effect of negative
evaluation of social ecological situation for the probability to vote the left
party is significant. Regarding the other predictors, one can see a negative
effect of age on the probability to vote for the green party and for the non-
voting option when compared to UNION. This implies that it is more likely,
that younger people vote green or do not participate in election. Moreover,
being a man has a positive effect on all parties compared to UNION, where
only the parameter for FDP is not significant.
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Table 2.4: Estimation Results
Nested Multinomial Logit Model
Generic coefficients
PI 2.9725466***
(-0.1587886)
ANIMALWELFARE.percentage -0.0092424***
(-0.0034481)
CLIMATE.percentage -0.0100824**
(-0.0051017)
WATER -0.0033195
(-0.0028367)
EDUCATION.percentage -0.0083410***
(-0.0021612)
SECURITY.percentage -0.0103498***
(-0.0021584)
SOCIALSECURITY.percentage -0.0790581***
(-0.0193037)
GROWTH.percentage -0.0029507
(-0.0026101)
GLOBALJUSTICE.percentage -0.0071517***
(-0.0021945)
Party specific coefficients
ASC age man Econ SocEcol
AfD 0.1750522 -0.0043618 1.0048967*** 0.6236013*** 0.2468747
-0.6559577 -0.0111198 -0.3624503 -0.2164142 -0.1772427
FDP -0.1113056 -0.0082456 0.4423195 0.1245194 0.3105806
-0.6892734 -0.0127964 -0.4109347 -0.2431356 -0.2320232
GREEN 1.1363529** -0.0183168* 0.8621904*** 0.0953518 0.2918229
-0.5637948 -0.0099508 -0.3199301 -0.2043939 -0.1924583
LEFT -1.2207657 -0.0028549 1.5635602** 0.8725184** 0.8854244**
-1.0318779 -0.0164534 -0.6421833 -0.3592242 -0.3455413
NOTVOTE -3.2081950*** -0.0333411** 1.5159473*** 0.4541247* 0.102973
-0.7671033 -0.0146551 -0.5008617 -0.2373717 -0.2134351
SPD -0.9486043 0.0005422 0.6668723* 0.2744299 -0.1909698
-0.6346426 -0.0111437 -0.3630819 -0.2162499 -0.2083315
Lambda
iv:no 0.8569388***
(0.1198975)
iv:yes 1.4360750***
(0.2558212)
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1
Source: Own presentation.
2.4.2 Marginal Effects
We calculated the marginal effects for all policy issues according equations
2.15. The median values for the marginal effects of animal welfare and
climate protection are presented in table 2.5.
As one can easily see, a distance change by one percentage point
regarding animal welfare affects probability to vote for the green party by
0.0007, and UNION by 0.0006 (table 2.5). Thus, probabilities for these
two parties react most sensitive. The overall average marginal effect of
animal welfare equals a probability change of 0.00031. Regarding climate
protection, we see a median effect of 0.0008 for the GREEN probability if
distance is changing by one percentage point (table 2.5). For the UNION
alternative, the corresponding effect is 0.0007, for non-voting 0.000034
(table 2.5). Overall, the median effect of climate protection is 1.09 times
higher than animal welfare.
With figure 2.2 we compare the marginal effects of animal welfare
(green bar), climate (orange) and water protection (blue). In particular, the
43
Table 2.5: Median values for marginal effects of animal welfare and climate
protection
Animal welfare Climate protection
Overall 0.000305 0.000332
Alternative
AfD 0.000333 0.000363
FDP 0.000261 0.000284
GREEN 0.000728 0.000794
LEFT 0.000215 0.000234
NOTVOTE 0.000032 0.000034
SPD 0.000388 0.000423
UNION 0.000601 0.000656
Source: Own presentation.
bars represent the ratio of the medians of ecological issues and the con-
trol issues which are placed at the y-axis. The average marginal effect of
a distance change regarding animal welfare is 3.13 times higher than eco-
nomic growth and 1.29 times higher than global justice. Moreover, it is also
1.11 times higher than education. The average effect of climate protection
Figure 2.2: Ratio of ecological and control issues
Source: Own presentation.
is 3.42 times higher than economic growth, 1.41 times higher than global
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justice and 1.21 times higher than education spending’s effect. Thus, cli-
mate protection has a stronger influence on voting behaviour than animal
welfare. We summed up the marginal effects of the ecological issues as
well as the full policy space (including all policy distances) and compared
them with the marginal effect of PI. The latter is 131.27 times higher than
the ecological issues (figure 2.3). Moreover, it outweighs the effect of the
full policy space by a factor of 22.78. Thus, neither the ecological nor all
policy issues together are more important than party identity.
Figure 2.3: Ratio of PI and summed up marginal effects in policy space
Source: Own presentation.
2.5 Conclusion
Ecological issues gained importance in public debates the last decades.
Using a probabilistic model of voting behaviour, we quantified the effects
of farm animal welfare, climate and water protection on voting behaviour.
Our results suggest that climate protection overweights farm animal wel-
fare by factor 1.09 and the effect of water protection is not significant.
Furthermore, we could show that economic growth (non-significant esti-
mate) is offset by all environmental issues. Nevertheless, party identifi-
cation is more important than policy oriented voting. Of course, this only
applies for people who identify with a party. Thus, parties have to move
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along policy dimensions in order to gain additional votes. The effect of
climate protection might be explained by the cross-sectoral nature of the
issue: while financing animal welfare and N-surplus are agricultural spe-
cific questions, greenhouse gas emissions address also other economic
sectors. Hence, it is no surprise that the issue affects voters’ behaviour
more than farm animal welfare or reduction of N-surplus. One limitation of
our study might be the econometric model used. The MNL-family assumes
homogeneous preferences for attributes and predictors. To deal with het-
erogeneous weighting of the single policy issues, latent class models of
choice have already been applied to voters’ choice (Petri, 2015; Henning
et al., 2018). But one crucial part here is the modelling of nested decision
structures. Here we see room for future work.
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Abstract
In both, politics and society there is still the open question about farm
animal welfare. Since markets fail to provide the appropriate level of an-
imal welfare, political solutions are needed. An important role is played
by financing, which depends on citizens’ willingness to pay. In this con-
text, this paper contributes to the literature. First, we suggest a theoretical
framework for the political provision of animal welfare. Second, based on
a latent class approach, we estimate private WTP for legal fattening pig
husbandry standards as well as collective WTP for animal welfare itself.
Estimation results imply that WTPs are rather heterogeneous and vary
not only across socioeconomic characteristics but also across specific at-
titudes towards animal welfare. They also show clear patterns regarding
husbandry standards and the source of financing. Additionally, we identify
a big gap between estimated private and collective WTP.
Keywords: Animal welfare, public goods, willingness to pay for hus-
bandry systems, social acceptance of husbandry systems, financing ani-
mal welfare, budget reallocation
3.1 Introduction
Nowadays, animal welfare is high on both the political and academic agenda
in Germany as well as many other highly industrialized countries around
the world. For example in Germany, farm animal husbandry is challenged
by a decreasing social acceptance (WBA, 2015). Media coverage about
bad practice cases in the agricultural sector and the observed alienation
of society and agriculture imply that the demand for animal welfare is con-
stantly rising over the last decade (Balmann, 2016; Kayser et al., 2011;
Spiller et al., 2016). Presumably, the criticism of the status-quo is based
on a change of values in developed countries and ethical concerns about
conventional farming (Dirscherl, 2013). The latest nutrition reports of the
German government not only express a higher demand for animal welfare
among the population but also propose the concept of a state-run animal
welfare label (BMEL, 2017a, 2018). Especially pig husbandry and the cor-
responding legal framework are criticized by citizens (Rovers et al., 2017;
Schulze et al., 2006; Weible et al., 2016; Wildkraut et al., 2015). Social
movements and non-governmental organizations like Greenpeace (2017)
claim that the German pig husbandry is illegal and unconstitutional. There-
fore, it is not a surprise that the German government has formulated a
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comprehensive strategy for animal husbandry including an animal welfare
label (BMEL, 2017b).
However, despite an intensive political debate and political activism,
very little has been effectively changed, yet. Thus, the question arises why
is it so difficult to adapt animal production to changed consumer prefer-
ences for a higher animal welfare? A first obvious answer to this ques-
tion corresponds to the fact that consumers’ demand for animal welfare is
plagued by various collective action dilemmas, i.e. asymmetric information
and free riding (see Lusk and Norwood, 2011). The former results since
animal welfare corresponds to a product attribute that cannot be directly
observed or experienced by consumers as it is a property of the produc-
tion process and not the final product itself. Thus, the famous “market
for lemons” phenomenon applies, i.e. since animal welfare is costly for
producers, rational consumers form beliefs expecting a minimum level of
animal welfare supplied at the market. Consequently, consumers reveal
minimal willingness to pay for animal welfare at the market and produc-
ers deliver accordingly. A prominent institutional arrangement that helps
to avoid market failure due to asymmetric information corresponds to pub-
lic or private labels. For example, the German Animal Welfare Federation
introduced its animal welfare label back in 2013 and the food retail indus-
try and agriculture sector launched the so-called Animal Welfare Initiative1
back in 2015 (Initative Tierwohl, 2017). Beyond asymmetric information
the demand for animal welfare is also plagued by free riding, due to exter-
nal effects in consumption. Consumers have incentives to free ride, which
is to buy animal products of the same quality that have not been produced
under high animal welfare standards at a lower price. This incentive results
since individual consumption of high animal welfare products has only a
marginal effect on the overall level of animal welfare.
All in all, it is easy to conclude that the markets fundamentally fail to ef-
fectively provide a higher level of animal welfare even if this is collectively
desired by consumers. Therefore, analogously to any other public good,
an efficient provision of animal welfare can only be achieved via appropri-
ate political processes. Such a process includes the implementation of a
political mechanism that guarantees both: an efficient production of any
desired level of animal welfare as well as the derivation of citizens’ true
demand for animal welfare. While the former can relatively easy be imple-
1Within the program a set of specific animal husbandry standards has been defined to
guarantee a higher level of animal welfare. Farms enrolled in the program have to acquire
these husbandry standards and in exchange are compensated. Compensation paid to
farmers is basically paid by the agribusiness industry (Initative Tierwohl, 2017).
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mented, e.g. via contracting2, the latter is challenging since the invisible
hand of the market cannot be used to consistently reveal and aggregate
individual consumer demand. Thus, politicians need to know the exact
level of animal welfare consumers collectively want to be realized. This is
not a trivial endeavor, since consumers have heterogeneous preferences
and often are not capable to state their individual preferences accurately.
Moreover, animal welfare is a multi-criteria concept (Fraser, 2008; Welfare
Quality ®, 2009) which is technically determined by a set of husbandry
components including space (see for example O’Connell, 2009), climate
and possibilities to express natural behaviour (see Veit et al., 2016, for
the relation of raw material and tail-biting). Hence, the effective provision
of farm animal welfare depends not only on citizens’ evaluation of animal
welfare itself, but also on the priorities regarding farm animal welfare di-
mensions. In this context, economic studies that measure preferences for
public goods and animal welfare empirically are of particular interest. Un-
fortunately, due to a lack of sufficient data, empirical approaches based
on revealed consumer preferences are rather rare. Thus, a prominent
approach corresponds to the estimation of stated preferences using dis-
crete choice models (Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985; Hensher and Greene,
2003).
These approaches have already been widely applied to estimate con-
sumer preferences for animal welfare (see nice overview given by Lagerkvist
and Hess, 2011; Clark et al., 2017). The standard approach corresponds
to the estimation of the parameters of a probabilistic utility function apply-
ing different variants of a logit approach. Generally, consumer preferences
are estimated in terms of willingness to pay (WTP) or willingness to ac-
cept (WTA) for specific commodity attributes derived as the marginal rate
of substitution (MRS) from the estimated probabilistic utility function. A
comprehensive overview on empirical studies estimating WTP for animal
welfare is given by Lagerkvist and Hess (2011) as well as Clark et al.
(2017), who conducted meta-studies on the WTP for animal welfare. Fur-
ther, Tonsor et al. (2009) analyze Michigan consumers’ preferences for
(not) banning gestation crates as an attribute of a hypothetical purchasing
situation for pork, while Grunert et al. (2018) estimate weights and WTP
for production characteristics like animal welfare for German and Polish
consumers. Very interesting studies have been undertaken by Liljenstolpe
(2008, 2011). In particular, (Liljenstolpe, 2008, ibid.) examines the WTP
2This is done for objectives regarding biodiversity within the scope of contractual
nature conservation management (see Ministerium für Energiewende, Landwirtschaft,
Umwelt, Natur und Digitalisierung des Landes Schleswig-Holstein (MELUND), 2016)
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for improved husbandry components for pork in Sweden, e.g. enlarged
space per animal, avoidance of castration, mobile slaughter and specific
improved feeding regulations. At a methodological level these studies ex-
plicitly take heterogeneity of consumer preferences into account applying
MNL-, RPL- and LC-models, respectively. However, Liljenstolpe (2008)
concluded that her studies only apply to Sweden and have only very lim-
ited implications for other European countries, as consumer preferences
are heterogeneous especially across different countries. Moreover, a gen-
eral problem of existing studies including the one of Liljenstolpe (2008)
corresponds to the fact that undertaken social choice experiments assume
that animal welfare is a private good, e.g. they assume that individual
consumers can choose between different commodities with different at-
tributes corresponding to specific components determining animal welfare
(e.g. enlarged space, no castration or mobile slaughter). The problem is
that it is unclear how free riding is treated within this setting: Do respon-
dents take into account that beyond their own individual realized choices
animal welfare levels are determined by choices of other consumers? Or
do they answer assuming that their individual consumer choices determine
the level of animal welfare?
A political provision of farm animal welfare implies regulation of hus-
bandry standards as well as the compensation of additional costs by the
state3. Hence, since individual choice express respondents’ preferences
as citizen for a specific policy regulation of animal welfare free riding can-
not occur under this scenario. A more appropriate design would provide
choice options differing in levels of legal standards for animal husbandry.
Additionally, alternative schemes of public spending should be offered. Ac-
cordingly, WTPs derived within this approach can be interpreted as collec-
tive WTPs (see Uehleke and Hüttel, 2016). Estimating collective WTP
implies a further problem: In particular, the government provides many dif-
ferent public goods and services. Governmental budgets are allocated to
different areas like security, education or climate protection. Money used
for farm animal welfare is not available for these other services. Given this
fact, one has to decide about the relative value of a public good, since the
acceptance of animal welfare policies depends also on the relative value
of animal welfare. Thus, citizen choices correspond to a nested choice
among private and public consumption: At a first stage, citizen have to
choose the share of their income they want to allocate to the provision of
public goods versus the share of income they like to spend on private con-
3In fact, payments from public budgets seem conceivable for the government as part
of livestock strategy (BMEL, 2017b).
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sumption. At a second stage, citizen have to allocate total public expen-
diture among specific public goods and total private expenditure among
different private consumer goods. In this setting the estimation of WTP for
a specific public good, i.e. animal welfare, which equals to the marginal
rate of substitution between this good and the aggregate bundle of private
consumer goods, is a not appropriate measure for relevant consumer pref-
erences for animal welfare. Furthermore, the measurement of collective
WTPs for animal welfare vary significantly depending on how animal wel-
fare is financed, i.e. by additional taxes or via reallocation of governmental
expenditures across different public goods.
Thus, overall it is fair to conclude, although many interesting studies ex-
ist, which estimate empirically WTP for animal welfare and specific compo-
nents of animal husbandry, the understanding of relevant consumer pref-
erences determining political regulations is still vague. In this context this
paper aims to contribute to the literature. In particular, we estimate the
private WTP for different husbandry standards as well as collective WTP
for overall animal welfare applying two discrete choice experiments. While
the former is the classical trade-off between animal welfare components
and private consumption, the latter is the trade-off between animal welfare
and three public services: education, public transport and security. The
latter implies interesting differences between estimated collective WTPs
depending on the source of finance.
3.2 Theoretical Background
3.2.1 Modelling the public provision of animal welfare
To model consumer preferences regarding the provision of animal welfare
consider the following utility function
U(z,M) = zαM1−α (3.1)
z =
∏
i
Zαii
For simplicity we assume that public goods can be provided implying the
same log-linear cost function, Ci(Zi), thus from the viewpoint of an individ-
ual consumer with a total income of Y optimal consumption of public (z)
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and private goods M follows from
z∗,M∗ = argmaxU(z,M) = zαM (1−α) (3.2)
s.t.∑
i
Ci(Zi)Zi +M = Y
Ci(Zi) = C
γ
i
Resulting in
Zi = [
ki
1 + kiαi
∑
j
1
αj
]
1
γ (3.3)
M = (1−K)Y
M is the total expenditure for private consumption. Assuming for simplicity
that αi = αj,∀i, j, results in symmetric demand for public goods:
Zi = [
k
n(1 + k)
]
1
γ (3.4)
M = (1− k
1 + k
)Y
k =
α
(1−α)γ
(1 + α
(1−α)γ )
(3.5)
Note that the optimal provision of a specific public good just follows results,
where the WTP for this good equals the marginal costs
WTPi =
ααi
(1− α)
M
zi
= γZ
(γ−1)
i = C
′
i(Zi) (3.6)
Please note that the WTPi is derived for the private consumption resulting
in the utility optimum, i.e. given the optimal consumption of all n public
goods. Therefore, designing a choice experiment, where only the de-
mand for one specific public good is varied results in a WTP estimation
for this good that is not appropriate for the true optimal consumer choices
as it neglects consumer preferences for other relevant public goods. Espe-
cially comparing estimated WTPs with marginal cost of providing the public
good to derive optimal provision of this specific public good is misleading
as WTPs for other public goods might be much higher implying that con-
sumers would prefer to allocate expenditure towards the consumption of
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these other public goods. To see this formally consider the utility maxi-
mization assuming that consumers can only choose between private con-
sumption and one specific public good, say i=1, then it follows:
Z1 = [
k
n(1 + k)
]
1
γ (3.7)
M = (1− k
1 + k
)Y
k =
α
(1−α)γ
(1 + α
(1−α)γ )
Note that the derived demand for the public good 1 is n times higher when
compared to corresponding optimal demand considering simultaneously
all relevant public goods. Accordingly, the estimation of WTPs based on
choice experiment data focusing on only one specific public good implies
a bias when compared to the optimal provision for this good. Undertak-
ing an additional choice experiment that allows the estimation of relative
WTPs between different public goods reveals the direction and magnitude
of this bias. In other words, even if the locally estimated WTP for ani-
mal welfare would be much higher than the marginal cost to provide an
additional amount of this good, this does not necessarily imply that an
additional supply of animal welfare is optimal in maximizing consumer’s
welfare. Therefore, to test for this bias empirically we undertake additional
choice experiments to estimate the relative WTP for animal welfare when
compared to other public goods (see section 3 below).
3.2.2 Assessing WTP for Animal Welfare empirically
To asses WTP for animal welfare or specific components of animal hus-
bandry that determine animal welfare empirically, we follow the standard
approach of stated preferences. Let X denote a certain farm animal policy,
e.g. legal husbandry standards or financing schemes, and U individual n’s
utility derived from this policy, i.e. Un(X). Given a set of alternative poli-
cies J, rational decision maker will always choose the alternative with the
highest utility corresponding to their preferences. If
U(Xi) > U(Xj)∀j ∈ j = 1... J, (3.8)
a decision maker would choose alternative i, therefore the probability of
choosing i is
Pi = Prob(U(Xi) > U(Xj)). (3.9)
57
Following random utility theory, the utility function of a certain good i can
be divided into two components: the observable deterministic component
V (Xi) and the error term ε (Hensher et al., 2005). So, U(Xi) is written as
U(Xi) = V (Xi) + ε. (3.10)
As mentioned above, farm animal welfare is affected by the physical and
psychological dimension as well as the natural behaviour of an animal.
Physical and mental states together with the opportunity to express natural
behaviour are determined by the husbandry system. Thus, one has to
choose a policy which defines standards for husbandry systems that lead
to an increase of farm animal welfare. Like other goods, a husbandry
system is described by its components, e.g. stocking density or structure
of pig boxes. According to the characteristics of value theory (Lancaster,
1966), a person’s utility from a husbandry system is driven by the value of
its characteristics. Which animal welfare policy people choose is therefore
determined by the quality and quantity of components. Thus, V (Xi) is an
additive function of the K attributes of the animal welfare policy X. Thus,
V (Xi) = αi +
K∑
k=1
βkXk, (3.11)
with βk denoting the weight of the attribute k and αi denoting the constant.
Below, we will use the term private WTP to refer to the willingness
to pay in a more or less classical choice scenario (additional cost per kg
carcass weight), but specifically for legal standards of animal husbandry
systems4. In contrast, the term collective WTP denotes the willingness
pay for animal welfare improvements in exchange for other public goods.
This terminology is inspired by Uehleke and Hüttel (2016) who compare
individual purchase situations with a collective referendum. To avoid mis-
conceptions, we emphasize that the collective WTP is not an aggregated
WTP of all respondents. Rather, the collective WTP indicates the indi-
vidual MRS between animal welfare and another public good of individual
consumers, i.e. the number of units of a public good a person would give
up in exchange for one additional unit of animal welfare. Technically, the
4Trying to identify the key problems associated with livestock systems, the public does
focus rather on resource-based conditions of husbandry systems than on management
procedures – apart from the use of antibiotics – and therefore demands barn specific
adaptation to improve the well-being of farm animals (Zander et al., 2013). Since scien-
tists and political advisors recommend the inclusion of the citizens’ view on animal welfare
(WBA, 2015), this paper focuses on resource-based husbandry preferences, even though
we acknowledge the importance of management aspects for animal welfare.
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latter is mimicked in the choice set-up via a hypothetical reallocation of
public expenditures among the two public goods (see section 3 below).
In general, as well as for animal welfare, WTP analyses are confronted
with much criticism concerning their explanatory power in regard to real
preferences. That is the case because the willingness to pay for animal
welfare stated in a survey or an interview situation doesn’t match the over-
all observed consumer behaviour in the market. There are several ex-
planations for this empirical discrepancy that is commonly called "citizen-
consumer gap" (a comprehensive literature review on this phenomenon is
provided by Grethe, 2017). On the one hand, social desirability or the so-
called hypothetical bias could displace financial calculations and may lead
to an overly inflated WTP. On the other hand, the phenomenon occurs be-
cause primarily purchasing decisions are biased, whenever citizens sup-
press unpleasant facts about slaughtering with the effect of consuming be-
haviour deviating from intrinsic beliefs (Grethe, 2017; Loomis, 2014; Lusk
and Norwood, 2011). However, the objective of choice experiments is to
extract real WTPs. This is especially relevant for public goods, because
their provision is a question of appropriate political regulation, since they
suffer from market failure. Of course, choice experiments are always hypo-
thetical and one can doubt the methodological suitability for realistic WTP
studies. But a choice design, that reminds probands of relevant decision
criteria, they base their decision on, may be the right way for extracting
honest WTPs. Corresponding, in case of animal welfare, it is important
that choice sets present costs of animal welfare improvements in a way
that reminds probands of their public good nature.
A further problem of estimating WTPs empirically corresponds to pref-
erence heterogeneity. For example, existing studies show that women
have a higher WTP for animal welfare than men (see Clark et al., 2017;
Heise and Theuvsen, 2017). A possible reason might be that women are
more sympathetic towards animal welfare than men (Herzog, 2007). Com-
pared to latter, women rather express agreement to statements denying
morally justification of using animals for food. Also, they agree that the
suffering of animal in food production should be minimized (Beardsworth
et al., 2002). Therefore, we assume that sex has an influence on the het-
erogeneity of preferences about animal welfare standards and financing
and thus, on private and collective WTP. Additionally, although not well
tested, we assume certain attitudes and values to be drivers for hetero-
geneous preferences. The extent of WTP for animal welfare husbandry
systems presumably depends on the personal importance of the issue as
well as the perceived need for improvements in husbandry. The worse
people evaluate the current level of farm animals, the higher the willing-
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ness to pay for improvements should be. As we know from literature, WTP
is affected negatively if the animal welfare standards are implemented by
law (Lagerkvist and Hess, 2011). In this regard, political ideology seems
to have an influence, i.e. consumers’ general attitude towards state in-
terventions in a market economy measured on a left-right scale. In our
empirical analyses we take potential heterogeneity into account applying
a latent class approach.
3.3 Econometric Model and Data
3.3.1 Econometric Model
In our empirical analysis we apply the conditional logit model as the stan-
dard model for discrete choice analysis based on generic attributes (Greene,
2012; Train, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002). The probability to choose alterna-
tive i is
P (ynt = i) =
exp(Vit)∑J
j=1(Vjt)
. (3.12)
In the case of discrete choice experiments, one has to consider α as the
alternative-specific constant (ASC) in V (see equation 3.11). Using la-
belled experiments, where people have to select one alternative from a
set of husbandry systems which are also described by their name like
"free range husbandry" and "stabling", the ASC represents characteristics
which are not included in the model but nevertheless can possibly influ-
ence the decision. Here, husbandry systems could be described in terms
of space and feeding, but people may also see benefits from the fact that
there is more fresh air for pigs in free range systems. Therefore, they
will choose this kind of farm animal husbandry. In the case of unlabelled
experiments, in which the alternatives are labelled as A, B or C, individ-
uals do not obtain a specific benefit from the names of the alternatives.
In this sense, the constant can be omitted (Hensher et al., 2005). The
disadvantage of the standard conditional logit model is the assumption of
homogeneous preferences for all individuals, while mixed logit and latent
class models are able to capture heterogeneous preferences. When using
the mixed logit model, the researcher has to define the form of preference
distribution, whereas with the latent class approach only the number of
groups must be decided. (Greene and Hensher, 2003). The coefficient of
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the attributes varies for each Q classes, so we can rewrite5 (3.11) as
Vi|q =
K∑
k=1
βk|qxk (3.13)
and define the choice probability for i depending on class q as
P (yn|q = i) =
exp(Vi|q)∑J
j=1(Vj|q)
. (3.14)
Thus, the choice probability depends on the class membership, which can
be determined by observable covariates like age, sex, economic status or
attitudes and values (Swait, 1994; Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002; Greene
and Hensher, 2003). The probability to belong to class q then is
Pnq =
exp(λq +
∑Z
z=1 γqzzn)∑Q
q=1 exp(λq +
∑Z
z=1 γqzzn)
, (3.15)
with Z characteristics of individual n. The class constant λq and the char-
acteristics’ coefficients are estimated by the researcher. Finally,
P (yn = 1) =
Q∑
q=1
PnqP (yn|q = i). (3.16)
For conditional logit models the average WTP for attribute k is
WTPk = −
βk
βc
, (3.17)
with βc as the parameter of a cost attribute. The use of a latent class model
allows the calculation of an individual willingness to pay. We weight the
ratio of class coefficients for attribute and costs (which equals the average
WTP within the class) by Pnq to calculate individual WTP:
WTPnk =
Q∑
q=1
Pnq(−
βk|q
βc|q
). (3.18)
5Please note that there is no need for a constant in our model because of the use of
unlabelled experiments.
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3.3.2 Data and Design of Discrete Choice Experiments
To apply our models, we used data from an online survey of the AniFair
project. AniFair is a research project funded by the German Federal Office
for Agriculture and Food (BLE) and executed by Kiel University that eval-
uates the relative relevance of various animal welfare indicator variables
with the objective to develop a comprehensive animal welfare assessment
tool. Among other methods, the project applies elite surveys and online-
choice experiments to analyze preferences of different stakeholders and
voters. These surveys concern husbandry techniques that need to be ag-
gregated in order to achieve a common measurement of animal welfare.
In the first part of the online questionnaire respondents have to answer
questions about farm animal welfare in general and the measurement of
pigs’ animal welfare. These questions are followed by the first choice ex-
periment regarding preferred husbandry system components. The second
part contains questions about politics in general followed by the third part
which evaluates the attitude towards financing animal welfare and intro-
duces the second experiment about budget reallocation. Policy issues
regarding sustainability and agriculture constitute part four, which is fol-
lowed by the last part with general socioeconomic questions. The data
were collected in March 2017, and the final dataset contains answers from
employees and students of the University of Kiel.
To measure private and collective WTPs for husbandry system compo-
nents we implemented two discrete choice experiments. In the first experi-
ment, five choice sets with each three alternative husbandry systems were
presented to respondents, described by the following attributes: space
per animal, climate system, manipulable material to explore/dig into, and
additional costs. We chose space as attribute because sufficient space
fits physical needs of an animal and provides a certain quality of live in
terms of expressing natural behaviour or maintaining discrete pen areas
(O’Connell, 2009). Offering straw to dig into is an important factor to ex-
press natural behaviour and to experience positive emotions (Tuyttens,
2005). Because pigs are not able to regulate their body temperature,
they need a climate regulation system within the stable. Therefore, we
include climate regulation as a factor directly related to physical needs. All
of these attributes are regulated by the German Animal Protection Live-
stock Decree, so developing levels was straightforward. To make sure that
the attributes and levels make sense we consulted a veterinarian working
on the project during the development process. The third alternative in the
choice sets contained the current legal status in Germany as an opt-out
62
option. The variable costs equals the weighted6 sum of additional costs
of the attribute levels (Table 3.1). Please note that we did not ask the re-
spondents to choose a product that fits better husbandry conditions, but to
choose the future legal standard for husbandry systems in Germany and
the corresponding additionally costs which lead to higher prices. Given
this design we avoid that respondents anticipate economic externalities or
market failure. Thus, we created the discrete choice setting in way that no
free-riding can occur.
6The additional costs of every attribute level have been estimated, based on own re-
search and different sources. Because of the insufficient availability of data in this area
we can’t preclude overestimation and underestimation of costs. Therefore, we multiplied
with 0.8, 1 or 1.2 to weaken possible overestimations and underestimations.
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Table 3.1: Attributes of husbandry systems in the first experiment
Attribute Levels
Variable
Space per animal 1: 0.75 m
Space 2: 1.3 m
3: 2 m
Climate 1: Air system
Climate 2: Swine shower
3: Outdoor area with opportunity to wallow
Manipulable material 1: Manipulable material
Play 2: Straw two times per day (machine)
3: Straw three times per day (human)
Costs Costs of attribute combination × 0.8, 1 or 2; status quo: 0
Costs (e/kg carcass weight)
Source: Authors’ own presentation
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The second choice experiment basically equals the first, but the costs
of additional animal welfare are no more stated in higher costs for pig meat,
but rather in the reduction of the provision of other public goods, namely
education, public transportation and public security (represented by teach-
ers, bus drivers and police officers in Table 3.2). The idea proposed here
is to divide a fixed governmental budget and thus, to reallocate existing
state budget expenditures (an approach based on Bergstrom et al., 2004)
to an animal welfare budget which leads to an increase of farm animal
welfare of pigs. We offer different choice sets that could possibly merge
into a political regulative for minimum animal welfare standards. The only
payment option is a trade-off between budgets for education, public trans-
portation and public security. Respondents must deal with high, though
realistic, costs for animal welfare within this scenario. Moreover, assum-
ing respondents consider social surveys to be influential for policy makers,
this methodology sets the respondents into a situation, in which stated
preferences may become influential in reality. Hence, we presume a bind-
ing purchasing character. We consider the design of the second choice
experiment to better mimic real political processes when compared to the
first. In detail we offered six choice sets with each three alternatives in
the second experiment. Every alternative suggests a budget reallocation
scheme. The attributes and levels are presented in Table 3.2. In the case
that jobs respectively salaries shall be cut down, the saved money is off-
set with the cost of the most expensive option of Experiment 1 and the
number of fattening pigs in Germany. As explained above, we interpret the
marginal rate of substitution between animal welfare and the different other
public goods as the collective WTP. Formally, the MRS corresponds to re-
lation of the WTP (expressed in money) of animal welfare and the other
public good, respectively. This relation corresponds to the relative evalua-
tion of animal welfare compared to other public goods from the viewpoint
of consumers and hence will give further insights regarding the potential
bias of private WTP measures as explained in the theory section above.
The variable AnimalWelfare was measured based on the option defined
for the first choice experiment7. The italic printed levels in Tables 3.1 and
3.2 are the status quo in Germany. As already described, participants had
to choose one of three options per choice set in each experiment. The
alternatives are marked as A, B or C. Thus, we have unlabelled experi-
7Original variable AnimalWelfare was presented as an amount of Euro per animal (pig)
to half of the sample while a hypothetical increase in animal welfare based on the best
option of the first experiment was presented to the other half. To treat them equal in
analysis the variable had to be unified through transformation by certain thresholds for
both variants (Appendix 3.11)
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ments (see above). The option C is always the status quo, which means
no increase of husbandry components and no budget reallocation.
Table 3.2: Attributes of policies to finance animal welfare
Attribute Levels
Variable
Teacher per district 0
Teacher -1
-2
-3
Bus driver per district 0
BusDriver -1
-2
-3
Police officer per district 0
PoliceOfficer -1
-2
-3
Animal welfare increase 0-3
AnimalWelfare
Source: Authors’ own presentation
As argued above, preference heterogeneity may stem from socioeco-
nomic characteristics as well as attitudes. Thus, we included the socio-
economic variables SEX (as dummy for women) and STUDENT (a dummy
for students) as well as four attitude variables. One question within the
survey was, whether farm animal welfare is not important, less important,
important or very important to respondents, which we included via the vari-
able IMPORTANCE_ANIMAL_WELFARE. Following our exposition above,
the perceived need for action in the area of animal husbandry is another
potentially important attitude that could affect preferences for animal wel-
fare. Thus, we include the variables NEED_ACTION_HUSBANDRY as
well as the variable EVALUATE_AW_LEVEL. The latter measures how
people evaluate the current level of animal welfare in agriculture. The
fourth attitude variable that we included in our study is REGULATION_MAR-
KET. This variable measures to what extend respondents agree that prob-
lems of animal welfare should be solved by the market or regulated by
the government/parliament. We used the Stata module DCREATE (Hole,
2017) for design of experiments as well as R (R Core Team, 2017) and the
gmnl package (Sarrias and Daziano, 2017) for analysis and estimation.
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3.4 Results
Our sample includes 1673 people with a student share of 61.9 percent
(Table 3.3). A third of the respondents are men. Please note that this
sample is by no means representative for the German population, as one
can easily see in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of the sample
Sample (n=1673), share (%) German population (%)
Sex
Men 33.9 49.3
Women 66.1 50.7
Students 61.9 3.39
Sample, mean (sd) German population (mean)
Age 29.88 (10.5) 44 years and 3 months
Source: Author’s own presentation of sample; Statistisches Bundesamt
(Destatis) (2017, 2018a,b)
3.4.1 First Choice Experiment: Private WTP
The estimation results for class membership of a two-class model for hus-
bandry systems are presented in Table 3.4. Class 1 is the reference class.
Therefore coefficients for the covariates8 are set to zero. Compared to this
reference class, for people in class 2 farm animal welfare is a more impor-
tant topic. They also see a higher need for action in the area of husbandry
systems. The probability to be in class 2 decreases with a better evalu-
ation of the current state of farm animal welfare in Germany as well as
with a preference for animal welfare support by the market. While women
rather belong to class 2, being student decreases class probability.
Please note that most respondents are assigned to class 2. In this
class all estimated parameters for the husbandry system attributes result
as expected: higher levels of space, play and climate are positive while
costs decrease the benefit (table 3.4). For class 1, one can see some un-
expected patterns of preferences. Higher levels of opportunity to play and
climate regulation have a negative effect, only space seems to increase
respondents’ benefit. The cost attribute has the most surprising effect:
8Please note, that we only show estimates of the model with covariates that have a
significant effect on class membership.
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Table 3.4: Estimation results for class membership (husbandry systems)
Variable Class 1 Class 2
(Reference)
Constant 0 -2.871***
IMPORTANCE_ANIMAL_WELFARE 0 1.351***
NEED_ACTION_HUSBANDRY 0 0.506***
EVALUATE_AW_LEVEL 0 -.0892***
REGULATION_MARKET 0 -0.219***
SEX 0 0.270**
STUDENT 0 -0.468***
Share 0.153 0.847
p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 ***
Source: Authors’ analysis of survey data
contrary to the assumption that costs are a lost benefit, the coefficient for
this attribute is also positive. Hence, higher costs increase the perceived
benefit of people belonging to class 1. In case of private goods, a possi-
ble explanation for positive cost coefficient might be that prices have more
than one function. Leavitt (1954) argues, that people perceive price as an
indicator for quality or choose higher prices to meet social expectations.
In the case of farm animal welfare, the social dimension deserves special
attention. If we assume that animal welfare is an issue where individual
behaviour might be judged by others, people may select more expensive
standards to fulfill society’s requirements. But it is also fair to assume
that the mental patterns follow a simple relation like “the more money, the
more animal welfare”. Thus, they ignore the technical aspects (as implied
by negative coefficients for climate and play) and just chose the most ex-
pensive alternative.
Based on estimation results we calculated the individual WTP for every
husbandry system component. As shown in Figure 3.1, the willingness
to pay for better climate regulation is the highest (more than three Euro),
followed by space (more than two Euro). For better play opportunities
through manipulable material respondents want to pay less than two Euro
per kg carcass weight.
Comparing classes 1 and 2, total private WTP9 within the latter is
higher than among members of the former (Figure 3.2). Figures 3.1 and
9Total private WTP denotes the sum of the WTPs for the three components.
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Table 3.5: Estimated parameters of husbandry system attributes
Attribute Class 1 Class 2
Space 0.162* 1.44***
Play -0.350* 0.906***
Climate -0.336*** 1.872***
Costs 0.863*** -0.519***
p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 ***
Source: authors’ analysis of survey data
Figure 3.1: WTP for husbandry system components
Source: Authors’ own presentation.
3.2 also show negative willingness to pay for some system components.
They are due to the unexpected coefficients in class 1. However, since the
majority of the respondents belong to class 2 as can be seen in table 3.4,
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willingness to pay is dominated by constant estimates.
Figure 3.2: Total private WTP by class membership
Source: Authors’ own presentation.
Comparing students and non-students, we see that the latter have a
higher WTP than the former (Table 3.6). There is also a difference between
means for men and women: the latter are willing to pay more for climate
regulation (0.50 Euro), play (0.21 Euro) and space (0.46 Euro). A Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon test confirms the significance of the mean differences.
Overall, we consider the estimated relative WTP values for the different
husbandry components as more interesting and reliable when compared
to the absolute values. According to our estimation, consumers evaluate
climate regulation standards as most important followed by space, while
they express the lowest relative WTP for the possibility to express natural
behaviour.
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Table 3.6: Comparing mean private WTP by socio-economic characteris-
tics
Climate Space Play
Overall mean 3.03 2.25 1.5
Students 2.93 2.16 1.46
Non-students 3.18 2.39 1.57
Men 2.69 1.94 1.36
Women 3.19 2.4 1.57
Source: Authors’ own calculation
3.4.2 Second Choice Experiment: Collective WTP
Unlike the estimation results for the first experiment, parameters for the
second all show the expected signs, e.g. parameters for teachers, bus
drivers and police officers per district all have a negative sign implying that
consumers evaluate a reduction of public expenditure for these goods as
costs, while estimated parameters for animal welfare are positive for both
classes (Table 3.7).
Table 3.7: Estimated parameters of LC-Model for public goods
Attribute Class 1
Teacher -1.344***
BusDriver -0.228
PoliceOfficer -0.813***
AnimalWelfare 0.177
p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 ***
Source: Authors’ analysis of survey data
Results for class membership show that now students belong to class
2 (Table 3.8). All other covariates have the same direction like in the hus-
bandry model, meaning that class 2 can be described in the same way for
both models.
We used the estimation results to calculate the trade-off between ani-
mal welfare and the other public goods as the collective WTP. Therefore,
we were able to evaluate the relative value of animal welfare compared to
other public services relevant in daily life. Figure 3.3 shows these trade-
offs as a density plot.
Based on calculations one can see that respondents are rather willing
to reduce bus drivers, teachers or policy men, i.e. reallocate education
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Table 3.8: Estimation results for class membership (public goods)
Variable Class 1 Class 2
(Reference)
Constant 0 -3.379 ***
IMPORTANCE_ANIMAL_WELFARE 0 0.878***
NEED_ACTION_HUSBANDRY 0 0.176***
EVALUATE_AW_LEVEL 0 -0.442***
REGULATION_MARKET 0 -0.051**
SEX 0 0.901**
STUDENT 0 0.404***
Share 0.428 0.572
p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 ***
Source: Authors’ analysis of survey data
or security budgets in exchange for a higher animal welfare level. Sum-
mary statistics for the trade-off variables can be found in appendix 3.12.
Again, there is a clear difference between both classes regarding the WTP.
No matter if teachers, bus drivers or policemen, the collective WTP is the
highest in the second class (Figure 3.4). Theoretically, these empirical
results reflect consumer’s different shadow prices for public transport, se-
curity and education, respectively.
Table 3.9: Mean collective WTP by socio-economic characteristics
Teacher Bus drivers Police officers
Overall mean 0.8 12.86 1.58
Students 0.96 15.47 1.9
Non-students 0.82 13.03 1.61
Men 0.51 7.57 0.99
Women 1.08 17.54 2.13
Source: Authors’ own calculation
Looking at the socio-economic characteristics10 again, we observe a
higher collective WTP for animal welfare for students when compared to
non-students (Table 3.9). As already observed for the private WTPs for
husbandry components, estimations reveal a higher collective WTP for
women when compared to men. Furthermore, our results imply a weak
10Again, a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test confirms the significance of the mean differ-
ences.
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Figure 3.3: Collective WTP for increase of animal welfare in terms of jobs
per district
Source: Authors’ own presentation.
but significant negative correlation of roughly -0.28 between respondent’s
attitude in favor of a market-based implementation of animal welfare and
the collective WTP based on education, public transport and security, re-
spectively (see appendix 3.13 ).
Finally, we compared the collective WTP with the private WTP. To this
end we transformed estimated collective WTPs in corresponding values
measured as Euros per kg of pig meat. In particular based on average
salaries for teachers, policy men and bus drivers, respectively, as well as
total number of pigs in Germany and the average carcass weight we were
able to transform originally estimated collective WTP into Euros per kilo-
gram of carcass weight. The means of the transformed collective WTPs
are presented in Table 3.10. Please note that in Table 3.10 “Private Total”
WTP has been calculated as the mean of the sum of the WTPs for the
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Figure 3.4: Collective WTP for animal welfare by class membership
Source: Authors’ own presentation.
three components estimated at the first stage.
Table 3.10: Means of transformed collective WTP and private WTP
WTP e / kg carcass weight
Collective
AW_TEACHER 0.012
AW_BUSDRIVER 0.098
AW_POLICEOFFICER 0.012
Private Total 6.771
Source: Authors’ own calculation
As one can easily see from Table 3.10, there is a big gap between
private and collective WTP, where the latter is much lower than the for-
mer. These patterns indicate that citizens’ WTP for animal welfare is ne-
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glectable, when compared to the other public goods, i.e. education, public
transport or security. Furthermore, assuming the WTPs for the other public
goods roughly correspond to their costs (i.e. the average salaries of teach-
ers, policy men and bus drivers used in the calculations) implies that the
estimated private WTP exceeds the collective WTP by the factor ranging
between 69.9 (bus drivers) and 564.25 (teacher/police officers). Following
our theoretical expositions, this indicates a significant bias resulting from
a mismatched design of choice experiments focusing only on animal wel-
fare and neglecting other public goods. However, please note that based
on our second choice experiment data we are unable to identify abso-
lute WTP neither for animal welfare nor for the other public goods. Thus,
reported values in Table 3.10 could only be calculated assuming that ab-
solute WTPs for the other public goods correspond to their costs. This is,
of course, only an ad hoc assumption. Hence, we conclude that further
analyses are needed.
Moreover, at a theoretical level, also other theoretical explanations for
our results are conceivable. For example, the difference between the pri-
vate and collective WTPs could be explained following the prospect theory
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). People tend to judge losses larger than
gains (Kahneman et al., 1991). In the case of collective WTP for farm
animal welfare, citizens might judge the loss of teachers, bus drivers and
police officers higher than the gain of farm animal welfare, respectively the
"consumption" of farm animal welfare which is expressed in private WTP.
Thus, they refuse to pay for animal welfare through reducing for example
police officers in the district.
Finally, please note that the collective WTPs differ significantly depend-
ing on the assumption how animal welfare is financed. In particular, as-
suming animal welfare is financed via budget reallocations cutting expendi-
tures for education or security results in a significant lower collective WTP
when compared to cuts in expenditure for public transport (see Tables 3.9
and 3.10). This might reflect different shadow prices for these goods. Fur-
ther, it indicates that the WTP for animal welfare also depends on the way
the latter is financed. Overall, we conclude from our findings that the em-
pirical measurement of WTP for animal welfare remains a problem, which
has not been fully solved yet. Hence, we still consider WTP analyses as a
very interesting and relevant topic for future research.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
What do we learn from these results? Measured by private WTP, i.e. the
trade-off between animal welfare related husbandry systems and private
consumption, consumers are most concerned about climate regulation,
followed by a comfortable environment in terms of freedom of movement.
Interestingly, the opportunity to express natural behaviour and to avoid
boredom seems to be less important, at least from the citizens’ point of
view. The finding for the relation of WTP for space and WTP for play is in
line with empirical results regarding perception of fattening pig production
in Germany: Consumer evaluate pig husbandry on the basis of several cri-
teria, from which “space per animal” is perceived as very important, while
manipulable material seems to be unimportant (Rovers et al., 2018). Wild-
kraut et al. (2015) report, that consumers confronted with video record-
ings also rely on space per animal as most important evaluation criteria.
Hence, citizens’ acceptance of fattening pig husbandry systems could be
increased more effectively if standards focus on higher levels of climate
regulation or space per animal instead of implementing better activity sup-
plies for pigs. Therefore, policies defining husbandry standards should
focus on the former two criteria. Analysing collective WTP, i.e. the trade-
offs between public expenditure for animal welfare and other public goods,
reveals another set of interesting findings. Our estimation results clearly
indicate that consumers have distinct preferences regarding the sources of
public finance. More specifically, for a given level of animal welfare people
would rather cut public transport than public expenditure for education or
security. Vice-versa the maximal level of animal welfare that consumers
are willing to accept significantly varies with the financial scheme, i.e. fi-
nancing animal welfare programs by reallocating state budget from pub-
lic transport would lead to much higher accepted levels of animal welfare
when compared to reallocation budget from security or education.
However, WTPs are heterogeneous among citizens. According to our
estimations, relative high private and collective WTPs are observed for
women and relative low private WTPs are estimated for students11 con-
firming results of existing studies (see Clark et al., 2017; Heise and Theuvsen,
2017). Beside socioeconomic characteristics, private and collective WTP
depend on attitude and values of people. Citizens, who are more con-
cerned about farm animal welfare, have a higher WTP for husbandry sys-
tems and a higher willingness to reallocate government budgets. The lat-
ter is also influenced by the attitude towards regulation of animal welfare:
11Please note that collective WTP is higher for students.
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Support for the “invisible hand of the market” leads to a lower collective
WTP. We think that this consideration of attitudes and values explaining
heterogeneity of preferences is an interesting approach at the methodi-
cal/modelling level. One might question that the absolute values of our
measurements express the real absolute WTP, because there is the risk
to underestimate or overestimate the realizable amounts of money for an-
imal welfare. But discrete choice experiments are undeniably appropriate
to depict relative WTPs. Our results show clear patterns regarding the
relative value of farm animal welfare. Nevertheless, we definitely see the
need for further research here. Furthermore, comparing private and col-
lective WTPs our estimation results indicate some interesting differences.
In particular, our estimation results imply that neglecting other relevant
public goods leads to WTPs for animal welfare standards, which are over-
estimated by a factor ranging from 70 to over 560 compared to financing
schemes. Shadow prices for education, public transport and security are
higher than farm animal welfare. This finding raises support for our theo-
retical assumptions. In context of market failure and the following political
provision of farm animal welfare, people don’t choose between private con-
sumption and animal welfare. Rather, they first choose between private
and public consumption. Subsequently, citizen choose between different
public goods to allocate governmental spending. Following this theoreti-
cal model, choice settings focusing only on animal welfare and neglecting
other public goods implies a significant bias in estimated WTPs. Integrat-
ing other public goods leads to more reliable results. An appropriate choice
design for farm animal welfare policies should therefore include both: le-
gal standards and the source of financing additional costs. However, we
also discussed alternative explanations for our finding. Beside shadow
prices, loss aversion might be an explanation for the large gap between
private and collective WTP. In line with the prospect theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979), individuals in our experiments might judge the loss of
teachers, bus drivers and police officers higher than the gain of more farm
animal welfare (see Kahneman et al., 1991).
Finally, we see the following limitation of our analysis which we don’t
want to conceal: First of all, the data used are not representative; there-
fore, the findings are not valid for the whole population in Germany or even
Schleswig-Holstein. Second, drawing general conclusions from our esti-
mation results regarding future organization of animal husbandry systems
has to be done with caution for the following reason: Estimated WTPs for
different components of husbandry systems, e.g. focusing on the issue of
climate regulation and space, rather than on activity material, reflect con-
sumers naive perception of how different components impact on animal
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welfare. Accordingly, these are misleading to the extent that consumers’
perceptions are biased. In particular, consumers are laymen regarding
animal welfare. Therefore, their perceptions generally do not match cor-
responding expert opinions or scientific findings. Veterinarians and scien-
tists might have concerns about neglecting manipulable material for play,
because especially straw “is used as a substrate for the expression of var-
ious behaviour patterns such as exploring, rooting, foraging and chewing”
(Tuyttens, 2005) and can support farmers to avoid tail biting. Hence, in the
worst case, the systems implemented will fail to reach better animal wel-
fare because of public’s naive beliefs. Thus, a mechanistic orientation of
future animal husbandry systems towards revealed consumer preferences
would certainly lead to failure. In this regard, adequate communication
with and providing information for citizens is a very important aspect. A
third limitation of our study is the missing link to the political arena. Since
markets fail to efficiently supply animal welfare, the latter has to be pro-
vided via adequate policy programs. However, just like markets, politics
feature a complex process structure. Accordingly, to guarantee an opti-
mal design of future animal welfare policies, one needs to understand how
political processes work.
Overall, our findings might contribute to an improved comprehension
of the political economy of animal welfare. This applies especially to the
assessment of collective and private WTP, which should be extended by
future empirical and theoretical work. Particularly, our approach should
be tested and advanced based on representative data. At the same time,
follow-up studies should not neglect the influence of citizens’ attitudes and
values, i.e. the intrinsic factors, at the methodical/modelling level. Due
to the third limitation, we want to encourage researchers to focus on the
politics of farm animal welfare. A first step could be the investigation of
voters’ political support for parties to implement animal welfare policies.
Within the random utility framework, probabilistic voter models seem to
be a promising approach to identify specific political processes that allow
citizens to express their support for promoting farm animal welfare policies.
All in all, the topic “animal welfare” provides interesting fields of activity for
economics and social science.
3.A Appendix
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Table 3.11: Unified AnimalWelfare
Euro per Animal Animal welfare increase AnimalWelfare level
0 0 0
> 0 > 0 1
> 2.93 > 2.06 2
> 5.86 > 4.13 3
Source: Authors’ own calculation
Table 3.12: Summary statistics for collective WTP
Variable Mean Max
(standard deviation)
AW_TEACHER 0.8 1.54
(-0.56)
AW_BUSDRIVER 12.86 25.77
(-9.52)
AW_POLICEOFFICER 1.58 3.07
(-1.11)
Source: Authors’ own calculation
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Table 3.13: Correlation coefficients REGULATION_MARKET and collective WTP
AW_TEACHER AW_BUSDRIVER AW_POLICEOFFICER
REGULATION_MARKET -0.283 -0.286 -0.284
Source: Authors’ own calculation
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Abstract
We analyse econometrically the WTP for animal welfare of fattening pigs
in Germany using a latent class model. Based on the trade-off between
different husbandry system components and private consumption we es-
timated a private WTP while a collective WTP for animal welfare increase
of all pigs in Germany is estimated by using budget reallocation schemes
regarding education, public transport and security. Results show relatively
high WTPs for better climate regulation or space. We also show a will-
ingness to rather cut down payments for public transport than salaries of
teachers or police officers. Moreover, we show that the collective WTP
(converted into euros per kg carcass weight) for animal welfare is much
lower than private WTP.
Keywords Animal welfare, willingness to pay, latent class model, bud-
get reallocation
4.1 Introduction
Spurred on by a negative media coverage (Kayser et al., 2011) and an
observed alienation of society and agriculture (Balmann, 2016) traditional
housing systems in agriculture are facing increasing criticism in Germany
(Spiller et al., 2016; WBA, 2015). Based on a change of values in de-
veloped countries ethical concerns lead to a questioning of conventional
husbandry practices (Dirscherl, 2013), the demand for animal welfare is in-
creasing. GREENPEACE (2017) claims current standards of pig fattening
to be illegal as well as unconstitutional. The latest nutrition reports of the
German government express a higher demand for animal welfare among
population (BMEL, 2017a, 2018). While food retail industry launched the
Animal Welfare Initiative back in 2015 (Initative Tierwohl, 2017), the Ger-
man Animal Welfare Federation introduced its animal welfare label two
years before. Finally, the German government developed a livestock strat-
egy including an animal welfare label (BMEL, 2017b). In fact, the Animal
Welfare Initiative as well as the government driven label cannot come as
a surprise, especially considering that consumers shift responsibility for
animal welfare to state and retailers (Te Velde et al., 2002).
Consequently, the scientific council for agricultural policy recommends
a policy mix that includes not only industry solutions but also state funding
for animal welfare and explicitly states that the taxpayer will pay for it (WBA,
2015). This raises the question of how much the state is allowed to spend
on animal welfare. The answer to this question, in turn, depends on the
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value attributed to animal welfare (also compared to other areas of life).
The first question to be answered is therefore: What is the value of an
increase of animal welfare?
From an economic point of view we consider animal welfare to be
a public good, since for consumers it is a non-rival and non-excludable
by-product of agricultural production (Grethe, 2017; Lusk and Norwood,
2011; Bennett, 1995). People can be concerned about animal suffering in
livestock production, even if they do not consume (certain) animal prod-
ucts. Thus, they can experience pleasure from better animal husbandry
(Norwood and Lusk, 2009). Especially these and all other animal wel-
fare concerned people are affected by the behaviour of consumers at the
market who buy products from livestock production where animal suffer.
This consumption externality leads to market failure (Harvey and Hubbard,
2013). Additionally, the (stated) attitude towards higher animal welfare
does not lead to a corresponding consuming behaviour (see nice overview
by Harvey and Hubbard, 2013, p.109). Generally, many people state that
they want better animal husbandry conditions, but few people buy cor-
responding products (Grethe, 2017). This so called ’citizen-consumer gap’
may be caused by free-riding. Uehleke and Hüttel (2016) show that de-
mand for animal welfare labelled meat is higher in a collective scenario
where free-riding is excluded due to governmental regulation.
Contemporary animal science definitions of animal welfare mainly agree
on the characteristics of the concept. Accordingly, farm animal welfare is
perceived as a physiological, behavioural and emotional state of being that
is affected by resources and management procedures on-farm as well as
off-farm (Welfare Quality ®, 2009). The public does focus rather on re-
source based conditions of husbandry systems to improve the wellbeing
of farm animals (Zander et al., 2013). Scientists and political advisors
recommend the inclusion of the citizens’ view on animal welfare (WBA,
2015), so we take a closer look on this public view. Increasing costs for
husbandry systems are only accepted if the purchased husbandry compo-
nents match citizens’ beliefs and animal welfare improving factors. So the
second question is quite intuitive: What’s the value of single husbandry
system components?
To answer both questions we will analyse people’s willingness to pay
for an increase of animal welfare as well as for certain components of
husbandry systems based on two discrete choice experiments. Based on
characteristics of value theory (Lancaster, 1966), goods are described by
certain attributes which create the utility of a good. This theory perfectly
matches with the idea that people evaluate husbandry systems based on
their beliefs regarding which aspects of husbandry are essential for the
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wellbeing of animals. It also fits the aim of the second experiment: While
the first experiment can be described as a more or less classical shop-
ping cart scenario, where people have to choose their preferred husbandry
system described by components and additional costs to assess prefer-
ences for components, the second experiment is a budget reallocation
scenario that could possibly merge into a political regulative for minimum
animal welfare standards. The offered payment option for animal welfare
improvements is a trade-off between other public goods. Assuming that
people consider social surveys to be influential for policy makers and so
their choices may become reality, we presume a binding character in this
experiment. Below, we will use the term private WTP to refer to the will-
ingness to pay in a classical shopping cart scenario (additional cost per
kg carcass weight), but specifically for animal husbandry system compo-
nents. In contrast, the term collective WTP denotes the willingness pay for
animal welfare improvements in exchange for other public objectives. To
avoid misconceptions, we emphasize that the collective WTP is not an ag-
gregated WTP of all probands. Rather, the collective WTP indicates how
many units of a public good an individual person or class would spend for
animal welfare under the condition that these spending concern all citizens
throughout Germany and thus be collective.
4.2 Data
The data comes from an online survey of the AniFair project and have been
collected in March 2017. A total of 1673 students and employees of Kiel
University took part in the survey. Majority of respondents are students
and women (table 4.1). For analysis of data we used R (R Core Team,
2017) with gmnl (Sarrias and Daziano, 2017) for model estimation.
Table 4.1: Characteristics of Data Set
Characteristics (Relative) Frequency / Mean (sd)
N 1673
Men 0.339
Women 0.661
Students 0.619
Age 29.88
(10.5)
Source: Authors’ own presentation
90
As mentioned above we used two discrete choice experiments to anal-
yse people’s preferences and WTP for animal welfare and husbandry sys-
tem components. Attributes and levels of both experiments are presented
in table 4.2. The first experiment addressed the private WTP and con-
tained five choice sets with each three alternative husbandry systems,
only described by the attributes space per animal (Space), climate system
(Climate), manipulable material to explore and to dig into (Play ), and ad-
ditional costs (Costs). Please note that each Level 1 of the attributes and
additional costs of zero are the current legal status in Germany, a combi-
nation of these current levels have been presented as an opt-out option to
respondents. The attributes describing husbandry systems are in line with
the guidelines recommended by the scientific council for agricultural policy
(WBA, 2015, p. 285).
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Table 4.2: Attributes of Experiments
Experiment 1: Private WTP
Attribute Levels
Space 1 0.75 m
2 1.3 m
3 2 m
Climate 1 air system
2 swine shower
3 outdoor area with opportunity to wallow
Play 1 manipulable material
2 straw two times per day (machine)
3 straw three times per day (human)
Costs Costs of attribute combination
(e/kg carcass weight)
Experiment 2: Collective WTP
Attribute Levels
Teacher 1 0
(sector of education) 2 -1
3 -2
4 -3
BusDriver 1 0
(sector of public transport) 2 -1
3 -2
4 -3
PoliceOfficer 1 0
(sector of security) 2 -1
3 -2
4 -3
AnimalWelfare 0 3
Source: Authors’ own presentation
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The second experiment, dealing with the collective WTP for animal
welfare, offers six choice sets with each three alternatives containing a
hypothetically budget reallocation from the sectors education, public trans-
portation and security for animal welfare purpose. To finance an increase
of animal welfare for all fattening pigs in Germany (AnimalWelfare), up to
three teachers (Teacher ), bus drivers (BusDriver ) and police officers (Po-
liceOfficer ) should be cut down in each of the 318 German districts. Again
the first level of each attribute and zero animal welfare increase are the
current state (no budget reallocation as mentioned by the scenario) and
an opt-out option was offered containing this status quo.
4.3 Modelling Approach
As mentioned in section 2, our sample only contains students and uni-
versity staff. Although this is a very limited sample, different preferences
among respondents are also possible. For example, gender differences
could occur that have already been uncovered in the literature (see Clark
et al., 2017). Also, students may have other preferences than employ-
ees. Additionally, attitudes towards animal welfare and financing may vary
among university members. Thus, we assume heterogeneous preferences
among the individuals in our sample. The utility of an alternative i can be
divided into two components, namely the observable part Vi and the error
term ε. Taking into account the characteristics of value theory the utility
function is
Ui = Vi + ε = αi +
K∑
k=1
βkxk + ε , (4.1)
with K attributes X and the estimated constant α and the estimated at-
tribute parameters β. We use a latent class model to take preference
heterogeneity into account. Latent class models not only allow the mea-
surement of preference heterogeneity, but also capturing its origin using
covariates. Unlike random parameter models (see Hensher and Greene,
2003) latent class models need no distributional assumptions about pref-
erences.
Assuming Q segments or classes within the sample the constant and
the coefficients now vary about the classes (Greene and Hensher, 2003),
therefore V is rewritten as
Vi|q = αi|q +
K∑
k=1
βk|qxk. (4.2)
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The choice probability for alternative i now depends on membership in
class q of individual n:
P (yn|q = i) =
exp(Vi|q)∑J
j=1(Vi|q)
(4.3)
The probability for individual n belonging to class q is determined by a set
of covariates Z like socioeconomic characteristics or attitudes (Boxall and
Adamowicz, 2002; Greene and Hensher, 2003; Swait, 1994):
Pnq =
exp(λq +
∑Z
z=1 γqzzn)∑Q
q=1 exp(λq +
∑Z
z=1 γqzzn)
(4.4)
The class constant λq and the characteristics’ coefficients γ are estimated
by the researcher. So the probability to choose i now is
P (yn = i) =
Q∑
q=1
PnqP (yn|q = i). (4.5)
To make the models for both experiments as comparable as possible,
we decided to use the following covariates for both models. Since there
is evidence for women being more sympathetic towards animal welfare
then men (Herzog, 2007), stronger rejecting animal suffering in food pro-
duction (Beardsworth et al., 2002) and a stronger WTP for animal friendly
products (Heise and Theuvsen, 2017), it is straightforward to assume that
preferences for animal welfare depend on individual’s sex (SEX). Since we
use data collected at the university we also want to check weather stu-
dents’ preferences are different to others, so we included a dummy vari-
able for being student (STUDENT). Preferences should also vary by the
personal importance of animal welfare; therefore a corresponding variable
IMPORTANCE_ANIMAL_WELFARE is included. The perceived need for
action in the area of animal husbandry could also affect preferences as
well as how people evaluate the current level animal welfare in agriculture,
so both attitudes are included, too (NEED_ACTION_HUSBANDRY and
EVALUATE_AW_LEVEL). Especially preferences about budget realloca-
tion should depend on the attitude towards financing and regulating ani-
mal welfare. Therefore our last covariate represents the question, whether
problems of animal welfare should be solved by the market or regulated by
the government (REGULATION_MARKET).
Given the attributes listed in table 2 and formula 4.2,
Ui|q = βSpace|q×Space+βClimate|q×Climate+βPlay|q×Play+βCosts|q×Costs+ε
(4.6)
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is the utility function of husbandry system i in the first experiment for class
q. The utility function of a budget reallocation scheme i in experiment two is
Ui|q = βTeacher|q × Teacher + βBusDriver|q ×BusDriver +(4.7)
βPoliceOfficer|q × PoliceOfficer + βAnimalWelfare|q × AnimalWelfare+ ε
Please note that since we use unlabelled experiments the constant is omit-
ted (Hensher et al., 2005).
4.4 Results
Estimation results of a two class model for private WTP are surprising.
While we would expect a negative effect of costs and a positive effect of
space, climate regulation or manipulable material, class 1 doesn’t fit these
expectations (table 4.3).
Table 4.3: Estimation Results for Husbandry System Components
Attribute Class 1 Class 2
Space 0.162* 1.44***
Play -0.350* 0.906***
Climate -0.336*** 1.872***
Costs 0.863*** -0.519***
p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 ***
Source: Authors’ own presentation
While costs seem to increase perceived benefit of respondents, straw
for play or better climate regulation have a negative effect. Only space
has the expected direction. However, in class 2 all estimated parameters
behave like expected: increasing costs lead to decreasing benefit of a
husbandry system while more space, better climate regulation or a better
level of play opportunities have a positive effect.
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Table 4.4: Estimation Results for Class Membership (Experiment 1)
Variable Class 1 Class 2
(Reference)
Constant 0 -2.871***
IMPORTANCE_ANIMAL_WELFARE 0 1.351***
NEED_ACTION_HUSBANDRY 0 0.506***
EVALUATE_AW_LEVEL 0 -0.892***
REGULATION_MARKET 0 -0.219***
SEX 0 0.270**
STUDENT 0 -0.468***
Share 0.153 0.847
p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 ***
Source: Authors’ own presentation
Looking at the estimation results for class membership in table 4.4 we
see that the stated importance of animal welfare raises the probability of
being in class 2. The more people perceive a need for action in the area of
pig housing the more they are related to class 2, while a positive evaluation
of the current state decreases class membership. Preferring market based
solutions of animal welfare problems also lowers the class membership
probability for class 2. Finally one can see that women rather belong to
class 2 than men and that being student has a negative effect. All in all,
we can call class 2 ’animal welfare oriented’-class.
We used these estimation results to calculate the private willingness to
pay. The respondents would spend the most amount of money (more than
three euro per kg carcass weight) for better climate regulation, a compo-
nent directly related to pigs’ physical needs (figure 4.1). While there is a
WTP of more than two euros/kg for more space per animal, activity ma-
terial seems not important compared to the other components. Negative
values are due to the unexpected coefficients in class 1. However, since
the majority of the respondents belong to class 2 as can be seen in ta-
ble 4.4, willingness to pay is dominated by constant estimates. For the
second experiment the estimated coefficients behave like expected. Ta-
ble 4.5 shows negative parameters for the public goods education, public
transport and security, being the sources of budget reallocation for better
animal welfare and therefore being cost attributes. A higher level of animal
welfare increases decision makers’ benefit.
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Figure 4.1: Private WTP (husbandry system components)
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Source: Own presentation.
Table 4.5: Estimation Results for Public Goods
Attribute Class 1 Class 2
Teacher -1.344*** -0.666***
BusDriver -0.228 -0.04**
PoliceOfficer -0.813*** -0.335***
AnimalWelfare 0.177 1.066***
p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 ***
Source: Authors’ own presentation
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With the exception of the students, who also belong to class 2 now, the
classes can be described in a similar way as for the first experiment (table
4.6). Another difference is the size of classes. Class 2 is still the biggest
one, but the share isn’t as high as in the first experiment.
Table 4.6: Estimation Results for Class Membership (Experiment 2)
Variable Class 1 Class 2
(Reference)
Constant 0 -3.379 ***
IMPORTANCE_ANIMAL_WELFARE 0 0.878***
NEED_ACTION_HUSBANDRY 0 0.176***
EVALUATE_AW_LEVEL 0 -0.442***
REGULATION_MARKET 0 -0.051**
SEX 0 0.901**
STUDENT 0 0.404***
Share 0.428 0.572
p < 0.10 * p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 ***
Source: Authors’ own presentation
The calculation of the collective WTP, i.e. the trade-offs between animal
welfare and the other public goods, shows that respondents would give up
more bus drivers than police officers or teacher. Table 4.7 also shows that
students have a lower private WTP while their collective WTP is higher.
On average, women have a higher collective WTP as well as private WTP
than men.
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Table 4.7: Mean collective and private WTP
Private WTP Collective WTP
Climate Space Play Teacher Bus drivers Police officers
Overall 3,03 2,25 1,5 0.80 12,86 1,58
Men 2,69 1,94 1,36 0.51 7,57 0.99
Women 3,19 2,4 1,57 1,08 17,54 2,13
No Students 3,18 2,39 1,57 0,82 13,03 1,61
Students 2,93 2,16 1,46 0.96 15.47 1,9
Source: Authors’ own presentation
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Knowing the average salaries of the individual occupations and the
number of districts in Germany allows us to calculate the amount of euro
that is saved by people’s willingness to cut off public goods. Figure 4.2
presents the budget in millions of euros that would be available for in-
creased animal welfare. As one can easily see, the highest amount of
money would be available if public transport budgets are cut down. Finally
Figure 4.2: Collective WTP (Millions of Euros)
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we divided respondents collective WTP, i.e. the amount of euros available
from cutting budgets, by the number of fattening pigs in Germany and then
divided the amount of euros per animal by 100 kg to get the collective
WTP in terms of euros per kg carcass weight. So both WTP measure-
ments have the same dimension.
As can be seen from figure 4.3, there is a positive relationship be-
tween private and collective WTP. Generally, people who want to pay more
for single husbandry components also want to give more money for over-
all animal welfare by budget reallocation. But there is a clear difference
regarding the absolute values of euros per kg slaughter weight: while re-
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spondents would pay up to more than three euros for better climate regula-
tion, the amount for better animal welfare is quite small. Cutting education
budgets leads to a maximum of 0.022 euros, while even saved bus driver
salaries only generate up to 0.20 euros. In other words, respondents are
willing to pay more money for single components of livestock systems than
they are willing to pay for overall animal welfare by budget reallocation.
Figure 4.3: Collectiveand Private WTP
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4.5 Conclusion
We can derive several conclusions from our results. With regard to the first
research question we found evidence that the value of animal welfare itself
depends on the source of money: While policies cutting off budgets for ed-
ucation or security would hardly be accepted by society, financing animal
welfare through budget reallocation from public transport seem to have re-
spondents’ support. The value of animal welfare is higher if payed by bus
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driver savings, the amount of money which could be reached by budget
reallocation is up to 250 M Euros. These results may reflect the different
shadow prices for public transport, security and education. Our estimation
results indicate an average relative shadow price of 8.5 of education vis-
a-vis public transport and 7.9 for security vis-a-vis public transport. The
second question addressed the husbandry system components being im-
portant for accepted husbandry systems. Our results suggest that the
physiological condition of pigs, i.e. climate regulation in our experiment,
and a comfortable environment, i.e. space per animal, are the main issues
higher standards of livestock should take into account. However, pigs’ op-
portunity to express natural behaviour, i.e. getting straw to dig into, seems
to be less important to respondents. Even if the absolute WTP may be
biased (due to known problems of stated preferences or the above men-
tioned "citizen-consumer gap"), the relative patterns are interesting. They
show clear preferences for husbandry components as well as source of
financing animal welfare.
The comparison of private and collective WTPs delivers also interest-
ing results. Generally, we showed a positive relationship between private
and collective WTP. In line with the literature we were able to show that
women would pay more for animal welfare than men. But we also found
differences between collective and private WTP. First, students seem to
have a higher collective WTP compared to the average of the sample but
their private WTP is lower than the mean WTP of our sample. One possi-
ble theoretical reason for this result may be students’ relative low shadow
prices for public goods and high shadow prices for private consumption,
which could be due to low income of students. Another explanation may
be free riding, which is a problem of private WTP. For our first experiment
we assumed that WTP includes free riding, while the second experiment
should exclude free riding through the binding character of the German
wide budget cuts. If we further assume that free riding incentives vary
systematically between students and others, the former may have higher
incentives to free ride. Second, the collective WTP for increased animal
welfare in terms of euros per kg carcass weight is lower than the private
WTP for single husbandry aspects. Again the underlying shadow prices of
public goods may be responsible for this result, i.e. they are higher than
shadow prices of private consumption. So people would rather pay more
money in the super-market than give up education, public transport or se-
curity. To test for this hypothetical source of the "kg carcass"-gap between
collective and private WTP, further research should integrate an additional
cost component in the financing scheme, i.e. a new additional tax for ani-
mal welfare. If it’s the case that public goods have higher shadow prices,
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the WTP in terms of an additional tax should be higher than the trade-offs
of animal welfare and teachers, bus drivers or police officers. The exper-
imental design could be another reason for differences between private
and collective WTP: While in the first experiment concrete housing sys-
tems could be selected that in the broadest sense corresponded to one’s
own ideas about animal-friendly housing systems, the second scenario
focused only on the financial side and an more or less abstract animal
welfare increase or a special amount of money per animal.
Please note that there are limitations of our study which should not be
ignored. First, we used non-representative data for analysis, so our results
aren’t valid for the whole population in Schleswig-Holstein or Germany. We
rather understand our finding as an impetus for future research. Second,
the results for husbandry system components should be considered with
caution, because they reflect consumers’ naive perception of how different
components affect animal welfare. Consumers are laymen and therefore
their perceptions may not match experts’ opinion or scientific findings. Sci-
entists might have concerns about neglecting straw for play, because it can
avoid tail biting. In a worst case scenario the public’s naive beliefs would
lead to the implementation of husbandry systems which fail to increase
animal welfare, if they are just orientated on stated consumer preferences.
Further research on the topic of animal welfare should therefore include
communication with and information of consumers about issues of animal
welfare. Third, our analysis lacks of a link to the political dimensions, i.e.
an analysis of voting behaviour regarding animal welfare. Optimal designs
of animal welfare policies are possible, only if political processes allow cit-
izens to express their true preferences as voters and if these preferences
are reflected in policy outcomes, i.e. higher legal standards as well as fi-
nancing schemes. All in all, the political economy of animal welfare is a
very interesting topic of future academic work.
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Abstract
Nowadays political debates revolve around the issue of sustainability. Re-
garding agriculture, people call for more animal welfare and reduced nitro-
gen outflow. Another issue beyond sectoral borders is climate change and
the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions. Hence, citizens drive public
debates and put pressure on politicians to solve ecological problems. The
relation between policies and the intended outcomes is a complex one.
In order to reduce this complexity, laymen apply policy beliefs, i.e. naive
mental models, to understand how policies translate into outcomes. These
beliefs can be biased due to psychological factors and therefore differ from
expert judgements (true political technologies).
Combining voting behaviour with economic analysis of willingness to
pay (WTP) we are able to measure these voters’ beliefs regarding eco-
logical issues. In particular, our empirical approach is embedded in the
random utility framework and consists of two key components: First, we
use a discrete choice experiment in order to calculate respondents’ WTP
for the ecological goods climate protection, animal welfare as well as water
protection. Second, we estimate a probabilistic voter model using corre-
sponding policy distances between voters and parties. Since we are inter-
ested in individual measurements and parameters, the econometric back-
bone of both parts is a latent class model. It is applied to representative
data from an online survey among German citizens. WTP measurements
as well as the policy weights allow us to calculate voters’ underlying be-
lief parameters. We investigate the relations between these beliefs and
the policy position. Moreover, we check for differences between socio-
economic groups.
5.1 Introduction
Today’s political debates in Germany revolve around issues of sustainabil-
ity, i.e. combining ecological with social and economic demands. This
is especially true for agricultural production. In particular, farm animal
husbandry is criticized due to a lack of farm animal welfare (WBA, 2015)
which is demanded by German citizens according to the last food reports
(BMEL, 2017a,b). Despite high reported hypothetical willingness to pay
(Clark et al., 2017; Lagerkvist and Hess, 2011), free riding (Uehleke and
Hüttel, 2018) and market failure (Harvey and Hubbard, 2013) may promote
need for regulation (Grethe, 2017). Another sustainability issue is nitrogen
surplus. It pollutes the groundwater since a high concentration of reactive
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nitrogen compounds may not only lower biodiversity, but also harm human
health (Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen , 2015; UBA, 2018). So
far, the governmental goal of reducing nitrogen surplus has been missed
since N-balance still corresponds 100 kg per ha surplus per year (Taube,
2016). Another topic in the debate on sustainability is the issue of climate
change. Greenhouse gas emissions drive an increasing earth tempera-
ture. To reduce this global warming, the Paris Agreement was adopted in
2015. Germany’s goal is a decrease of emissions by 55% until 2030. This
corresponds to 562 million tons of CO2 equivalents (BMU, 2019).
These issues described are examples for rather complex policies. To
cope with this complexity laymen apply policy beliefs (Caplan, 2001, 2002,
2007). A comparison of the beliefs of voters with expert judgements in the
economic sphere shows that views of voters systematic differ from those
of experts (Rhoads, 1985; Blendon et al., 1997; Caplan, 2002). Caplan
(2002) argues that these biases result from judgemental anomalies of the
general public. Hence, he refers to the idea of cognitive biases (Akerlof,
1989). A the same time, economic experts are considered to have unbi-
ased and true beliefs, at least on average Caplan (2002).
In democratic systems, political agents put weight on voters and their
policy positions since they want to be (re-)elected (Downs, 1957; Adams
et al., 2005). Hence, they have incentives to follow voters’ policy positions
that are determined by their beliefs. If the beliefs are strongly biased and
policy decisions follow these biased beliefs, they could cause inefficient
policy outcomes. This would lead to a basic democratic policy failure (Ca-
plan, 2001). This is contrary to the widespread view where the political
failure in providing sustainability goods seems to be the result of interest
group influence (Swinnen et al., 2000; Anderson, 1995).
Given the importance of beliefs, it would be interesting to measure
these beliefs regarding the three mentioned sustainability issues animal
welfare, climate protection and water protection. It is unlikely that all vot-
ers have the same beliefs, rather we assume that they are heterogeneous.
Hence, possible biases are also heterogeneous. Here the question occurs,
how we can asses the beliefs empirically as well as the possible biases.
To our best knowledge, no studies exist that try to measure these be-
liefs. Rather, studies on political economy of sustainability focus on voting
behaviour (see for example Achterberg, 2006; Grunenberg and Henning,
2019) or willingness to pay (WTP) for ecological issues (see for exam-
ple Clark et al., 2017; Lagerkvist and Hess, 2011; Liebe, 2007; Liebe and
Preisendörfer, 2007).
Hence, we suggest an approach to quantify voters’ beliefs based on
voting behaviour as well as voters’ willingness to pay (WTP). It contributes
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to a better understanding of how voters think regarding political technology
and hence, helps to evaluate the role of political processes. Assuming that
animal welfare, water protection and greenhouse gas emission reduction
are public goods, we develop a theoretical framework where the political
technology to produce a public good is a function of monetary input. This
framework is described in the following section. Subsequently, we show
how theory is linked to empirical assessment in section 5.3. We present
the results of our study in section 5.4 and finally end with a conclusion.
5.2 Theoretical Framework
Modelling real policy processes, governmental policy making corresponds
to the Nash equilibrium of a political game between parties, interest groups
and voters (Brock and Magee, 1978; Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Gross-
man, 1994). In particular, parties’ positions are driven by strategic be-
haviour, because they seek for benefits from governmental offices (Downs,
1957). First, we assume a society that consists of a set of i = 1, 2, ..., n
voters. Note that the society’s political system is considered to be repre-
sentative. Hence, members of society vote for political agents (i.e. parties)
deciding over policies. Additional to the set of voters, consider now a set
of l = 1, 2, ..., L interest groups. We define an interest group as a subset of
voters who share a common interest in certain policy domains. As Olson
(1965) discussed, the mere fact that individuals share a common inter-
est in policies is not enough to ensure that they will engage in collective
action due to the free rider problem. However, some interest groups do
overcome these free-rider problems and manage to coordinate the lobby-
ing activities. The number of lobby groups is exogenous, where generally
multiple interest groups exist.
Let z denote a public good and X the corresponding policy program.
Then it follows that the provision of of public good z is the result of a political
technology T (z,X) that maps state z to policy X. Especially the informed
voters value a public good, where Vi(z) denotes voter i ’s utility derived
from public good z. Furthermore, we denote voters’ income with y. For
simplicity we assume that voters have quasi-linear preferences. Thus,
Vi(z) + yi − tic(z) (5.1)
is the utility an individual voter i derives from the provision of a public good
assuming a cost share ti. In general, voters’ policy preferences can be
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derived from the following maximization problem:
max
x
Vi(z) + yi − tic (5.2)
s.t.
T (z,X) = 0
e′X = c
Note that e′X denotes political costs here. We assume a simple linear
utility function, i.e.
V (z) = κiz. (5.3)
We further consider public good provision as the result of a simple
Cobb-Douglas production function, hence
T (z,X) = F (X) = ΓXγ = z. (5.4)
With X = c(z) the following cost function results:
C(z) = Γ−
1
γ z
1
γ . (5.5)
Let βi denote the willingness to pay (WTP) of voter i for a public good. For
the net rent
NR = β ∗ Z − C(z) = β ∗ F (X)−X ⇒ max! (5.6)
⇒ FOC : βF ′(X)− C ′(z) = 0 (5.7)
⇒ SOC : NR′′ = (γ − 1)βγΓX(γ−2) (5.8)
we assume that the marginal costs of public good provision are equal
a monetary unit. Therefore,
βF ′(X) = C ′(X) = 1. (5.9)
It follows
NR′ = βγΓX(γ−1) = 1 (5.10)
⇒ X(γ−1) = (βγΓ)−1 (5.11)
⇒ X∗ = (βγΓ)
1
1−γ (5.12)
and
max βz − C(z) = 0 (5.13)
β − C ′(z) = 0 (5.14)
β − γ′Γ′zγ′−1 = 0 (5.15)
111
⇒ z∗ = ( β
γ′Γ′
)
( 1
(γ′−1) ). (5.16)
Following Caplan (2001, 2007) and others (Akerlof, 1989), one has to
consider that voters’ beliefs regarding T might differ from the true political
technology. Therefore,
T̃ (z, x) = F̃ (x) = Γ̃xγ̃ = z (5.17)
with [Γ̃, γ̃] as the underlying belief parameters.
Another building brick of our theoretical approach refers to probabilistic
theory of voting. Voters don’t chose policies directly, but vote for one of j =
1, 2, ...J parties. The latter announce different policy platforms including
policy positions x. Then
Pij = Prob(Uij > Uij′) (5.18)
Uij = Vij + µij, (5.19)
where Pij corresponds probability that voter i votes for party j depending
on utility Uij. Vij denotes the deterministic part of voter i’s utility associated
with her voting for party j. Furthermore, µij corresponds the stochastic
component of the utility function. Following the literature, we assume that
each µij is drawn from the same probability distribution. We denote the cu-
mulative distribution of errors as Ψ. Because of the stochastic assumption,
voter behaviour is modelled by a probability vector, where the probability
that a voter i votes for party j is:
Pij =
∫
µ
I(µij′ − µij < Vij − Vij′)f(µi)dµi. (5.20)
I(·) is an indicator function, which equals 1 if the expression in parenthe-
ses is true and 0 otherwise. Accordingly,
Pj =
1
n
n∑
i
Pij (5.21)
corresponds party j’s voter share. The deterministic utility component Vij
consists of different components:
Vij = αiV
P
ij + θiV
NP
ij , (5.22)
with V P as policy oriented voting and V NP for non policy-oriented voting.
αi and θi are the relative weights of the two components. Policy-oriented
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voting refers to the classical voting theory that is founded in the work of
Downs (1957), Davis et al. (1970) and Enelow and Hinich (1984). In the
Downsian tradition parties announce their policies prior to the election.
Once a party is elected, it is assumed to credibly commit to it’s stated
policy position. Please note that xj denotes the policy position announced
by party j.
Interest groups seek for economic welfare. Thus, they support politi-
cal parties in order to move their positions in the preferred direction. To
maximize re-election probability, parties tend to exchange political control
over issues against the support offered by interest groups. They have
to counterbalance this exchange against the position preferred by voters.
The political decision in the equilibrium is the result of a weighted welfare
function:
X∗ = δ
n∑
i=1
ωiXi + (1− δ)
∑
l
ΩlXl. (5.23)
Note that δ denotes the weight that parties put in the position of voters.
With ωi we denote the relative weight that voter i puts in policy position
Xi and Ωl denotes the corresponding relative interest of interest group
l. It’s straightforward to see that the higher the value of δ, the more basic-
democratic, i.e. voter oriented, the policy process is. Moreover, δ becomes
higher if voters vote more policy oriented, i.e. αi from equation 5.22 is
higher than θi.
Here the potential for basis democratic policy failure occurs: If the
weight of policy oriented voting increases, parties tend to put more empha-
sis on voters’ position. Hence, finally a party would more follow Xi than Xl.
As mentioned above, voters’ beliefs regarding public good provision cor-
respond equation 5.17. The underlying parameters may systematic differ
(Rhoads, 1985; Akerlof, 1989; Blendon et al., 1997; Caplan, 2002) from
those in equation 5.4, e.g. due to overestimating or underestimating costs
for provision. Since the policy position Xi depends on the beliefs regarding
[Γ̃, γ̃], i.e. how the policy X works, voters’ positions can differ from their
true X∗. Hence, political failure would be a by-product of basic democratic
oriented policy decisions. In the next session we suggest how to measure
the underlying belief parameters.
5.3 Empirical Specification
We assess voters’ beliefs regarding three ecological issues. Since it is
hard to ask people regarding specific parameters, we have to derive the
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underlying belief parameters (see equation 5.17) from econometric results.
Following the key components of the theoretical model, i.e. WTP as well
as political weights, we first have to assess people’s WTP as well as the
voting behaviour. Before presenting the corresponding econometrics, we
first derive γ and Γ from estimation results as well as underlying data.
5.3.1 Deriving voters’ belief parameters
Since issues are related (see theory above), we assume that elasticities of
farm animal welfare affect climate’s cost elasticities. First, we use Taylor
approximation at X0
f(X∗) = f(X0) + f
′(X0)(X
∗ −X0) +
1
2
f ′′(X0)(X
∗ −X0)2 (5.24)
= f(X0) +
1
2
f ′′(X0)(X
∗ −X0)2.
Furthermore, we consider Uij = α0 + αP (X − X0)2 as net utility of public
good production. Net rent NR = βF (X) − X = βZ − C(z) can be Taylor
approximated, hence
NR(X∗) = NR(X0) +NR
′(X0)(X
∗ −X0) +
1
2
NR′′(X0)(X
∗ −X0)2 (5.25)
⇒ NR(X∗) = NR(X0) +
1
2
NR′′(X0)(X
∗ −X0)2.
If not considering constants,
1
2
NR′′(X0)(X
∗ −X0)2 = αp(X −X0)2 (5.26)
⇒ 1
2
β(Γγ(γ − 1)Xγ−2) = αp. (5.27)
Consider now two public goods i and j. The net rent gives utility in mone-
tary unit which has the same value independent from the good.
∂Probg
∂Xi
∂Probg
∂Xj
=
∂Probg
∂NRi
× ∂NRi
∂Xi
∂Probg
∂NRj
× ∂NRj
∂Xj
, (5.28)
=
2αPi (X
∗
i −Xi)
2αPj (X
∗
j −Xj)
(5.29)
114
with Probg as the probability to vote for government party g.
∂NRi
∂Xi
∂NRj
∂Xj
=
αi(X
∗
i −Xi)
αj(X∗j −Xj)
(5.30)
=
1
2
NR′′(X∗i −X0i )
1
2
NR′′(X∗j −X0j )
(5.31)
NRi = NRi(X
∗
i ) + βf
′
i(X
∗
i )− 1 +NR′′(X∗i )(X∗i −Xi) (5.32)
∂NRi
∂Xi
= βif
′′
i (X
∗
i )× 2(X∗i −Xi) (5.33)
∂NRi
∂Xj
= βjf
′′
j (X
∗
j )2(X
∗
j −Xj) (5.34)
f ′′i (Xi) = γi(γi − 1)× Γi ×X
γi−2
i (5.35)
=
(γi − 1)
X∗i
× fi
′
.
(5.37)
From 5.8 follows
NR′′i =
∂βf ′i − 1
∂Xi
(5.38)
=
∂(βΓγXγ−1i )
∂Xi
= βΓγ(γ − 1)×Xγ−2 × (X
X
)
=
(γ − 1)F ′(X)
X∗
,
and thus
αPi
αPj
=
(γi−1)×F ′(Xi)
X∗i
(γj−1)×F ′(Xj)
X∗j
(5.39)
⇒ α
P
i
αPj
=
γi − 1
γj − 1
×
X∗j
X∗i
(5.40)
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⇔ α
P
i ×X∗i
αPj × Z∗j
=
γi − 1
(1− γ′j)
(5.41)
kij =
γi
1− γ′j
(5.42)
⇒ kij − kijγ′j = γi − 1 (5.43)
(1− γ′j) =
γi − 1
kij
(5.44)
γ′j = 1−
γi − 1
kij
=
kij + (1− γi)
kij
. (5.45)
5.3.2 Econometric Models
Since we assume heterogeneity among voters, we need individual political
weights as well as WTP measurements. In particular, we estimate discrete
choice models which are theoretically founded in the random utility frame-
work. We chose a latent class approach to assess both, the economic
preferences (the WTP for environmental public goods) and corresponding
political weights.
We assume a set of i = 1, 2, ..., n voters which we consider to be utility
maximizers. Let then t denote the choice situation and J a set of alterna-
tives. The utility of alternative j is denoted by Uitj. Hence, i decides for j
if
Uitj > Uitj′ . (5.46)
In particular, utility consists of two components, where Vitj refers to the de-
terministic part of voter i’s utility. It is based on observable characteristics
while εitj is the unobserved stochastic error component (Hensher et al.,
2015). Hence,
Uitj = Vitj + εitj. (5.47)
Please note that Vitj is a linear combination of a g × 1 vector of g explana-
tory variables x as well as a g × 1 vector of parameters β:
Vitj = βx. (5.48)
Following (Greene, 2012), the corresponding probability to choose al-
ternative j is
Pitj = Prob(y = j|it) = Prob(Uit(j) > Uit(j′)) = Prob(Uit(j)− Uit(j′) > 0).
(5.49)
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Standard models for discrete choices are the conditional and the multino-
mial logit model (McFadden, 1974). The underlying assumption is that the
stochastic component εitj is independent and identically distributed with
Gumbel (type 1 extreme value) distributions (Hensher et al., 2015). The
conditional logit model corresponds
Pitj =
eVitj∑
j e
Vitj
(5.50)
=
e(β0+
∑
g βgxitgj)∑
j e
(β0+
∑
g βgxitgj)
,
where xitgj denotes the gth attribute of alternative j in choice set t for
decision maker i. Note that attributes vary among alternatives in the choice
set. Furthermore, β0 corresponds the alternative specific constant (ASC)
and is also estimated like βg. For considering individual characteristics,
the multinomial logit model has to be used. Accordingly, a k × 1 vector z
of individual characteristics now refers to utility’s observable part:
Pitj =
eVitj∑
j e
Vitj
(5.51)
=
e(
∑
k αkjxitk)∑
j e
(
∑
k αkjzitk)
,
where zitk is the kth characteristic of individual i in choice situation t1. Both
models might be combined (Greene, 2009), i.e.
Pitj =
eVitj∑
j e
Vitj
(5.52)
=
e(β0+
∑
g βgxitgj+
∑
k αkjxitk)∑
j e
(β0+
∑
n βnxitnj+
∑
k αkjzitk)
.
While the mentioned models assume homogeneous preferences among
decision makers, the latent class model (Swait, 1994; Boxall and Adamow-
icz, 2002; Greene and Hensher, 2003) allows preference heterogeneity.
First, the set of voters is divided into Q groups which we label as classes
in the following. Note that the membership in class q is not deterministic,
but - as the choice model - probabilistic and depends on a l × 1 vector
s of decisions maker’s l characteristics. Accordingly, one can write the
1Please note that parameters α vary among alternatives.
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corresponding membership likelihood function as
Miq = θ0 +
∑
l
θqsil, (5.53)
with the class membership constant γ0. Hence,
Piq =
eMiq
e
∑Q
q=1Miq
. (5.54)
Moreover,
Pitjq =
eVitjq∑
j e
Vitjq
(5.55)
=
e(β0q+
∑
g βgqxitgj+
∑
k αkjqxitk)∑
j e
(β0q+
∑
n βnqxitnj+
∑
k αkjqzitk)
and the overall probability to chose j corresponds
Pij =
Q∑
q=1
PiqPitjq. (5.56)
Moreover, Greene and Hensher (2003) suggest to use Bayes theorem in
order to calculate posteriori class probability:
P̂iq =
PijqPiq∑Q
q=1 PijqPiq
| y = j. (5.57)
We can use posteriori probability to calculate individual WTP:
WTPq = −
βk
βcosts
(5.58)
WTPi =
Q∑
q=1
P̂iqWTPq (5.59)
5.3.3 Data
We use a sample of 1002 respondents from an online survey on the topic
sustainability which was carried out in November 2018. The online sur-
vey consisted of questions regarding voting behaviour and three discrete
choice experiments as well as several socio-economic questions. Policy
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issues covered were, among others, the topics animal welfare, climate and
water protection. These three ecological issues were part of the first dis-
crete choice experiment which we use to calculate the willingness to pay
(WTP) for each issue. Original attributes as well as attribute levels are
given in appendix 5.11.
The dependent variable for the voting behaviour model is participants’
answer to the question which party they would vote for if a election would
be held on the next Sunday. Moreover, they had to state their own po-
sition regarding amount of greenhouse gas emissions in CO2 equivalent,
financing animal welfare and kilograms (kg) nitrogen (N) per hectare (ha)
farm land as well as other issues. Participants were also asked to state
the perceived position of the parties that are part of the German parlia-
ment in order to calculate corresponding distances2. Distance variables
are presented in table 5.1.
2For alternative of not voting we set distance to 0.
119
Table 5.1: Distances for policy issues
Dimension Issue Variable
Ecology Farm Animal Welfare ANIMALWELFARE.percentage3
CO2 Emissions CLIMATE.percentage3
Water protection (reduce nitrogen surplus) WATER3
Economy Economic growth GLOBALJUSTICE.percentage3
Source: Own presentation.
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The variable ANIMALWELFARE.percentage3 deals with the question
how much money the government should spend in order to promote farm
animal welfare. Absolute values range from zero (current) to 4.5 billion
euro governmental spending and thus correspond to scientific suggestions
(see WBA, 2015). With CLIMATE.percentage3 we address the reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions where 909 million tons CO2 equivalent in
2016 (BMU, 2019) serve as reference value. Our third issue of interest is
reduction of nitrogen surplus in order to protect water. The corresponding
variable is WATER3. Please note that our variables have different scales
as well as different units. Hence, we transformed animal welfare positions
into percentage of maximum value (4.5 billion euro). Moreover, we have
set mentioned amount of CO2 emissions (climate position) in relation to the
status quo. So the distance attributes are expressed in percentage points.
To control for party loyalty we included the variable PI which comes also
as an attribute of the parties. If a voter i identifies with party j, it holds
PIij = 1 and PIij′ = 0.
For retrospective voting we use results from a PCA: The survey con-
tained a set of ten retrospective variables which are presented in table 5.2.
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Table 5.2: Retrospective variables
Values Economic Ecology Social
Current status
Very Good 1 economic_situation evaluate_ecology evaluate_socialpeace
Very Bad 5 evaluate_growth evaluate_globaljustice
Compare to 5 years ago
Much better 1 retro_economic_situation retro_ecology retro_socialpeace
Much worse 5 retro_growth retro_globaljustice
Source: Own presentation.
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Voters evaluated four issues from a current perspective as well as in
comparison to the situation five years ago. Values range from 1 (“very
good” or “much better”) to 5 (“very bad” or “much worse”, see table 5.2).
With a PCA we reduced these dimensions to a suggested two component
solution.
Figure 5.1: PCA Loadings
Components Analysis
evaluate_globaljustice
retro_globaljustice
retro_socialpeace
evaluate_socialpeace
evaluate_ecology
retro_ecology
evaluate_growth
retro_economic_situation
economic_situation
retro_growth
SocEcol
0.7368
0.7214
0.6742
0.6644
0.6198
0.5097
Econ
0.7295
0.7071
0.7048
0.6639
Source: Own presentation.
The economic variables load on one component (figure 5.1). Hence,
we label the corresponding variable Econ. The social and environmental
judgements load on the second component which is denoted as SocEcol.
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Table 5.3: Variables for covariates or predictors
Variable Content Values Value meaning
age Age in years 18 Youngest
93 Oldest
educational_level Level of education 1 Leaved schhol without graduation
7 University
political_interest Political interest 1 Very strong
5 No interest at all
importance_ecology Importance: Ecology 0 Unimportant
100 Very important
sustainability_market Regulating sustainability via market 1 Full agreement
5 Full disagreement
subjectiveincome Subjective perceiption own income 1 Living good
5 Hard to cope with
hypotetical_info Hypotetical bias information 0 No
1 Yes
Source: Own presentation.
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Table 5.3 shows the set of covariates and predictors used in the econo-
metric models. We present the results of the analysis in the next section.
5.4 Results
We start with a brief presentation of the econometric results from the em-
pirical specification before we show the belief parameter results.
5.4.1 Econometric Modelling
Using BIC measure we identified a three class model as the best fitting
model for DCE choices. The corresponding parameters for the choice
model are given in table 5.4. Moreover, the class membership coefficients
are presented in table 5.5.
Table 5.4: WTP Estimation results for choices
1-3 Class1 Class2 Class3
ASC
1 -0.074 0.568 -1.049*
2 -0.070 1.889 0.191
3 0.144 -2.456 0.859
Attributes
ANIMAL 0.264*** 0.155** -0.091
CLIMATEPROTrelred.year 0.177*** -0.026 -0.130
WATERPROTrelred.year 0.018*** -0.010 0.111*
COSTS.euro -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.013***
Predictors
importance_ecology
1 1.366*** 1.082*** 1.581**
2 1.099*** 1.598*** -0.125
3 -2.465*** -2.680*** -1.456***
hypotetical_info
1 -0.042 -1.375 -2.330
2 0.190* -2.922*** 7.051*
3 -0.148 4.297* -4.721
Source: Own presentation.
The animal welfare attribute has a positive and significant impact on
choice probability in classes 1 and 2 and a (not significant) negative esti-
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mate in class 3. Hence, in the two largest classes (see table 5.5) animal
welfare increases utility. Interestingly, climate protection is only positive
(and significant) in classes 1 and 2. Water protection, i.e. reduction of
kg N per ha is utility increasing in two classes (table 5.5). The sign of
our cost attribute is negative in all classes and corresponds to theoreti-
cal assumptions. For the controlling predictors our results show that per-
ceived importance of issue “ecology” decreases the choice probability of
the status quo alternative in all classes and for alternative 2 in class 3. Ta-
ble 5.5 also shows that providing information about hypothetical bias has
only three significant coefficients for alternative 2 (positive in 1 and 3 as
well as negative in class 2).
Table 5.5: WTP Estimation results for class membership
Class1 Class2 Class3
Intercept 0.374 -0.722* 0.347
age -0.000 0.007 -0.007
education_level 0.074* 0.063 -0.136**
sustainability_market 0.231*** -0.034 -0.197**
Share 0.79 0.14 0.07
Source: Own presentation.
With regard to the class membership, we see a non significant impact
of age over all classes. Note that membership likelihood for largest class 1
(see again table 5.5) increases with higher education as well as disagree-
ment to the statement that markets should regulate sustainability 5.5. We
calculated the individual willingness to pay for each ecological attribute
(see equations 5.58-5.59) from estimation results. Distributions of indi-
vidual WTP by class membership are given in figure 5.2 and show that
willingness to pay in class 1 is the highest for all of the ecological issues.
As one can easily see from the scale, people are willing to spend up to
110 Euro in order to finance animal welfare (figure 5.2). This exceeds
maximum values for climate (73.7) or water (8.52) protection. Note that
our results also show some negative WTPs, i.e. indicating willingness to
accept for ecological issues.
126
Figure 5.2: Distribution of WTP by Class
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For voting behaviour, we decided for a 2 class model. All distances
behave like we expect from theory: they have a negative coefficient (ta-
ble 5.6), implying that increasing distance leads to decreased utility and
hence, probability. In contrast, party identification increases voting proba-
bility.
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Table 5.6: Voting behaviour estimation results for choices
Class1 Class2
ASC
UNION 1.358* 3.012***
SPD 0.402 2.945***
AfD 2.232*** -4.554**
FDP 1.401* 1.134
LEFT 1.244 -6.127**
GREEN 2.255*** 1.216
NOTVOTE -8.891** 2.373***
Distances
ANIMALWELFARE.percentage3 -0.016*** -0.002
CLIMATE.percentage3 -0.026*** -0.006
WATER3 -0.007** -0.010
GROWTH.percentage3 -0.013*** -0.005
PI 3.504*** 5.702***
Predictors
SocEcol
UNION 0.109 -0.341
SPD -0.077 0.205
AfD 0.602** -4.617***
FDP 0.598** 0.572
LEFT 0.863*** 4.500***
GREEN 0.547** -1.127
NOTVOTE -2.642* 0.808*
Econ
UNION -0.009 -1.219**
SPD -0.249 0.205
AfD 0.432* -0.916
FDP -0.016 -0.184
LEFT 0.373 3.293***
GREEN -0.090 -1.664**
NOTVOTE -0.441 0.486
Source: Own presentation.
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In class 1, higher values for SocEcol increase probability to vote for
AfD while coefficient in class 2 has a negative sign. This also applies for
the green party, but here the parameter in class 2 is not significant.
Table 5.7: Voting behaviour estimation results for class membership
Class1 Class2
Intercept 1.320 -1.320
age 0.009 -0.009
political_interest -0.694*** 0.694***
education_level 0.204** -0.204**
sustainability_market 0.089 -0.089
Share 0.89 0.11
Source: Own presentation.
Class 1 is characterized by older (non significant), better educated peo-
ple who disagree to market driven regulation of sustainability, while people
with less political interest rather belong to class 2 (table 5.7). Note that
0.89 of respondents belong to class 1 (table 5.7).
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Figure 5.3: Distribution of individual policy weights by class
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Source: Own presentation.
From these estimation results we calculated policy weights at the indi-
vidual level. Figure 5.3 shows that for class 1 the weights of animal welfare
and climate protection are higher. In contrast, members of this class put
less emphasis on water protection compared to class 2.
5.4.2 Belief Parameter
With the results for WTP3 as well as policy weights we were able to cal-
culate the belief parameters. Please note that all parameters presented in
the following are the beliefs of voters. From equation 5.45 it follows that
cost elasticities for ecological goods depend on those of another good. So
we calculated cost elasticities given fixed cost and production elasticities
for animal welfare. Hence, we show conditional cost elasticities for a set
of fixed animal welfare cost elasticities in the following. Table 5.8 presents
variable names and sets of fixed parameters.
3Note that cases with neagtive WTP measure have been removed.
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Table 5.8: Cost elasticities for climate and water given animal welfare fixa-
tion
Animal welfare fixation
Variable Production elasticity Cost elasticity
g01.climate 10 0.1
g2.climate 0.5 2
g10.climate 0.1 10
g01.water 10 0.1
g2.water 0.5 2
g10.water 0.1 10
Source: Own presentation.
Figure 5.4 shows that climate protection cost elasticities’ distribution
varies depending on fixed animal welfare cost elasticity: In particular, the
mean for g01.climate cost elasticity corresponds 1.37.
Figure 5.4: Distribution of 1
γ
for climate under animal welfare restrictions
0
1
2
1 5 10 15 20
Cost Elasticity
de
ns
ity
Variable g01.climate g10.climate g2.climate
Under restrictions for farm animal welfare
Cost Elasticity: Climate
Source: Own presentation.
If we fix γ′ = 1
γ
= 2 for animal welfare, average cost elasticity for cli-
mate corresponds 2.83 (figure 5.4). Thus, on average people assume that
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1% more reduction of CO2 pollution changes costs by 2.83 percent. This
is twice as high as for the 0.1 fixation. Changing the fixation to 10, we
see that this also doubles climate’s cost elasticity: on average, people’s
belief correspond an elasticity of 4.3 (figure 5.4). Hence, as expected from
theory, cost elasticity beliefs regarding animal welfare technically also in-
fluence climate beliefs.
Figure 5.5: Distribution of 1
γ
for climate by gender
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Source: Own presentation.
If looking at g2.climate’s distributions for men and women separately,
one can see that we measured slightly higher cost elasticities for the for-
mer: Men have a mean cost elasticity of 3.070 while women’s parameters
on average correspond 2.597 (figure 5.5). We tested this difference re-
garding significance using a t-test. The test results imply that the difference
between men and women is statistically significant (table 5.9). Please note
that this pattern holds also for the two other specifications. i.e. g01.climate
and g10.climate.
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Table 5.9: Results from t-test regarding gender group means
Variable man woman p-Value
g01.climate 1.414 1.320
g2.climate 3.070 2.597 0.024
g10.climate 4.725 3.875
g01.water 1.018 1.016
g2.water 1.089 1.080 0.414
g10.water 1.161 1.144
Source: Own presentation.
For water protection, we see that in general the cost elasticities are
smaller. Mean value for g01.water is 1.02 while g2.water ’s mean cor-
responds 1.08. If assuming animal welfare’s cost elasticity equals 10, the
mean for water g10.water is 1.15 (figure 5.6). Hence, cost beliefs of animal
welfare do not affect water protection cost beliefs that much. Also, there
is not much difference in g2.water regarding gender. This is confirmed by
the t-test, where results clearly reject statistical significance between the
small differences in group means (table 5.9).
Figure 5.6: Distribution of 1
γ
for water under animal welfare restrictions
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To identify whether higher beliefs regarding cost elasticities depend on
voter groups, we run a binary logit model. The dependent variable is a
dummy measuring whether measured belief parameter of an individual
exceeds the median of all measured cost elasticities. Note that we set the
AfD as the reference party, hence party coefficients have to be interpreted
in comparison to AfD voters. We also controlled for gender effects, consid-
ering results from t-test presented above. Moreover, we added controls for
evaluating change in ecology’s state (retro_ecology ) and attitude towards
sustainability regulation (sustainability_market). We applied this to both,
climate protection and water protection.
Table 5.10: Estimation results for binary logit models regarding climate
and water
Climate Water
Intercept -1.140* -0.927
woman -0.433** -0.222
retro_ecology 0.062 -0.006
sustainability_market 0.154 0.036
FDP 0.778* 0.944*
GREEN 0.480 0.640*
LEFT 0.354 0.207
NOTVOTE 1.056 3.639***
SPD 0.713* 1.176***
UNION 0.981** 1.376***
AIC 883.53 845.08
Source: Own presentation.
Estimation results show that if people vote for the FDP, the likelihood for
a higher γ′ increases significantly for both public goods. This also applies
for people voting for SPD and UNION. Regarding water protection, voters
of the GREEN party or non voters also seem to have higher cost beliefs.
So far, γ′ for animal welfare was fixed at 2 and hence, γ corresponded
0.5. We used γ = 0.5 to calculate efficiency parameter Γ accordingly, using
X.ANIMALWELFARE_orig. Subsequently, we calculated a new variable
X.faw_new_g with Γ and γnew = 0.48 to see how they affect the X position.
134
Figure 5.7: Distributions of X for animal welfare
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As becomes clear from figure 5.7, changing production elasticity by
only -0.02 moves the whole distribution towards a lower level: Mean po-
sition for X.ANIMALWELFARE_orig equals 1.714 billion Euro while for
X.faw_new_g the mean now is 0.692 billion Euro. Thus, preferred policy
position regarding animal welfare depends on underlying beliefs regarding
efficiency.
Finally, we also changed the belief parameters of g2.climate, i.e. cost
elasticity, in order to simulate new values for Z. In particular, we first
took the quantile values for the lower and the upper 5% quantile which
we denote as ĝl and ĝu. With weighting factor λ = 0.95 we then calcu-
lated two new variables where we shifted original g2.climate in a lower
(g2.climate_new_low) or higher (g2.climate_new_low) direction4. Results
for the new Z -variables as well the original Z are given in figures 5.8
and 5.9.
4g2.climater_new_low = λg2.climate + (1 − λ)ĝl and g2.climater_new_high =
λg2.climate+ (1− λ)ĝh
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Figure 5.8: Distribution of Z for changend γ′
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If changing γ′ to a lower level, we see that average Z∗ increases and
if increasing the cost elasticity it decreases (figure 5.8). Hence, one could
conclude that rising cost beliefs lower the amount of greenhouse gas emis-
sion that people want.
136
Figure 5.9: Distribution of Z for changed Γ′
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Source: Own presentation.
This also applies for Γ′, i.e. the costs for the first percentage of reduc-
tion: If we increase this parameter, it lowers Z and if we set a low value,
preferred Z increases (figure 5.8). From that we conclude that the pre-
ferred amount of greenhouse gas emission depends on the cost beliefs
that people have in mind.
5.5 Conclusion
Sustainability is a field of complex political technologies. Nowadays ques-
tion of ecological sustainability covers the topics climate and water protec-
tion as well as animal welfare. Voters are uncertain about the true political
technology that translates a policy into outcome. Since these kind of re-
lation is rather complex, laymen apply policy beliefs, i.e. simple mental
models regarding the true political technology. These beliefs might be
biased, so they can cause inefficient and non-optimal policy decisions if
political agents put most emphasis on voters’ position. Hence, it would
be interesting to measure beliefs so that voter beliefs can be compared to
interest groups beliefs and true political technologies.
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Combining theoretical approaches of economics and analysis of voting
behaviour, we developed an approach to measure voters’ underlying belief
parameters for climate and water protection as well as animal welfare. In
particular, we assume that the provision of public goods corresponds to
a Cobb-Douglas production function of governmental spending. Further-
more, we combined the theory of policy oriented voting with the concept
of WTP for public goods, i.e. calculating individual WTP as well as policy
weights for each issue. Hence, we were able to derive the measurement
of the production functions’ parameters which we assume to correspond
to the beliefs. Based on survey data we subsequently calculated belief
parameters for the issues animal welfare, climate and water protection.
First, we could show that climate protection beliefs vary depending on
fixed animal welfare cost elasticity. Depending on the chosen γ′ for animal
welfare, climate protection cost elasticities on average correspond 1.37,
2.83 or 4.3. Here higher cost elasticities for animal welfare increase cli-
mate’s cost elasticities. In general, this pattern holds for water protection.
But here the values are near 1 for all fixations. Hence, water protection
costs are perceived as nearly proportional elastic.
Second, we found heterogeneity. For example, there is a significant
difference between men and women for climate protection. For women,
we measured slightly lower belief parameters. Moreover, results show
evidence that voters of FDP, SPD and UNION in general seem to have
increased belief parameters.
Third, simulating new policy positions changing parameters gave inter-
esting results. Setting the fixed γ for animal welfare from 0.5 to 0.48 de-
creased policy positions of voters regarding governmental spending. We
also changed the belief parameters for climate to simulate new values for
Z. Here we could show that changing γ′ to a lower level increased the
Z-position. If γ′ is increased, Z is lower. This also applies for the costs
of the first percentage of greenhouse gas reduction. Thus, we conclude
that policy positions of voters seem to strongly depend on cost elasticities
and costs for the first unit of a good. More precisely, positions depend on
the beliefs regarding the costs. If people’s beliefs correspond to smaller
cost elasticities, i.e. in the direction of proportional costs, the amount of
relative greenhouse gas emissions they want increases. But if reducing
greenhouse gas emissions is perceived with higher costs (or is initially
expensive), they want less reduction.
All in all, these findings underline the important role of beliefs. With our
approach we were able to demonstrate how they drive voters’ policy posi-
tions. From a theoretical perspective, it allows to evaluate biases regarding
sustainability goods and their politically provision. If a benchmark is given,
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one can asses the beliefs among voters and subsequently compare them
to the true political technology.
Unfortunately, we don’t have such an adequate benchmark, yet. This
especially applies for animal welfare’s political technology, but also for cli-
mate or water protection. Thus, the empirical application of our approach
is restricted to the pure measurement of voters’ beliefs. We clearly see
this as a first step to evaluate political processes regarding the possibility
of basis democratic policy failure.
Regarding belief formation, we see need for more research of the causal
mechanisms. The beliefs measured depend on the individual character-
istics that influence voting and economic behaviour, i.e. policy weights
and WTP. Nevertheless, this is not a causal mechanism that leads directly
to the beliefs. Rather, beliefs are the result of learning. As argued by
Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2010), learning can be an observational and/or
communicational mechanism. The latter can take place in social networks
(Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990). It corresponds to the mechanism of infor-
mational lobbying (Henning et al., 2019) among policy stakeholders. Con-
sidering for example important role of media in animal welfare discourse
(Brümmer et al., 2019; Grossarth, 2014), one should also take into ac-
count the influence of mass media. This also applies for social media
where both, interest groups and voters, can communicate to each other
and can influence opinions (Buddle et al., 2018). Hence we suggest future
research to investigate the causal mechanism of belief building among vot-
ers considering mass and social media as well as personal communication
in networks. Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective we think that our
paper contributes to the political economy of sustainability, since it allows
to identify voters’ policy beliefs empirically.
Bibliography
Daron Acemoglu and Asuman Ozdaglar. Opinion Dynamics and Learning
in Social Networks. Dynamic Games and Applications, 1(1):3–49, oct
2010. doi: 10.1007/s13235-010-0004-1.
Peter Achterberg. Class voting in the new political culture: Economic,
cultural and environmental voting in 20 western countries. International
Sociology, 21(2):237–261, mar 2006. doi: 10.1177/0268580906061378.
James Adams, Samuel Merrill, and Bernard Grofman. A Unified Theory
of Party Competition. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2005.
139
George A. Akerlof. The economics of illusion. Economics & Politics, 1:
1–15, March 1989.
Kym Anderson. Lobbying incentives and the pattern of protection in rich
and poor countries. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 43
(2):401–23, January 1995.
Robert J. Blendon, John M. Benson, Mollyann Brodie, Richard Morin,
Drew E. Altman, Daniel Gitterman, Mario Brossard, and Matt James.
Bridging the gap between the public’s and economists’ views of the
economy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11:105–118, 1997.
BMEL. Deutschland, wie es isst. der BMEL-Ernährungsreport 2017,
2017a.
BMEL. Nutztierhaltungsstrategie, 2017b.
BMU. Klimaschutzbericht 2018 zum Aktionsprogramm Klimaschutz 2020
der Bundesregierung, 2019.
Peter Boxall and Wiktor Adamowicz. Understanding Heterogeneous
Preferences in Random Utility Models: A Latent Class Approach.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 23(4):421–446, December
2002.
William A. Brock and Stephen P. Magee. The economics of special
interest politics: The case of the tariff. The American Economic
Review, 68:246–250, 1978.
Nanke Brümmer, Jenny Wolfram, Marcus Mergenthaler, and Inken
Christoph-Schulz. Das Bild der Geflügelhaltung in den Deutschen
Printmedien. In Christian Henning, Sebastian Hess, Uwe
Latacz-Lohmann, Jens-Peter Loy, Holger Thiele, and Martin Braatz,
editors, Visionen für eine Agrar- und Ernährungspolitik nach 2020,
volume 54 of Schriften der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und
Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaus e.V., pages 355–357. Gesellschaft
für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaus e.V.,
Landwirtschaftsverlag GmbH, 2019.
E. A. Buddle, H. J. Bray, and W. S. Pitchford. Keeping it ‘inside the fence’:
an examination of responses to a farm-animal welfare issue on twitter.
Animal Production Science, 58(3):435, 2018. doi: 10.1071/an16634.
140
Bryan Caplan. Rational Irrationality and the Microfoundations of Political
Failure. Public Choice, 107:311–331, 2001.
Bryan Caplan. Systematically Biased Beliefs about Economics: Robust
Evidence of Judgemental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and
Economists on the Economy. The Economic Journal, 112:433–458,
April 2002.
Bryan Caplan. The Myth of the Rational Voter - Why Democracies
Choose Bad Politics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2007.
Beth Clark, Gavin B Stewart, Luca A Panzone, Ilias Kyriazakis, and
Lynn J Frewer. Citizens, Consumers and Farm Animal Welfare: A
Meta-Analysis of Willingness-to-Pay Studies. Food Policy, 68:112–127,
2017.
Otto Davis, Hinrich J. Melvin, and Peter C. Ordeshook. An expository
development of a mathematical model of the electoral process.
American Political Science Review, 64:426–48, 1970.
Anthony Downs. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row,
New York, 1957.
James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich. The Spatial Theory of Voting: An
Introduction. Cambrigde University Press, New York, 1984.
Noah E. Friedkin and Eugene C. Johnsen. Social influence and opinions.
Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 15:193–205, 1990.
William Greene. Discrete choice modeling. In Terence C. Mills and Kerry
Patterson, editors, Palgrave Handbook of Econometrics Volume 2:
Applied Econometrics, pages 473–556. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN,
Basingstoke, 2009.
William H. Greene. Econometric Analysis. Pearson, 7th edition, 2012.
URL http://stat.smmu.edu.cn/DOWNLOAD/ebook/econometric.pdf.
William H. Greene and David A. Hensher. A latent class model for
discrete choice analysis: Contrasts with mixed logit. Transportation
Research Part B: Methodological, 37(8):681–698, September 2003.
Harald Grethe. The economics of farm animal welfare. Annual Review of
Resource Economics, 9:75–94, 2017.
141
Jan Grossarth. Moralisierung und Maßlosigkeit der Agrarkritik. Gedanken
zu Strukturen und Motiven in Mediendebatten und politischem Protest
gegen die Agrarindustrie. In Gunther Hirschfelder, Angelika Ploeger,
Jana Rückert-John, and Gesa Schönberger, editors, Was der Mensch
essen darf, chapter 24, pages 363–377. Springer Fachmedien
Wiesbaden, 2014.
Gene M. Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. Electoral Competition and
Special Interest Politics. Review of Economic Studies, 63(2):265–286,
1996.
Jean Baldwin Grossman. Evaluating social policies: Principles and U.S.
experience. The World Bank research observer, 9(2):159–180, 1994.
Michael Grunenberg and Christian H.C.A. Henning. Ökologisches
Wählen in Deutschland. Vortrag auf der 29. Jahrestagung der ÖGA in
Innsbruck, September 2019.
David Harvey and Carmen Hubbard. Reconsidering the political economy
of farm animal welfare: An anatomy of market failure. Food Policy, 38:
105–114, 2013.
Christian Henning, Christian Aßmann, Johannes Hedtrich, Julian
Ehrenfels, and Eva Krampe. What drives participatory policy
processes: Grassroot activities, scientific knowledge or donor money?
– a comparative policy network approach. Social Networks, 58:78–104,
jul 2019. doi: 10.1016/j.socnet.2019.03.001.
David A. Hensher, John M. Rose, and William H. Greene. Applied Choice
Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2 edition, 2015.
Carl Johan Lagerkvist and Sebastian Hess. A meta-analysis of consumer
willingness to pay for farm animal welfare. European Review of
Agricultural Economics, 38(1):55–78, 2011. doi: 10.1093/erae/jbq043.
Ulf Liebe. Zahlungsbereitschaft für kollektive Umweltgüter. Soziologische
und ökonomische Analysen. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, 2007.
Ulf Liebe and Peter Preisendörfer. Zahlungsbereitschaft für kollektive
Umweltgüter. Zeitschrift für Soziologie, 36(5):326–345, Oktober 2007.
D. McFadden. The measurement of urban travel demand. Journal of
Public Economics, 3:303–328, 1974.
142
Mancur Olson. The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press,
Cambridge (Mass.), 1965.
S. Rhoads. The Economist’s View of the World: Government, Markets,
and Public Policy. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.
Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen . Stickstoff: Lösungsstrategien für
ein drängendes Umweltproblem. Sondergutachten, Berlin, January
2015.
Joffre Swait. A Structural Equation Model of Latent Segmentation and
Product Choice for Cross-sectional Revealed Prefernce Choice Data.
Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 1(2):77–89, 1994.
J.F.M. Swinnen, L. Dries, and K. Macours. Transition and agricultural
labor. Policy Research Group Working Paper 16, Department of
Agricultural and Environmental Economics, Katholieke Univeriteit,
Leuven, 2000.
Friedhelm Taube. Umwelt- und Klimawirkungen der Landwirtschaft. Eine
kritische Einordnung - Statusbericht, Herausforderungen und Ausblick.
In DLG e.V., editor, Moderne Landwirtschaft zwischen Anspruch und
Wirklichkeit, pages 13–38. DLG-Verlag, 2016.
UBA. Nährstoffeinträge aus der Landwirtschaft und Stickstoffüberschuss.
Umweltbundeamt, 2018.
Reinhard Uehleke and Silke Hüttel. The free-rider deficit in the demand
for farm animal welfare-labelled meat. European Review of Agricultural
Economics, 46(2):1–28, 2018.
WBA. Wege zu einer Gesellschaftlich Akzeptierten Nutztierhaltung.
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat Agrarpolitik beim BMEL, 2015. Gutachten.
Berlin.
5.A Appendix
143
Table 5.11: Attributes and attributes’ levels of iscrete choice experiment. Italic levels are status quo.
Attribute Name Attribute Attribute level Level label
CLIMATEPROT Climate protection
1 909 Milion tons
2 735 Milion tons
3 535 Milion tons
4 388 Milion tons
ANIMAL Animal Welfare
1 No improvements
2 Husbandry
3 Husbandry + Management
4 Husbandry + Management + Breeding
WATERPROT Water protection
1 100kg N/ha
2 60kg N/ha
3 40 kg N/ha
4 0kg N/ha
COSTS Kosten
1 No further costs
2 0,3%
3 0,6%
4 0,8%
Source: Own presentation.
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Abstract
Based on a framework of political participation, this study quantifies com-
munication effects within German farm animal politics. Social network data
as well as stakeholders’ evaluation of a standardized testing and approval
procedure for mass-produced livestock facilities are used to demonstrate
these effects. The results show that the network of expert communication
is comparatively strong connected. Additionally, we see that agriculture
and animal production as well as animal protection groups are drivers of
expert knowledge and that the meat industry is the most open to external
expertise. Finally, structural effects lead to a slight convergence of posi-
tions.
Keywords: Farm animal politics, political processes, participation, be-
lief, farm animal welfare
6.1 Introduction
Livestock farming in Germany faces increasing criticism in recent years.
This is especially true for pig production, which citizens evaluate nega-
tively and associate with terms like "factory farming" (Kayser et al., 2012;
Rovers et al., 2018, 2019; Salamon et al., 2014). Due to a lack of farm
animal welfare, acceptance of the current husbandry systems decreases
(WBA, 2015). To solve acceptance problems and to fulfil the stated de-
mand (BMEL, 2018, 2017a) for animal welfare, appropriate political pro-
cesses are necessary.
Whenever it comes to politics, policy beliefs play a key role. Animal wel-
fare is a complex concept that includes several aspects of health and phys-
ically functioning, natural living as well as affective states (Fraser, 2008).
Thus, the relation between certain livestock policies and the outcomes are
also complex. To cope with this complexity, non-professionals as well as
politicians and agents of interest groups apply naive mental models. These
usually simple heuristics map the translation of policies into the outcome
and are named as policy beliefs. These beliefs influence the policy posi-
tions of voters as well as interest groups and political agents. Thus, they
affect the final policies that result from political processes. Empirical work
shows evidence for differences in policy beliefs between experts of econ-
omy and voters (see Caplan, 2002). The problem of those biased beliefs
is that they may lead to political failure (Caplan, 2001). Policy decisions
need political support. If supported policy positions base upon biased be-
liefs, inefficient policies result. Therefore, policy beliefs are a critical part
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of politics.
How stakeholders of German livestock politics form these beliefs is un-
known, yet. Literature investigating stakeholders in the area of animal wel-
fare focuses on the empirical comparison between different stakeholder
groups regarding their assessment of animal welfare programs. For exam-
ple, Heise and Theuvsen (2017) compared evaluation of 13 animal wel-
fare activities by different stakeholders. The authors not only asked for
the assessment with respect towards importance, but also with regard of
practical feasibility of the activities. Stakeholder groups asked are conven-
tional and ecological famers, veterinarians as well as consumers. While
many activities are evaluated as important and feasible, some differences
remain. For example, conventional farmers evaluate space allowance
as slightly important and judge it “partly / partly” in terms of practicabil-
ity (Heise and Theuvsen, 2017, pp: 257-258). All in all, Heise (2017)
concludes that judgments of different German stakeholder groups vary.
Other empirical work (see for example Verbeke, 2009; Ventura et al., 2015)
mostly focusses on comparison of stakeholder views along the supply
chain. Unfortunately, these studies restrict themselves on pure compar-
ison, leaving a gap with regard to the political process. Recent work in
comparative political science provides a stronger contribution to the un-
derstanding of political processes. In particular, there is evidence that the
green party drives change in farm animal welfare policies in the German
states (Vogeler, 2017b). On the national level, party difference as well
as economic integration may explain different policies (Vogeler, 2017a).
Social concerns influence the emphasis of parties on farm animal issues
(Vogeler, 2019). While investigating (parts of) the process leading to poli-
cies, these studies do not consider beliefs or belief formation. Moreover,
they focus on the policy outputs. Overall, despite the noteworthy work in
the field of stakeholder analysis, there is a gap in the understanding of how
farm animal politics work and how stakeholders form their beliefs.
We investigate the formation of beliefs within German farm animal pol-
itics empirically in order to contribute to a better understanding of political
processes. Since communication is a key determinant of belief formation
(Henning and Hedtrich, 2018), we quantify the effect of expert communi-
cation between the most important farm animal policy stakeholders. To
illustrate this effect, we use the issue of standardized testing and approval
procedure for mass-produced livestock facilities. This refers to the idea
that public agencies only allow mass produced facilities, which pass stan-
dardized tests before. Such facilities include, for example, feeding sys-
tems, watering facilities, flooring and grids (Gauly et al., 2006). Approval
standards are the requirements of the German animal protection regula-
148
tions in connection with the current scientific and technological knowledge
(BMEL, 2017b). Such a procedure is planned for husbandry of hens. The
experience gained there should then be used for the implementation of
other species. This procedure should ensure that mass-produced live-
stock systems correspond to legal and animal welfare requirements. It is
part of the coalition agreement between the parties CDU, CSU and SPD
(CDU et al., 2018) as well as of the strategy for farm animal husbandry
provided by the ministry for food and agriculture (BMEL, 2017b). The sci-
entific advisory board not only recommends the consideration of all kind
of farm animals, but also a procedure for anaesthesia facilities used in the
process of slaughter (WBA, 2015). The next section will briefly describe a
framework of political participation and belief updating.
6.2 Framework
We consider a simple framework of political participation, including vot-
ing, lobbying and communication (see figure 6.1). Within the framework,
members of the society can participate in two roles: voters and interest
groups. First, citizens of a society vote for their representatives or – in di-
rect democratic systems – a policy proposal. Thus, voting corresponds to
the basic democratic part of the political support. Please note that citizens
here appear as voters. Second, citizens form special interest groups in or-
der to influence the policy positions of political agents directly. They swap
the support of their members (e.g. farmers) for influence on the policy
position of political agents (see Grossman and Helpman, 1996; Henning,
2000, 2009). This mechanism is known as lobbying. Voting and lobby-
ing are both part of the political support function for a policy position (Fig.
6.1). Note that the policy preferences within legislative area depend on this
support. The third way of participation affects policy positions indirectly:
the aim of communication is influencing the policy beliefs determining the
policy preferences of actors. We define policy beliefs as (naive) mental
models regarding the relation between policy output x and the outcome z.
This relation is denoted as political technology T (z, x). While the real po-
litical technology is rather complex, laymen as well as interest group and
political agents apply their beliefs Ã to reduce complexity. Ã is the result
of communication learning process and the initial belief Ã0:
Ã = Υ(Ã0) (6.1)
with Υ denoting the communication mechanism (Henning and Hedtrich,
2018). As argued by Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2010), the social structure
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Figure 6.1: Political Process Framework
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Source: Own presentation based on Henning (2000); Henning and
Grunenberg (2018)
in which an actor is embedded in plays a role in belief formation. In par-
ticular, this structure appears as a social network over a set N of n actors.
Formally, the n × n matrix C describes the structure of this network. If
Cij 6= 0 , there is a communication tie between agents i and j. Let M
denote the stochastic matrix where the sum of the total weights equals 1.
The element mij > 0 indicates that i pays attention to j. In order to update
their own beliefs, agents take the weighted averages of their neighbours’
beliefs. Within this process, mij denotes the trust agent i places on cur-
rent belief of actor j and r = 1, . . . , R denotes the communication round
(Henning and Hedtrich, 2018). Thus,
Ãr+1i = mii Ã
0
i +
∑
j 6=i
mijÃ
r
j (6.2)
Please note that mii denotes the weight that actor i puts on his own belief
(his own control).
We can rewrite equation 6.2 to
Ãr+1i = miiÃ
0
i + (1−mii)
∑
j
m̄ij Ã
r
j (6.3)
with
m̄ij =
mij
(1−mii)
. (6.4)
Ari denotes the political belief of agent i after communication round r and
(1−mii) corresponds to the aggregated weight for all neighbours. If 6.3 is
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rewritten in Matrix notation,
Ã = [I − (1−mdiag)M̄ ]−1 ∗mdiag ∗ Ã0 (6.5)
where
M̂ = [I − (1−mdiag)M̄ ]−1 ∗mdiag (6.6)
corresponds to the network multiplier of communication. The element m̂ij
corresponds to the multiplier, i.e. direct and indirect effects of j′s initial be-
lief on i′s final belief (Henning and Hedtrich, 2018). This update procedure
corresponds to the model of Friedkin and Johnsen (1990). We apply this
framework on data presented in the next section.
6.3 Data
Both, network and belief data, are part of an elite network survey within
the research project AniFair. From September 2017 until October 2018 we
conducted 37 interviews with representatives of stakeholder organizations.
Based on a desk research we interviewed not only parliamentary groups
and state offices, but especially interest groups involved in German live-
stock politics. We emphasized that we asked not for the interview partners’
personal opinion, but for the position of their organization. A standardized
questionnaire was used that contains four parts:
I. Political Profile: areas of activity, preference space
II. Assessment and Evaluation of Farm Animal Welfare: level of farm
animal welfare, need for action, evaluation of indicators
III. Livestock Policies: designing a fattening policy according own pref-
erences
IV. Social Networks: reputation, communication, political support and
informal social relations.
Please note that we used the intermediate results of the reputation net-
work complementary to our desk research before the starting round of
interviews to filter out the most important actors. The average interview
duration was 1.5 hours. Since one organization did not completed the
interview, the data set consist of 36 actors.
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6.3.1 Network
To calculate the network multiplier, we use the confirmed communication
network. The communication ties were asked from two perspectives. First,
we asked the interview partners, to whom they send expert information, i.e.
being the supplier of expert knowledge. The perspective changed in the
second question: here the interviewed representatives should name the
organizations from whom they receive information, i.e. being demander of
expert knowledge. This approach is useful to ensure that the real connec-
tions are measured: Using both perspectives allows constructing the con-
firmed network (Pappi et al., 1995). An additional question addressed the
value of information. Representatives had to name organizations which
knowledge is especially valuable. For each of these questions a binary
n × n matrix is constructed, where "1" indicates connection tie and "0"
indicates no tie. S denotes the matrix showing which actors in the rows
send information to the actors in the columns. R is the demand matrix,
showing which row actors receive information from which column actors.
V is the matrix where row actors mark the especially valuable suppliers of
information. So, at a first stage we construct a weighted receiving matrix
W = R + V , (6.7)
which’s transpose is elementwise multiplied in order to get the confirmed
network:
C = S ⊗W T . (6.8)
C is the confirmed network matrix where "0" corresponds to no connection,
"1" to a normal tie and "2" to an especially valuable knowledge exchange
from row actors to column actors.
We used the reputation network to specify the network boundaries. Within
the reputation network, actors marked the organizations they perceive as
influential with regard to livestock politics. Consider the socio matrix G
representing the directed reputation network, where gij corresponds to the
naming of j as an influential actor by i. It is straightforward to use indegree
centrality to calculate reputation:
dj =
∑
j
gij∀i 6= j (6.9)
If dA for stakeholder organization A equals zero, it is not part of the net-
work.
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6.3.2 Belief Data
We use a variable of questionnaire part III to illustrate a belief change
within the network. Within this part, stakeholders had to evaluate some in-
stitutional and structural adjustments, i.e. regulation issues. This includes
the evaluation of a bylaw intended to regulate a standardized testing and
approval procedure for mass-produced livestock facilities. The interviewed
stakeholder representatives had to evaluate a possible corresponding by-
law for pig husbandry facilities on a five-point-scale. This scale ranges
from one ("Not useful") to five ("Very useful"). The corresponding variable
TestAppMPLS1 contains the answers. Please note, that we use the an-
swers as the initial beliefs of the stakeholders2. We present our results in
the next section.
6.4 Results
6.4.1 Network Structure and Multiplier Effects
One of the 36 actors has a reputational indegree of zero. Thus, our
network contains only 35 actors. Table 6.1 lists stakeholder categories,
groups and number of organizations within the network as well as the rep-
utation. The values of the column "Reputation" correspond to the mean
of the measurement presented in equation 6.9. Environment protection
groups and the parliamentary groups receive the highest reputation, i.e.
nomination as influential actors. Note that on average the reputation of
stakeholder organizations assigned to agriculture and animal production
have the lowest reputation.
1Acronym for "Standardized testing and approval procedure for mass-produced live-
stock systems".
2This is of course an ad hoc assumption, ignoring that stakeholders might have com-
municated about this issue before the interviews. Thus, we do not claim to calculate the
true beliefs. Moreover, the variable serves illustrational purposes.
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Table 6.1: Actors and Reputation
Category Group Description n Reputation (Indegrees)
Interest Groups Agric_Animal Agriculture and Animal Production 7 12.14
AniProt Animal Protection 3 20.00
ConsProt Consumer Protection 2 24.00
EcoAgric Ecological Agriculture 2 19.00
EggMilk Egg and Milk Industry 1 19.00
EnvProt Environment Protection 2 26.50
Food Food Retail 5 18.00
Meat Meat Industry 3 14.33
Research Research Institutes and Organizations 1 14.50
Political Agents PubAdmin Public Administration 3 18.00
ParlGroup Parliamentary Groups 6 26.00
Source: Own presentation.
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Figure 6.2 presents the graph of the confirmed weighted communica-
tion network. The overall density of the network is 0.266, which is a com-
paratively high value (see Henning and Krampe, 2018; Henning, 2009). In
other words, the actors within this network realise more than 26 percent of
the possible connections. As one can easily see in figure 6.2, three actors
within the network do not serve as knowledge supplier, but only as de-
mander: One parliamentary group, one public agency and one food retail
organization are placed at the outer region of the graph. Note that these
organizations are not directly connected to each other. Actors from food
retail, producer organizations as well as one public administration actor
form the core of the network.
Figure 6.2: Communication Network
Source: Own presentation.
Based on this dense network we calculated the multiplier as described
in equation 6.6. We aggregated mean values of the results on group level.
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In order to show the relative weight we normalized the values as share
of external knowledge while cancelling out own control. The correspond-
ing figure 6.3 shows, how groups (coloured bars) influence other groups
(rows).
Figure 6.3: Aggregated Communication Multiplier
Source: Own presentation.
Agriculture and animal production organizations drive 40.09 percent
of food retailers’ and 35.20 percent of meat sector’s external knowledge.
Moreover, these organizations also have the highest influence on actors of
the political agents’ category. Interestingly, they also have the highest in-
fluence on the belief updating of research. Another key player is the group
of animal protection. They influence environmental protection groups’ be-
liefs by a share of 0.2912. Moreover, they also are second important for
belief updating of parliamentary groups, i.e. having a share of 0.2454 of
their influence. Note that the latter not only are receiver of information,
but also influential knowledge provider for ecological agriculture (0.239),
consumer protection (0.228) and environmental protection (0.206) organi-
zations. Environmental protection groups (0.016) and consumer protection
(0.013) cover small shares of public administration’s external knowledge.
Moreover, the meat sector has small influence (0.036) on the parliamen-
tary groups belief updating. Interestingly, research has the lowest share
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(0.027), i.e. playing a subordinate role in the formation of policy beliefs
in the parliament. As presented in table 6.2, the sector of agriculture and
Table 6.2: Average Own Control (Group Level)
Group Own control
Agric_Animal 0.8528
AniProt 0.7494
ConsProt 0.3927
EcoAgric 0.7709
EggMilk 0.7182
EnvProt 0.3972
Food 0.5476
Meat 0.3626
Research 0.7103
PubAdmin 0.638
ParlGroup 0.5559
Sample 0.566
Source: Own presentation.
animal production has the highest own control. On average, actors of this
group rely to 85.3 percent on their own knowledge. Organizations of the
meat industry, however, have only an own-control of 0.365. Compared to
other groups, they are the most open to external knowledge. The mean
own control of all organizations in the network is 0.566.
6.4.2 Belief Change for Standardized Testing and Approval
Procedure
To illustrate the results of influence patterns, we present the application
results for the variable TestAppMPLS. As one can see in figure 6.4, the
application of the communication multiplier leads to a change in the dis-
tribution of values. Note that the median of initial belief (grey) equals 3
while the interquartile range is 2. After communication occurs, the final
belief distribution (black) has an interquartile range of 1.33 and a median
of 3.210. This corresponds to a shift towards a higher average evaluation
as “useful” policy. At the same time, the middle 50 percent of values are
distributed closer to each other. This indicates a consensus about the eval-
uation of standardized testing and approval procedure for mass-produced
livestock systems.
157
Figure 6.4: Distribution of TestAppMPLS
Source: Own presentation.
More interesting than the changes for the whole sample are the changes
among the stakeholder groups. Therefore, we calculated the delta of final
and initial beliefs and aggregated the mean on group level. The highest
positive change appears for the group of egg and milk production: on av-
erage, the group delta is 0.513 (figure 6.5). Stakeholders assigned to eco-
logical agriculture have the second highest change (0.283). The smallest
positive change is observed for the public administration (0.056).
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Figure 6.5: Deltas within Groups
Source: Own presentation.
Within environment protection there is an average negative belief change
of -0.617 (figure 6.5). In addition, we observe a negative belief change of
the meat sector by -0.451. This is not a surprise if thinking of the strongest
influence on this group: the sector of agriculture and animal production
determines 22 percent of meat sector’s beliefs while initially evaluating a
testing and approval procedure as rather not useful (see table 6.3). Fig-
ure 6.5 and table 6.3 show a negative change for animal protection groups
after communication. Nevertheless, these stakeholders still judge a bylaw
for testing and approval procedures as rather useful. The opinion within
the parliamentary space also changes in a negative direction; parliamen-
tary groups have a mean of 3.447 after communication (table 6.3). Thus,
they use to evaluate testing and approval procedure as (weak) rather use-
ful.
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Table 6.3: Group Means for Beliefs
Group TestAppMPLS
Inital Final
Agric_Animal 2.357 2.460
AniProt 4.667 4.392
ConsProt 4.000 3.675
EcoAgric 3.500 3.783
Egg_Milk 1.000 1.513
EnvProt 5.000 4.383
Food 3.000 2.966
Meat 2.667 2.216
ParlGroup 3.667 3.447
PubAdmin 3.000 3.056
Research 4.000 3.785
Source: Own presentation.
6.5 Conclusion
Our empirical findings confirm that communication plays a key role in farm
animal politics. Based on a network study we quantified the effect of ex-
pert knowledge communication on stakeholders’ beliefs. Our study shows
a comparatively dense network: The relevant stakeholder organizations
realise more than 26 percent of the possible communication relations. In-
terestingly, we only identified three actors (from three different branches)
who do not supply expert knowledge. Rather, they only receive informa-
tion from other organizations. The network multiplier derived from the net-
work show three things above all. First, the producer sector relies to more
than 85 percent on his own knowledge, i.e. other groups only influence
producers’ opinions to a small amount. At the same time, actors within
this group have the highest influence on meat industry and food retailers,
i.e. their downstream sectors, as well as on the legislative. Second, ani-
mal protection groups notably also influence parliamentary actors. Thus,
they represent a “counterpart” to the producers. Additionally, we observed
high influence on environmental and consumer protection when it comes
to farm animal politics. Overall, expert communication of farm animal poli-
tics seems to be characterized by solidified structures: Economic interest
groups tend to be influenced by each other in particular. However, this also
applies to (civil society) organizations in the fields of animal welfare, the
environment and consumers. Third, legislative actors, i.e. parliamentary
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groups, are not only demander of information. Rather, they have strong
influence on the belief formation of consumer and environment protection.
Additionally, we could demonstrate the result of the corresponding influ-
ence patterns. Results for the rating of standardized testing and approval
procedure for mass-produced livestock facilities seem to reflect this struc-
ture. The measured evaluation by producers – which we consider the ini-
tial belief – corresponds as rather not useful. This also applies for the final
beliefs and is due to the large own control of the sector. After communi-
cation, especially stakeholder from the meat industry change their beliefs
into negative direction. Environmental protection organizations also tend
to evaluate standardized testing and approval procedures less useful than
before communication. This is because ecological agriculture strongly in-
fluences belief formation of environmentalist while evaluating the policy
only with an initial value of 3.5. Nevertheless, distribution of final belief
values indicates a small chance for consensus among the stakeholders.
Given these results, we conclude that appropriate political processes
implementing animal welfare policies benefit from communication, since
consensus building seems possible. Nevertheless, the above average
strong own control of some organizations remains as a possible pitfall:
In particular, stakeholders assigned to producer group are hard to con-
vince. They tend to move to a very small extend in another direction. This
is especially a problem if their beliefs are biased, i.e. not corresponding
to the real political technology. Since this group has a large influence on
the knowledge of others, these stakeholders may pass on biased beliefs
to other organizations, e.g. the legislative and executive power. This also
applies for animal protection groups.
Finally, we do not want to conceal some limitations of the study. Taking
the answers of stakeholder representatives regarding standardized testing
and approval procedure as initial belief is clearly an ad hoc assumption.
It sheds light on a not negligible problem in the collection of belief data:
How can we know, whether we are measuring the initial or the final be-
lief? Or do we capture something in between? Additionally, one could
question whether the nomination of information sources as especially valu-
able justifies a double high as normal weighting in the adjacency matrix.
The weighting "particularly valuable" is a subjective rating that might have
different meanings for representatives of stakeholder organizations. To
overcome this problem, future research should use formulation of ques-
tions that clarify the quantitative (e.g. “double as high as. . . ”) judgment
of knowledge sources’ value. Another limitation results from the sample
composition. While the sample size is in line with other policy elite net-
work survey samples (examples: Pappi and Henning, 1999; Leifeld and
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Schneider, 2012; Henning and Krampe, 2018), it misses an important ac-
tor group: the media, who not only report more and more about issues
of husbandry but also tend to frame the debate (Kayser et al., 2011). We
were not able to include influential media actors, because they did not re-
act to an interview request. Thus, it might be possible that we used a
biased sample to some extent. Despite these limitations, we see our study
as a promising approach to understand German farm animal politics bet-
ter. Moreover, social network tools and the multiplier model may serve as
a tool for the assessment of consensus ability of political landscapes.
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Abstract
Animal welfare becomes more and more important in Germany’s agricul-
ture. Beside legislative actors, other stakeholders of livestock policy nowa-
days are key players of policy making. How do they form their beliefs which
reason their policy positions?
We use a communicational lobbying framework to investigate belief up-
dating regarding four selected issues of animal welfare regulation in Ger-
many. Backbone of our study is a confirmed communication network of
the 35 most influential actors in livestock politics. Our results imply that
agricultural producers as well as animal protection groups are the main
drivers of expert knowledge in German livestock politics.
7.1 Introduction
Germany’s livestock sector is facing decreasing public acceptance in the
recent years (see for example WBA, 2015; Kayser et al., 2012; Rovers
et al., 2018, 2019; Salamon et al., 2014). This is strengthened by nega-
tive media coverage of the productivity-oriented agricultural sector (Kayser
et al., 2012; Grossarth, 2014). Main driver is a perceived lack of farm ani-
mal welfare regarding animal husbandry (WBA, 2015).
At an economic level, animal welfare can be considered as a public
good (Bennett, 1995; Fawaz, 1997; Lusk and Norwood, 2011) plagued
by market failure due to consumption externalities (Harvey and Hubbard,
2013). Thus, public legislation is a main instrument for farm animal welfare
issues (Grethe, 2017). Indeed, empirical evidence shows that consumers
shift responsibility for animal welfare to state and retailers (Te Velde et al.,
2002). Furthermore, citizens (Schulze et al., 2006; Rovers et al., 2017)
and non-governmental organizations (NGO) like Greenpeace (2017) crit-
icize the current legal framework as not sufficient. Law studies also deal
with several aspects of regulating animal welfare (see for example Peters,
2016a,b; Kloepfer, 2016; Rossi, 2016; Schürmeier, 2017). This sheds light
to the area of legislation. In particular, the question regarding the leg-
islation drivers occurs. This refers to the according political processes.
Recent political science work shows evidence that especially the green
party drives change in farm animal welfare policies in the German states
(Vogeler, 2017b). On the national level, party difference as well as eco-
nomic integration may explain different policies (Vogeler, 2017a). Vogeler
(2019) shows that especially social concerns influence the emphasis of
parties on farm animal issues. But the mentioned studies don’t present
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the underlying process of establishing the position. Previous work iden-
tified substantial influence patterns of interest groups in European Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP) (Pappi and Henning, 1999; Henning, 2000;
Krause, 2005; Henning, 2009) or stakeholder influence in development
policy (Stark, 2017; Henning et al., 2017, 2019). In general, there is a ten-
dency to include stakeholder organizations in the policy implementation
process via political advisory committees (Hustedt et al., 2010).
What we know so far is that stakeholder of animal welfare policy have
heterogeneous views on animal welfare programs (see Heise, 2017; Ver-
beke, 2009; Ventura et al., 2015). A comparison of conventional and eco-
logical famers, veterinarians as well as consumers’ views shows that many
activities are evaluated as important and feasible (Heise and Theuvsen,
2017). Nevertheless, some differences remain for example in the ques-
tion of space allowance (Heise and Theuvsen, 2017). This heterogene-
ity sheds light to a key driver of politics: policy beliefs. In fact, animal
welfare is a complex concept including various issues assigned to health
and physically functioning, natural living as well as affective states (Fraser,
2008). Thus, the relation between certain livestock policies and the out-
comes are also complex. To cope with this complexity, non-professionals
as well as politicians and agents of interest groups apply naive mental
models, i.e. policy beliefs. Especially beliefs of voters and experts tend
to differ (Caplan, 2002). In a worst case, biased beliefs (Akerlof, 1989)
may cause political failure (Caplan, 2001). If a policy position is based on
biased beliefs, the policy will be ineffective and the outcome will be biased.
Therefore, policy beliefs are a critical part of politics, opening the door for
informational lobbying (Henning et al., 2019). How this mechanism works
in German livestock politics is unknown, yet. Hence, it would be interest-
ing to investigate the communicational influence patterns within livestock
policy.
Regarding the legal framework of animal husbandry, several issues are
in the focus of debate. Beside improving some detailed husbandry spec-
ifications, e.g. space per animal or playing material in the stable, new
legislative and regulatory projects are on the political agenda.
One of them is the collective right of action for animal protection groups.
In general, the German law system requires that plaintiffs’ subjective rights
are violated. Therefore, it does not consider such a popular action (Schürmeier,
2017). Nevertheless, in the area of environmental law a right of collective
action exists at federal level. For animal protection, the federal legisla-
tor as well as the states have the right to implement a corresponding law
(Kloepfer, 2016). Indeed, 7 of 16 states implemented such a regulatory
framework, which leads to heterogeneity and therefore could challenge
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legal certainty (Rossi, 2016).
The second issue is a standardized testing and approval procedure for
mass-produced livestock facilities. This refers to the idea that public agen-
cies only allow mass produced facilities which pass standardized tests be-
fore. Among these facilities are for example feeding systems, watering
facilities or flooring (Gauly et al., 2006). Approval standards are defined
by animal protection regulations and current scientific and technological
knowledge (BMEL, 2017). A corresponding bylaw is part of the recent
coalition agreement (CDU et al., 2018) as well as farm animal husbandry
strategy provided by the ministry for food and agriculture (BMEL, 2017).
Third, there is the question of a validation of competence regarding
animal husbandry. The scientific council of agricultural policy recommends
the introduction for all areas1 of husbandry (WBA, 2015). In particular,
this certificate might serve as an instrument for employees in agriculture
without formal training. Accordingly, the German farm animal husbandry
strategy includes such a validation (BMEL, 2017).
Another topic affects the transport of living animals. Back in the be-
ginning of 2019, two German states (Schleswig-Holstein and Hesse) re-
stricted and/or (temporarily) banned the transport of living animals in coun-
tries outside the European Union (EU). This bans were discussed not
only in agricultural (see for example agrarheute.com, 2019; topagrar.com,
2019), but also mass media (see for example FAZ, 2019; ndr.de, 2019). In-
deed, animal protection groups call for a ban of transport of living animals
in non-EU member states (Bündnis für Tierschutzpolitik, 2017). One rea-
son, among others, is that the duration of transports is very high. Hence, it
would be interesting to see how communication patterns affect the policy
positions of stakeholders in these four selected issues.
Our paper contributes to the literature in two ways. First, we quantify
the structures of belief formation in livestock policy empirically. This pro-
motes a better understanding of political processes in farm animal policy.
Therefore we use an established social network approach (Stark, 2017;
Henning and Hedtrich, 2018; Henning et al., 2019). We show the effect
of these structures by applying the network model on the evaluation of
the four mentioned policies. The latter are taken as the initial beliefs of
selected influential stakeholder organizations. Second, we test the robust-
ness of the model’s results. Therefore we use a Bayesian approach of
exponential random graph models (ERGM). We use the estimation results
to simulate 10,000 networks and apply the model of informational lobbying
for each of the network configurations.
1So far, this instrument has only been used for the husbandry of broiler chickens.
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This paper is structured as follows. The next section will briefly de-
scribe a model of belief updating within a political participation framework.
Subsequently, we give an overview about the data used for application.
Main results are then shown in section 7.4. We end with a conclusion.
7.2 Theoretical Framework
The theoretical backbone of our analysis is the framework of informational
lobbying as suggested by Henning et al. (2019). In particular, interest
groups use two influence mechanisms: classical (i.e. vote buying) and
communicational lobbying. The former refers to traditional interest group
theory “where politicians seeking reelection grant political favors to partic-
ular interest groups in exchange for political support” (Henning et al., 2019,
p. 79).
Interest groups are associations of citizens from certain socio-economic
groups. They seek for power in order to influence political agents (Olson,
1965; Henning, 2000). Hence, there is an exchange of influence resources
and votes between interest groups and political agents (Grossman, 1994).
This exchange leads to a power outflow from political agents to interest
groups as illustrated in figure 7.1. Accordingly, political agents have to
weight up between voters’ and special interest groups’ support before an-
nouncing a policy position (Brock and Magee, 1978; Grossman and Help-
man, 1996). This corresponds to the formal (network based) model of
Pappi and Henning (1998, 1999) as well as Henning (2009).
Communicational (or informational) lobbying serves as a complement
to the approach sketched above. It refers to the idea that political ac-
tors as well as laymen apply simple mental models to reduce real world
complexity. In particular, these policy beliefs map the relation between
a policy γ and the intended outcome z, i.e. the political technology. A
mechanism that is also embedded in a network structure is communica-
tion learning (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar, 2010). Since agents are only im-
perfectly informed about the political technology, they are interested in a
collective communication process in order to update their beliefs. As the
two-headed arrow in figure 7.1 indicates, exchange of expert knowledge
takes place from interest groups to political agents and vice versa. More-
over, political agents may provide knowledge for other political agents. The
same applies for interest groups.
To formalize this framework of belief updating, consider a set N of
i = 1, 2, ..., n stakeholders. Moreover, let ai denote actor i’s belief regard-
ing T (γ, z). The communication takes place in a social network which is
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Figure 7.1: Political Process Framework
Source: Own simplified illustration based on Henning et al. (2019)
represented in the adjacency matrix M where element mij > 0 implies a
communication tie between agents i and j. Normalizing this network ma-
trix leads to the stochastic matrix M̄ where
∑
j m̂ij = 1. Accordingly, m̂ij
gives the trust actor i places on the current belief of agent j. Furthermore,
actors’ own-control is needed. Own control refers to the extend that ac-
tors put on their own knowledge, i.e. the initial beliefs. Let Ω denote the
according diagonal matrix, where the corresponding element ωi gives the
own control value of actor i. Hence,
M̂ = [I− (I− Ω)M̄]−1Ω (7.1)
corresponds the multiplier matrix. Its element m̂ij describes the multiplier
effect, i.e. the effect of j′s initial belief on i′s final belief. Finally, we can
apply the multiplier on the n× k matrix2 A0:
Ã = M̂Ã0. (7.2)
The resulting Matrix Ã is the n × k matrix of the stationary points of the
final beliefs. This procedure of belief updating in general corresponds the
work of Friedkin and Johnsen (1990, 1997). Our model is applied to the
data described in the next section.
2Here k refers to the k = 1, 2, ...K beliefs
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7.3 Empirical Specification
Data are part of an elite network survey conducted from September 2017
until October 2018. In total, 37 interviews with representatives of stake-
holder organizations were conducted. Among them are parliamentary
groups, federal agencies as well as various interest groups involved in
German livestock politics. Before starting an interview, the interviewers
emphasized that the position of the organization and not the own posi-
tion were of interest. A standardized questionnaire was used consisting of
questions regarding
• the political profile,
• animal welfare assessment and evaluation,
• several livestock policy positions and
• social networks.
The desk research before the starting round of interviews was comple-
mented by the intermediate results of the reputation network question.
This snowball sampling was applied in order to filter out the most impor-
tant actors. On average, interview duration was 1.5 hours. Note that one
organization did not complete the interview. Hence, we end up with a
data base of 36 actors. After describing network data in particular, we out-
line the general econometric model of the network generating process and
possible determinants of tie creation.
7.3.1 Network Data
Backbone of this study is a confirmed communication network. We fol-
lowed previous studies (Pappi et al., 1995; Henning et al., 2019) in order
to ensure that the real connections are measured. In particular, commu-
nication ties were asked from a sender as well as a receiver perspective.
The former refers to the question to whom an actor sends informations,
while the latter refers to the question from whom an actor gets expert infor-
mation. Overall, the result is a confirmed network with the corresponding
matrix M. Hence,
mij =
{
1 if tie from i to j
0 if no tie from i to j
}
. (7.3)
Self ties are not allowed. Therefore, the diagonal of M is set to zero.
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Network boundaries were specified by using a reputation network: Ac-
tors marked the organizations which they perceive as influential actor in
politics. Given the corresponding socio matrix G, gij corresponds to the
answer of i that actor j is an influential organization. Indegree centrality is
used as reputation measurement:
dj =
∑
j
gij∀i 6= j (7.4)
An actor j is not part of the network if dj = 0. Since one of the interviewed
actors was not marked as influential, the final dataset consists of 35 actors,
each assigned to one of eleven groups (table 7.1).
Table 7.1: Actor groups
Group No. Description Frequency
Agric_Animal 1 Agriculture and Animal Production 7
AniProt 2 Animal Protection 3
ConsProt 3 Consumer Protection 2
EcoAgric 4 Ecological Agriculture 2
EggMilk 5 Egg and Milk Industry 1
EnvProt 6 Environment Protection 2
Food 7 Food Retail 5
Meat 8 Meat Industry 3
ParlGroup 9 Parliamentary Groups 6
PubAdmin 10 Public Administration 3
Research 11 Research Institutes and Organizations 1
Source: Own presentation.
The policy positions are measured using the following variables:
• CollectiveAction: the right for collective action regarding legal affairs
of animal protection/welfare
• TestAppMPLS: standardized testing and approval procedure for mass-
produced livestock facilities in the area of pig husbandry
• CertificateHusbandry : a certificate about knowledge in the area of
husbandry
• BanThirdCountries: a ban of living animal transports in countries not
being part of the EU
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All of these four policies had to be evaluated with a scale from 1 (“not
useful at all”) to 5 (“very useful”). Please note that we emphasised for
every corresponding question that we were asking for the ideal position.
Possible factors influencing tie creation are presented in the following.
7.3.2 Econometric Model
In particular, our econometric model follows Henning et al. (2019). Hence,
we make use of an ERGM (Wasserman and Pattison, 1996; Snijders et al.,
2006) in a Bayesian framework. Using a priori defined network statistics,
ERGMs are able to represent the structure of networks and the according
drivers. Beyond endogenous variables, they allow to consider exogenous
variables.
Given a n× n adjacency matrix y on a set of n actors, yij = 1 indicates
that there is a directed tie from i to j. If yij = 0 there is no tie. Note that self
ties are not allowed, hence yii = 0. Moreover, s(y,X) describes a vector
of network statistics containing endogenous as well as exogenous covari-
ates. The latter are denoted by X and consist of attributes at edge and
node level. They enter the model either as
∑
j(
∑
i yij)Xj,
∑
j(
∑
i yji)Xj
for edge attributes or
∑
i
∑
j yijXij for nodal attributes. Hence,
Pr(y|X) = exp {θs(y,X)}∑
ỹ∈Y exp {θs(ỹ, X)}
, (7.5)
corresponds ERGM’s probability density function with θ = (θ1, . . . , θQ).
Moreover,
∑
ỹ∈Y exp {θs(ỹ, X)} corresponds the normalizing constant sum-
ming over all possible network configurations denoted as Y. Hence, we
ensure 7.5 being a probability distribution. However, parameter estimation
in ERGM framework comes as a challenge, since the normalizing con-
stant is intractable even for networks of moderate size. This is due to
the fact that there is an enormous number of possible realizations in Y.
Following the literature (see Snijders, 2002; Hunter and Handcock, 2006),
Henning et al. (2019) suggest Bayesian estimation using Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques, to handle this problem. Accordingly,
estimated parameters appear as sample moments for a sample which is
drawn from the posterior distribution. Using this approach, we are able
to provide statistical inference on the derived measures of communica-
tional lobbying sketched in section 7.2. In particular, we draw a sample of
10,000 networks and then recalculate 7.1 as well as 7.2 for each of these
networks.
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Regarding the parameter interpretation, we also make use of marginal
effects (see Henning et al., 2019, 83-84) by first rewriting equation (7.5) as
a conditional logit (see Goodreau et al., 2009; Cranmer and Desmarais,
2011):
ln
[
Pr(yij = 1, Y Cij |X)
Pr(yij = 0, Y Cij |X)
]
= θδ(yij, Y
C
ij , X). (7.6)
Note that Y Cij denotes all dyads other than yij. Moreover, δ(yij, Y Cij , X)
denotes the vector of changes in the sufficient statistics when yij changes
from 0 to 1. Hence,
Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X) =
Pr(yij=1,Y Cij |X)
Pr(yij=0,Y Cij |X)+Pr(yij=1,Y Cij |X)
=
exp{θδ(yij ,Y Cij ,X)}
1+exp{θδ(yij ,Y Cij ,X)}
.
(7.7)
Since we are also interested in relative importance of different endoge-
nous and exogenous variables, we then quantify the effects on the prob-
ability given in 7.7 resulting from changes in δ(yij, Y Cij , X). Corresponding
marginal effects are calculated by
∂Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X)
∂δ(yij, Y Cij , X)
= Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X)(1− Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X))θ. (7.8)
The individual marginal effects are locally defined. Hence, they depend on
all network statistics, as they are derived as partial derivatives at a specific
point (Henning et al., 2019).
7.3.3 Endogenous and exogenous variables for the econo-
metric model
As sketched up above, endogenous as well as exogenous variables might
influence tie formation, i.e. the network generating process. The first en-
dogenous variable that we use is edges. It equals the number of edges in
the network and represents general propensity of tie formation:
E(y) =
∑
i<j
yij. (7.9)
We also add a statistic for mutuality (mutual), which corresponds to the
number of actor pairs where actor i sends and receive ties to and from j,
hence yij = yji = 1.
H(y) =
∑
i<j
yijyji (7.10)
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With twopath we take into account directed paths from actor i to j via k (i >
k > j). Two additional statistics used are the geometrically weighted dyad-
wise shared partner distribution (gwdsp) and the geometrically weighted
edgewise shared partner distribution (gwesp) (Goodreau, 2007; Hunter,
2007; Morris et al., 2008). The gwdsp measure captures the propensity
of any linked or not linked dyad to have multiple transitive shared partners
(Leifeld and Schneider, 2012). Moreover, gwesp counts the triangles in
the network as well as considering the ties being part of multiple triangles.
Positive parameters for gwesp indicate triadic closure in the network. If
both, gwesp as well as gwdsp are included in a model, the latter corre-
sponds to the base effect isolating the effect for not tied dyads only (Hen-
ning et al., 2019). The former then isolates the effect for those dyads which
are directly linked.
Additionally, we added several exogenous attributes at edge and node
level which are presented in table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: Exogenous variables for ERGM
Level Attribute Meaning
Node Group Actor group
1 Agric_Animal
2 AniProt
9 ParlGroup
10 PubAdmin
Reputation Reputation of an actor
ExternalKnowledge 1 - own-control
Edge Z_CONSUMER Euclidean distance: Importance consumer welfare
Z_FAW Euclidean distance: Importance animal welfare
Z_PRODUCER Euclidean distance: Importance producer welfare
soc.nw Informal relation network tie
Source: Own presentation.
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Using actor group assignments (see again table 7.1), we check whether
a tie is more likely to be created when both, actor i and j are part of the
same group. Furthermore, we expect parliamentary groups as well as
public administration to be demander of knowledge. Hence, we add addi-
tional parameters for main effects of factor attribute Group for legislative as
well as executive actors, i.e. groups 9 and 10 (see table 7.1). Moreovoer,
we control for group assingment to groups 1 and 2 at the sender and the
receiver stage of a tie. Reputation is a node’s attribute that corresponds
to the indegree-measurement presented in equation 7.4. In particular, we
add two statistics: one for the reputation of the sender and one for the
reputation of the receiver of information. With ExternalKnowledge we take
into account the openness for external knowledge of an actor. This term is
added for receiver side of a tie and equals 1 − ωi (see again equation 7.1
from theoretical framework). At the edge level, we take into account polit-
ical preference homophily. Since farm animal welfare affects consumers’
welfare3 the term Z_CONSUMER corresponds to the euclidean distance
between the actors regarding the importance of consumers’ welfare. We
add a corresponding statistic which equals the sum of edges’ distance val-
ues. Additionally, Z_FAW is the distance regarding importance of farm
animal welfare. Furthermore, we also add a statistic for the importance of
producers’ welfare (Z_PRODUCER) since animal welfare improvements
have consequences for producers4. The last attribute added is soc.nw
which corresponds to a network of informal social relations. Hence, the
term describes whether there is an edge in the social relation network as
well as the communication network.
All steps of analysis were performed using R with packages Bergm
(Caimo and Friel, 2014) and ergm (Hunter et al., 2008) for estimation as
well as tidyverse (Wickham et al., 2019) and ggthemes (Arnold, 2019) for
post-estimation analysis.
7.4 Results
This section provides the results of our study. We first show the most im-
portant properties of the realised network according the expert interviews
as well as the corresponding multiplier results. Subsequently, we present
3For example higher prices for animal based products due to higher costs of production
or well-being from the fact that animals are held under better conditions.
4For example, Henningsen et al. (2018) show a weak positive relation between eco-
nomic performance and animal welfare which might stem from good farm management.
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the outcomes of our econometric model as well as the belief changes, i.e.
we compare realised network based with simulation based results.
The confirmed expert communication network has a density of 0.266
(figure 7.11). Hence, more than 26 percent of possible ties are established.
One parliamentary group, one public agency and one food retail organiza-
tion in the network do not send expert information, but only receive knowl-
edge. This network serves as the basis for our multiplier model. Since the
own-control is a key element of multiplier calculation, figure 7.2 presents
corresponding mean values at the group level. As one can easily see,
Agric_Animal on average has the highest own-control value (0.743), fol-
lowed by ecological agriculture (figure 7.2). Other group means above the
full sample average (i.e. 0.549) are observed for AniProt, Egg_Milk and
Research. All other groups reported own-control values lower than over-
all mean. Please note that the meat sector is the most open to external
expertise (average own-control: 0.3, figure 7.2).
Figure 7.2: Reported own control mean at group level
Source: Own presentation.
Results of the multiplier model have been aggregated at the group level
and were subsequently normalized to the share of external knowledge.
Hence, own control is cancelled out.
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Figure 7.3: Aggregated communication multiplier
Source: Own presentation.
As figure 7.1 shows, Agric_Animal is a very dominant group when it
comes to belief formation. In particular, members of this group tend to in-
fluence 0.407 of food retailers’ external knowledge. Note also that shares
on Meats’s, Researchs’s and Egg_Milk ’s external knowledge are roughly
the same. However, civic society organizations are mainly influenced by
animal protection organizations. Animal protectors drive 28.7 percent of
external knowledge influencing environmental groups, the value for con-
sumer protection corresponds to 22.7 percent (figure 7.3). With regard
to the political agents, we see that parliamentary groups are mainly influ-
enced by Agric_Animal (0.257) and AniProt (0.236, figure 7.3). Interest-
ingly, these legislative actors not only serve as knowledge demander, but
also provide information. Furthermore, they have the highest share on ex-
ternal knowledge influencing ecological agriculture (see again figure 7.3).
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In the following we describe the results of our econometric model that
drives this influence patterns. All in all, we specified and estimated ten
different models. While Model 1 is a purely endogenous one, the Models 2-
6 are exogenous specifications. Among the latter, Model 5 is a “preference
only” model that only includes actors’ preferences. Models 7-10 combine
both, endogenous as well as exogenous variables, where Model 7 is the
“full model” including all endogenous and exogenous variables. We report
model fit criteria in table 7.3 which are based on likelihood. As one can
easily see, Model 9 delivers the lowest AIC as well as the lowest BIC.
Hence, this model seem to fit best our data. This is also suggested by
Table 7.3: Model fit criteria
Log. Likelihood AIC BIC
Model 1 -654.69 1319.38 1344.789
Model 2 -699.382 1414.763 1455.417
Model 3 -669.625 1359.25 1410.067
Model 4 -637.019 1296.039 1351.938
Model 5 -691.193 1388.385 1403.631
Model 6 -545.019 1118.038 1189.182
Model 7 -440.314 918.627 1015.18
Model 8 -428.587 889.175 970.482
Model 9 -429.398 886.796 957.94
Model 10 -434.163 892.326 953.307
Bayesian goodness of fit measures (Caimo and Friel, 2014) presented in
figure 7.4
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Figure 7.4: Goodness of Fit for Model 9
●
● ●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
● ● ● ●
●
●
● ● ● ● ● ●
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
in degree
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 n
od
es
0 3 6 9 13 17 21 25 29 33
Bayesian goodness−of−fit diagnostics
●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ●
●
●
●
● ●
●
● ● ●
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
out degree
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 n
od
es
0 3 6 9 13 17 21 25 29 33
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
0.
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
minimum geodesic distance
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 d
ya
ds
1 4 7 10 14 18 22 26 30 NR
●●
●●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●●
●
●●
●
●
●
●
●●● ● ●●
●
● ● ●● ●
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
edge−wise shared partners
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 e
dg
es
0 3 6 9 12 16 20 24 28 32
Source: Own presentation.
The corresponding estimation results are given in table 7.4. While
edges has a significant negative impact, mutuality has a positive parame-
ter (table 7.4). Please note that twopath is also positive, but in contrast not
significant. Parameter for gwesp is significant and gwdsp is negative (both
are significant). This can be interpreted in the sense that stakeholder or-
ganizations rely on others. The aim is to reduce transaction costs through
finding trustworthy sources of knowledge. With regard to nodal attributes
one can easily see that tie creation is more likely if the sender is an actor
of Agric_Animal or AniProt (table 7.4). Moreover, ties are more likely to be
created if the target is a political actor, i.e. parliamentary group or public
administration. This fits the theoretical assumption that especially politi-
cal agents seek for knowledge. Part of the exogenous nodal attributes is
the homophily measurement of group assignment. Looking at the estima-
tion results, it becomes clear that tie creation probability increases if two
actors belong to the same group (table 7.4). Related to that we see a posi-
tive effect of edge attribute soc.nw : If actors know each other and have an
informal relation, it increases probability of knowledge exchange. Further-
more, Reputation has a significant positive parameter for both, senders
and receivers. Additionally, the amount a possible receiver relies on exter-
nal knowledge positively influences creation of ties (table 7.4).
Based on these econometric results we simulated 10,000 network con-
figurations. For each of these simulations we applied the model presented
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Table 7.4: Estimation results for best fit model. Source: Own presentation.
Communication Network
edges -6.327 ***
(0.477)
mutual 3.113 ***
(0.21)
twopath 0.015
(0.019)
gwesp 1.291 ***
(0.342)
gwdsp -0.064 *
(0.029)
Factor (out): Agric_Animal 0.326 *
(0.196)
Factor (out): AniProt 0.678 ***
(0.276)
Factor (in): ParlGroup 0.873 ***
(0.213)
Factor (in): PubAdmin 0.509 **
(0.298)
Homophily: Group 0.32 *
(0.228)
edgecov.soc.nw 1.478 ***
(0.178)
node (out) Reputation 0.043 ***
(0.012)
node (in) Reputation 0.037 ***
(0.012)
node (in) ExternalKnowledge 0.622 *
(0.348)
in equation 7.2. Table 7.5 presents descriptive statistics of the initial belief
variables. They enter the matrix A0 according equation 7.2. First, we take
a look at the overall sample values for all belief variables. As figure 7.5
shows, the average final belief is always lower than initial beliefs reported
in table 7.5.
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Figure 7.5: Final belief values based on simulation and realised network
(cross)
●
●
●
●
1
2
3
4
5
Ba
nT
hir
dC
ou
nt
rie
s
Ce
rti
fic
at
eH
us
ba
nd
ry
Co
lle
cti
ve
Ac
tio
n
Te
stA
pp
M
PL
S
Belief
F
in
al
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Please note that the sample median for CertificateHusbandry based on
the interview data perfectly matches the median of the simulated final be-
liefs. Additionally, also medians for TestAppMPLS match nearly perfectly.
As the cross indicates in figure 7.5, the realised network based value is
only slightly higher than simulations’ median. For BanThirdCountries and
CollectiveAction we see that simulations’ median is always higher than the
median of the interview based belief values (figure 7.5).
Figures 7.6-7.9 show the group means for all four belief variables. In
particular, they show the means of simulated beliefs with the 0.95 confi-
dence intervals as well as the mean from the realised data. They allow us
to test significance of the latter.
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Figure 7.6: Group means for BanThirdCountries due to simulation (point)
and interview based network (cross) with 0.95 confidence intervals
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Figure 7.7: Group means for CertificateHusbandry due to simulation
(point) and interview based network (cross) with 0.95 confidence intervals
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Figure 7.8: Group means for CollectiveAction due to simulation (point) and
interview based network (cross) with 0.95 confidence intervals
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Figure 7.9: Group means for TestAppMPLS due to simulation (point) and
interview based network (cross) with 0.95 confidence intervals
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Note that the realised network based final belief mean of CollectiveAc-
tion perfectly matches the simulation based mean in Group Agric_Animal
(figure 7.8). Only few measures lay out of the 0.95 confidence interval, i.e.
indicating that the mean of calculated values based on interview data are
not significant. This applies for the average evaluation of BanThirdCoun-
tries after communication proecess(es): The group mean of Egg_Milk is
placed outside the lower confidence interval border (figure 7.6). Moreover,
environment protectors’ group mean for CertificateHusbandry is located
outside the upper 0.95 interval (figure 7.7). Regarding TestAppMPLS, the
mean in group EnvProt is higher than the upper border of the confidence
interval, i.e. indicating non significant measure.
Additionally, we calculated the delta group means for each of the 10,000
simulations. Delta corresponds Ãk − A0k where k denotes the simulated
network with its multipliers. It allows us to demonstrate which groups react
sensitive to communication networks. Figure 7.10 shows distribution of the
delta group means.
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Figure 7.10: Delta of group means for 10,000 simulations and realised
network based (cross) belief change
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As one can see, distributions for groups with higher own control (see
again figure 7.2) are wider than those for groups with a lower own control.
Moreover, we see that the direction of group deltas is not the same for all
simulated networks. For each belief the distributions of some group means
cross the threshold of 0 in both directions. There is one group, where this
applies for each belief: the public administration. It is also striking that most
of all the mean distributions that exceed zero in both directions concern the
beliefs that groups initially rated with values close to three, i.e. seem to be
indifferent.
7.5 Conclusion
Farm animal welfare is a very important issue in Germany. This is espe-
cially true for the legal and regulatory framework. Discussions revolve not
only around the right for collective action or testing procedures of mass
produced facilities, but also around questions of training and transport.
Due to the important role of stakeholders, we quantified their impact on
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knowledge formation regarding four policy beliefs. The theoretical frame-
work of our study is the network based theory of informational lobbying
(Henning et al., 2019). In order to check robustness of our empirical ba-
sis, we used Bayesian ERGM to identify drivers of the network generating
process and subsequently simulated 10,000 networks based on estimated
results.
Our results imply that in the realised network agricultural producers are
the main drivers of expert knowledge in German livestock politics. Ani-
mal protection organizations seem to be their counterparts when it comes
to knowledge communication: Especially consumer and environment pro-
tectors, ecological agriculture as well as (part of) the parliamentary floor
seem to be strongly influenced by animal protection. This is mirrored by
estimation results which show significant positive impact if a sender of a
tie belongs to Agric_Animal or AniProt. Moreover, coefficients for political
agent groups as knowledge demander are also positive, confirming that
legislative actors as well as executive branch seek for expert information.
Regarding policy beliefs, we could show that in general the belief changes
based on realised network data correspond simulated values. This is es-
pecially true for the certificate of animal husbandry as well as the standard-
ized testing and approval procedure: Here the means are nearly perfectly
matched. Hence, empirical data capture the simulated values. At a group
level, only few means of the final beliefs are not significant. Hence, we
assume the interview based results to be robust.
Note that we could show that all of public administration’s deltas per
simulation vary in their direction. It seems that depending on the network
configuration this group is easy to move. Considering the role of public
administration in German livestock policy, this finding is of particular in-
terest: Much regulations in the sector appear as by-laws, issued by the
federal ministry for agriculture5. Hence, worthwhile targets of influence
are the public agencies. In general, delta results showed that groups that
evaluate a policy with a neutral 3 are groups that can be moved in both
directions. Comparing the range of delta means per group per simulation
with the reported own control, i.e. the weight that organizations put on
their own knowledge, we showed that range is wider for low own-control
groups. This clearly follows from the model itself, but emphasizes a gen-
eral problem: How to convince actors that don’t want to be convinced?
For example, conventional as well as ecological producer organizations
heavily rely on own knowledge. Positions contrary to their own, even if
5For example, the minimum amount of space per animal in a stable is defined by the
German farm animal husbandry decree.
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they would lead to a more efficient policy, would cause their resistance. If
we now look again on the group of public administration, we see that their
own-control is slightly higher than 50 percent. Hence, they are more open
to external knowledge. Clearly, as indicated by the findings mentioned
above, the pitfall here is the network configuration. As already described,
it determines the direction of position change in PubAdmin. If we now
look at the influence patterns provided by multiplier results, we see that
besides Agric_Animal (which is hard to convince and thus might provide
biased policy knowledge), research has high influence. This comes as a
“hope” for optimal policy decisions.
Regarding real world policy impact, we also found that at a stationary
point only the right for collective action is negatively evaluated. Hence,
we can conclude that stakeholder participation does not increase likeli-
hood for this policy to be implemented soon. In contrast, a ban of living
animal transport in third party countries, farmers’ certificate of husbandry
knowledge and a standardized testing and approval procedure for mass
produced husbandry components are positive evaluated in the stationary
point. But of course we do not predict that all policies are implemented
since our study did not include classical lobbying. Here it would be inter-
esting to see how the final policy position would look like if integrating po-
litical support (see Henning, 2009; Pappi and Henning, 1998) structures.
This is a proposal to supplement this study. The application of a complete
decision-making model (see Henning and Hedtrich, 2018) could show the
outcome of the total participation of the stakeholders.
Finally, we want to point out limitations of our study, where the first one
is due to the missing media actors. During the interviews, all participants
stated communicational relations to media actors. But against all attempts,
no media actors were willing to participate at the interviews. Hence, de-
spite the important role of media coverage in the field of animal husbandry
(Kayser et al., 2012; Grossarth, 2014), they could not be considered. This
might lead to slight bias regarding the communicational structure. Sec-
ond, there is only one research organization included. Of course, expert
communication includes scientific knowledge and hence, all correspond-
ing actors should be included in a corresponding survey. Indeed, we were
able to conduct two interviews with research organizations. But since one
of them did not answer the network questions, it could not be included
in the social structure and therefore not considered for empirical investi-
gation. Both limitations, missing media actors as well as small research
group, therefore reflect a problem of social science in general: Conducting
elite studies requires the full participation of relevant stakeholders. Nev-
ertheless, our study contributes to a better understanding of German an-
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imal welfare policy by providing a framework that allows us to measure
influence beyond classical lobbying as well as showing that results of the
approach are robust from a statistical point of view.
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7.A Appendix
Figure 7.11: Communication Network. Source: own presentation
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Table 7.5: Descriptive statistics for initial beliefs. Source: Own presenta-
tion.
ORGATYPE Belief Min Mean Max SD
Agric_Animal BanThirdCountries 1 2.667 5 1.380
CertificateHusbandry 1 2.833 4 0.988
CollectiveAction 1 1.167 2 0.345
TestAppMPLS 1 2.333 4 1.024
AniProt BanThirdCountries 5 5.000 5 0.000
CertificateHusbandry 5 5.000 5 0.000
CollectiveAction 5 5.000 5 0.000
TestAppMPLS 4 4.667 5 0.471
ConsProt BanThirdCountries 5 5.000 5 0.000
CertificateHusbandry 5 5.000 5 0.000
CollectiveAction 5 5.000 5 0.000
TestAppMPLS 3 4.000 5 1.000
EcoAgric BanThirdCountries 5 5.000 5 0.000
CertificateHusbandry 5 5.000 5 0.000
CollectiveAction 3 3.500 4 0.500
TestAppMPLS 3 3.500 4 0.500
Egg_Milk BanThirdCountries 5 5.000 5 0.000
CertificateHusbandry 2 2.000 2 0.000
CollectiveAction 1 1.000 1 0.000
TestAppMPLS 1 1.000 1 0.000
EnvProt BanThirdCountries 3 4.000 5 1.000
CertificateHusbandry 5 5.000 5 0.000
CollectiveAction 5 5.000 5 0.000
TestAppMPLS 5 5.000 5 0.000
Food BanThirdCountries 1 3.200 5 1.833
CertificateHusbandry 1 3.400 5 1.356
CollectiveAction 1 1.400 3 0.800
TestAppMPLS 2 3.000 4 0.894
Meat BanThirdCountries 1 2.000 3 0.817
CertificateHusbandry 4 4.667 5 0.471
CollectiveAction 1 1.333 2 0.471
TestAppMPLS 1 2.667 4 1.247
ParlGroup BanThirdCountries 1 4.000 5 1.528
CertificateHusbandry 1 3.833 5 1.463
CollectiveAction 1 3.333 5 1.795
TestAppMPLS 2 3.667 5 1.247
PubAdmin BanThirdCountries 1 3.000 5 1.633
CertificateHusbandry 1 3.667 5 1.886
CollectiveAction 1 2.000 3 0.817
TestAppMPLS 2 3.000 4 0.817
Research BanThirdCountries 3 3.000 3 0.000
CertificateHusbandry 5 5.000 5 0.000
CollectiveAction 3 3.000 3 0.000
TestAppMPLS 4 4.000 4 0.000
Overall BanThirdCountries 1 3.562 5 1.595
CertificateHusbandry 1 3.910 5 1.384
CollectiveAction 1 2.605 5 1.706
TestAppMPLS 1 3.267 5 1.287
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Part III
Concluding Remarks
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
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The aim of this work was to contribute to the research on the political
economy of farm animal welfare. It addressed questions regarding animal
welfare policy, considering voters’ and stakeholders’ beliefs. With regard
to the voters, one has to state that animal welfare is not as important as
climate protection or social policy when measured at the ballot box (chap-
ter 2). But it clearly offsets issues like water protection or economic growth.
Moreover, studies on the voters’ WTP showed that the value of animal wel-
fare is low when compared to education or security (chapter 3 and chap-
ter 4). A second result of chapter 3 is that participants perceive climate
regulation in the stable as well as space per animal as important animal
welfare aspects. Hence, the corresponding WTP measurements are the
highest. Moreover, there is a gap between people’s private and collec-
tive WTP. The chapter 5 theoretically links voting behaviour with economic
analysis. Here the aim was to quantify voters’ beliefs regarding political
technology of the three issues already discussed in chapter 2. The empir-
ical part then tests for heterogeneity among voters. For climate protection
significant differences were found due to gender. Additionally, voters of
certain parties show a tendency to differ from others. Moreover, simula-
tions could show that beliefs indeed move voters’ policy positions.
Part II examined a stakeholder network structure where agriculture and
animal production as well as animal protection groups are the key drivers
of belief formation. This structure implies that stakeholders evaluate a
standardized testing and approval procedure for mass-produced livestock
facilities as rather useful (chapter 6). On the other hand, chapter 7 shows
that the right for collective action is still evaluated as rather useless. Com-
munication lowers the evaluations of animal husbandry knowledge certifi-
cate and banning living animal transports. But both policy beliefs remain
still positive. In general, the measured empirical data capture the simu-
lated values based on an ERGM. At group level, only few means of the
final beliefs are not significant. Hence, the interview based results seem
to be robust.
All in all, one can conclude that the role of policy beliefs matters for
both, voters as well as stakeholder organizations. The latter are able to
use politicians’ uncertainty to influence the direction of political decisions.
On the other hand, voters are strongly influenced by beliefs. Hence, if they
apply biased beliefs and vote strongly policy oriented, basis democratic
policy failure could occur if politicians put heavy weight on voters’ support.
In the following section I will critically discuss the single contributions be-
fore I give a general outlook.
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8.1 Chapters
8.1.1 Ecological Voting in Germany? Animal Welfare,
Climate and Water Protection as Drivers of Voting
Behaviour
Ecological issues gained importance in the last decades. Hence, this es-
say contrasted animal welfare with climate protection as well as water pro-
tection. In order to quantify corresponding marginal effects, a probabilistic
model of voting behaviour was used. The econometric backbone of the
study is a nested multinomial logit model. We followed the suggestion of
Thurner and Eymann (2000) since “non voting” has to be treated different
to the parties. The derived marginal effects show that farm animal welfare
is an important driver of voting behaviour, but also that climate protection
and social policy are more important. Furthermore, we show that party
loyalty still has the most important effect.
A possible limitation of the study occurs from the econometric model.
In general, multinomial logit models assume that preferences are homo-
geneous regarding attributes and predictors. But since weights of policy
issues might be heterogeneous among electorate, one should take this
into account. Hence, maybe a latent class approach would be more ap-
propriate. These kind of choice models allow to partition the electorate into
subgroups (classes). Applications of these models in voting behaviour re-
search can be found in Petri (2015) or Henning et al. (2018). The reason
for not using this kind of models was that modelling of nested decision
structures is not implemented, yet. Another issue to discuss is the com-
parability of the policy dimensions used. Climate protection is measured
in CO2 equivalent and water protection in N kg/ha. In contrast, farm an-
imal welfare is expressed in governmental spending. Hence, money is
compared to natural measurements.
8.1.2 The Price for Happy Pigs: Private and Collective
Willingness to Pay for Animal Welfare in Germany
&
About Bus Drivers and Happy Pigs: Collective and
Private Willingness to Pay for Animal Welfare
These chapters dealt with financing increased animal husbandry stan-
dards. We suggested a framework of modelling the public provision of
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animal welfare at the theoretical level. In particular, we distinguished be-
tween private WTP and collective WTP. The former refers to the financing
of particular husbandry factors and is the trade-off between animal welfare
related husbandry systems and private consumption. The latter addresses
the question of budget reallocation and therefore corresponds to the trade-
off between public expenditure for animal welfare and other public goods.
A critical point of the study is the database used. Since the survey
was just carried out via mailing list of Kiel University, we don’t have a rep-
resentative sample. Hence, we can not draw general conclusions for the
German population from the results. I strongly encourage further research
to apply the framework on a representative data basis. Regarding the
design of the experiments, two points have to be mentioned. The public
goods taken as the references (here: security, education and public trans-
port) may should be related to agriculture more strongly. In particular, the
chosen reference goods are more on a level like the “agriculture budget”.
If undertaking the study again, I would suggest to contrast animal welfare
spending with spending for environment protection or spending within agri-
cultural sector. Such a scenario would be even more realistic and helpful
to understand preferences of agricultural policy among citizens. Moreover,
it would contribute to the ongoing debate of financing only public goods
provided by agriculture (see WBAE, 2018; Henning et al., 2019a) and help
to see where the emphasis of European CAP should be located. Addi-
tionally, this would fix a problem of the study’s empirical setting: Public
transport is not a pure public good, but “only” a field where governmental
spending occurs.
8.1.3 Possible Democratic Policy Failure in Sustainabil-
ity?
Measuring German Voters’ Policy Beliefs
In this paper a theoretical framework was established that allows to evalu-
ate the role of policy beliefs. The framework integrates analysis of voting
behaviour as well as WTP measurement. Motivated by the aim to assess
basic democratic policy failure, the approach should enable the assess-
ment of belief biases regarding sustainability goods and their politically
provision. Hence, the paper contributes to the political economy of sus-
tainability: it allows to identify voters’ policy beliefs empirically. With this
approach we were able to demonstrate how they drive voters’ policy po-
sitions. In particular, the empirical findings underline the important role of
policy beliefs.
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If a benchmark is given, one can asses the beliefs among voters. Fur-
thermore, they can be compared to the true political technology. Unfortu-
nately, we don’t have such an adequate benchmark for animal welfare’s
political technology, i.e. how governmental spending contributes to animal
welfare. Hence, due to missing benchmarks, belief measurements could
not be evaluated. More research is needed here to investigate the relation
between plausible animal welfare indicators and governmental spending.
If true parameters are known, they can be compared to the results re-
ported by the paper. This would allow to judge whether putting emphasis
on voters’ policy position leads to optimal or non-optimal decisions. This
also applies for climate and water protection.
Regarding belief formation, I suggest more research of the causal mech-
anisms. Clearly, measured beliefs depend on the individual characteris-
tics that influence voting and economic behaviour, i.e. policy weights and
WTP. Nevertheless, this is not a causal mechanism that leads directly to
the beliefs. For example, beliefs can be the result of learning, which can
be an observational and/or communicational mechanism (Acemoglu and
Ozdaglar, 2010), where the latter takes place in social networks (Friedkin
and Johnsen, 1990). This corresponds to the mechanism of informational
lobbying (Henning et al., 2019b) among policy stakeholders that was ap-
plied in chapters 6 and 7. One should also consider mass media, due to
their important role in the animal welfare discourse (Brümmer et al., 2019;
Grossarth, 2014). This also applies for social media (Buddle et al., 2018).
Thus, I suggest future research to investigate the causal mechanism of
belief building among voters considering mass and social media as well
as personal communication in networks. Furthermore, the voter model
used comes as a limitation. It does not treat voting for a party different
than non-voting. Here I propose latent class models following the logic of
nested multinomial logit models (which were used in chapter 2).
8.1.4 Belief Formation in German Farm Animal Politics:
An Illustrative Example From A Stakeholder Net-
work Survey
The study assessed communication influence on livestock stakeholders
belief formation. A relatively dense communication network sets up the
basis for a network multiplier model quantifying organizations’ influence.
Additionally, we simulated the evaluation of a standardized testing and ap-
proval procedure for mass-produced livestock facilities.
The studies illustrate two general problems. First, assessing beliefs is
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not that simple. We took the answers from a stakeholder survey as the
initial beliefs. But we do not know, to what extend the answers of the rep-
resentatives are driven by communication that took place before. Even
though we framed the corresponding questions by emphasising that we
want to know organizations ideal positions, we can’t be sure that external
influence is eliminated. Second, weighting “particularly valuable” informa-
tion suppliers is crucial. Within the study we weighted the stated important
providers by value 2 while value of 1 represents normal communication
ties. Here the question occurs whether a double high weighting is appro-
priate. Not least because the term “particularly valuable” is a subjective
interpretation. If undertaking following studies using the same approach,
one should make use of a quantitative frame like “Which information do
you value as double high” or similar. Beyond these methodological ques-
tions I want to point out a problem of the data used. When investigating
communicational patterns, one can not ignore the role of the media. This is
due to the important role of mass media in public’s debate on livestock pro-
duction (Kayser et al., 2012). Unfortunately, the data used do not include
media actors. This is due to the fact that media actors did not response
to the interview inquiry. While methodological problems discussed before
may be solved by future research, this data problem is somehow typical
for social science investigations.
8.1.5 Communicational Lobbying and
German Animal Welfare Regulation: A Network Ap-
proach
This chapter complements chapter 6 by not only examining three other
policies, but also checking the results regarding their robustness. For this
purpose, a Bayesian Exponential Random Graph Model is used to ex-
amine drivers of the network generating process. Subsequently, 10,000
network configurations are simulated to calculate the confidence intervals
of beliefs’ stationary points.
The study shares the same problem of the previous chapter: it includes
no media actors. Hence, a possible important communication channel is
missing. Moreover, the sample only includes one research organization.
Of course, expert communication includes scientific knowledge. Thus, all
corresponding actors should be included in a corresponding survey. This
reflects the problem of willingness to participate in social science research.
Here I see also a problem at the econometric level. Including media ac-
tors and more research organizations could change the estimation results.
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This would also cause different simulation results for the 10,000 network
simulations. Therefore, even the robustness test for the belief changes is
challenged by the non-complete data sample.
8.2 A General Outlook
All in all, this thesis investigates some crucial aspects of German animal
welfare policy. Beside studies on voting behaviour, willingness to finance
FAW policies and a theoretical framework of belief measurement, it also
consists of essays on stakeholder influence. Hence, it contributes to the
understanding of the political economy of animal welfare policy under con-
sideration of policy beliefs. Nevertheless, I want to highlight three implica-
tions for future research.
First, there is need for further representative empirical research on vot-
ers behaviour and WTP. Due to a lack of sufficient data, it was not possible
to investigate the effect of certain animal welfare policy program aspects,
i.e. the comparison of husbandry and management factors, on the vot-
ing behaviour. This would be a step in the domain of sub policies which
could help to understand in which aspects polity should put emphasis. In
general, research should compare animal welfare with other agriculture
related issues like biodiversity or structural change. Such a comparison
would contribute to the design of sustainable agricultural policy that fulfils
social, economic and ecological demands. In a further step, one could
combine this to the willingness to pay sphere. The concept of collective
WTP should thereby be applied using issues that are linked to agriculture
and rural areas as well as being at the same administrative level (district,
state or national). Here I clearly see need for further research, for what the
chapters in part I form a solid foundation.
Second, one has to investigate voters’ belief building considering the
digital sphere. The formation of voter beliefs is not taken into account
in the corresponding chapters. Therefore, we do not know what drives
voters’ beliefs about important aspects of husbandry. With regard to the
chapters 3 and 4, we know which participants want to pay more money for
climate and space than for play. Additionally, a theoretical approach of be-
lief measurement based on WTP and voting behaviour was suggested in
chapter 5. So, we also know which people have which belief parameters.
But we do not know why they have these beliefs or, more precise, how
they formed these beliefs. An in-depth occupation with it could help to bet-
ter understand voters’ behaviour and willingness to pay motivation in ani-
mal welfare policy. Apart from personal networks (for example friendship),
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mass and social media could play an important role for voters’ belief for-
mation. There is empirical evidence that both, social networks and mass
media, affect voting behaviour (see for example Schmitt-Beck and Mack-
enrodt, 2010; Petri and Henning, 2015a,b). With regard to animal welfare,
these influence tools may contribute to the belief updating process of so-
ciety. This is especially true for mass media, which use to frame their cov-
erage about livestock in Germany (see Brümmer et al., 2019; Grossarth,
2014; Kayser et al., 2011). Beside traditional mass media like newspaper
or broadcast, especially social media might serve as belief driver. Political
discussions more and more take place in the digital sphere. Social media
link voters’ discourse space to the sphere of politicians and other stake-
holders. Platforms like Twitter allow politicians and stakeholders to directly
communicate with citizens who are concerned about animal welfare. Es-
pecially animal protection organizations use media like Twitter as influence
tool (see Buddle et al., 2018). Hence, belief updating might also occur via
social media channels. Investigating economic and voting behaviour in
animal welfare policy while considering belief updating through media in-
fluence is clearly an interdisciplinary work. It links agricultural economy
with political as well as communicational science. Therefore, I see this is-
sue as a promising research area for future methodological and empirical
work and as an extension of the results provided in this thesis.
Third, comparative research at the European level could be necessary.
Agricultural policy is mainly driven by the CAP, i.e. European policy mak-
ing and the corresponding legal framework. With the end of the current
period of payments new mechanisms will be implemented. Hence, scien-
tists recommend that payments should be oriented at public goods pro-
vided by agriculture (WBAE, 2018). This also includes animal welfare.
While the CAP sets a framework in which national strategies have room
to move, there is the question of how much spendings should be provided
for animal welfare. How much emphasis should be put on animal welfare
(spending) and how important are other issues? Moreover, there are rec-
ommendations to implement a European animal protection law (Broom,
2017). Beyond the questions of regulating the standards, European trade
of animal products is affected by higher standards. Since we know about
the influential role in general (see Pappi and Henning, 1999; Henning,
2009), it would be interesting to investigate the corresponding livestock
policy networks at the European level. Also, comparative studies on na-
tional influence of different stakeholder groups could be of interest since
nationals’ regulations within European framework are still heterogeneous
despite social concerns (Vogeler, 2019). Therefore, I recommend corre-
sponding empirical work of agricultural economists and political scientists.
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Chapter 9
Zusammenfassung
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9.1 Ecological Voting in Germany? Animal Wel-
fare, Climate and Water Protection as Dri-
vers of Voting Behaviour
Wahlverhalten wird nicht nur von einem Thema beeinflusst, sondern durch
mehrere Politikfelder. Somit ist die sinnvolle Messung des Tierwohlein-
flusses auf die Wahlentscheidung nur durch den Vergleich mit anderen
policy issues möglich. Daher quantifiziert dieser Beitrag den Tierwohl-
einfluss und stellt ihn den ökologischen Themen Klima- und Gewässer-
schutz gegenüber. Insbesondere der Stickstoffüberschuss belastet das
Grundwasser: Eine hohe Konzentration an reaktiven Stickstoffverbindung-
en kann nicht nur die biologische Vielfalt verringern, sondern auch die
menschliche Gesundheit schädigen (Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfra-
gen , 2015, S. 33). Laut Umweltbundesamt stammt der größte Teil der
Stickstoffemissionen aus dem Agrarsektor (UBA, 2018). Über Branchen-
und Landesgrenzen hinweg steht zudem der Klimawandel heutzutage im
Fokus der Öffentlichkeit. Treiber des Klimawandels sind die Treibhaus-
gasemissionen. Aus diesem Grund will die deutsche Regierung diese
Emissionen bis 2030 um 55% senken, also auf 562 Millionen Tonnen CO2-
Äquivalente (BMU, 2019).
Ein probabilistisches Wählermodell (Thurner, 1998; Thurner and Ey-
mann, 2000; Adams et al., 2005) wird geschätzt, dessen Datenbasis aus
einer repräsentativen Befragung zum Thema Nachhaltigkeit in Deutsch-
land stammt. Dabei handelt es sich um ein nested multinomial logit model.
Dies ist dem Umstand geschuldet, dass die Entscheidung zur Nichtteil-
nahme an einer Wahl Ergebnis eines anderen Abwägungsprozesses ist,
als die Entscheidung zur Wahl einer Partei (vgl. Thurner and Eymann,
2000). Auf Grundlage der geschätzten Parameter werden die marginalen
Effekte berechnet. Sie geben an, in welchem Umfang sich die Wahl-
wahrscheinlichkeit für eine Partei ändert, wenn sich eine erklärende Vari-
able um eine Einheit ändert. Das Modell enthält außerdem zahlreiche Kon-
trollvariablen zur ökonomischen Wohlfahrt und zu Fragen des Sozialen.
Darüber hinaus wird auch auf retrospektives Wählen und nicht-politische
Faktoren (Parteienidentifikation, Alter und Geschlecht) kontrolliert.
Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass Klimaschutz etwa 1,09 mal wichtiger ist als
Tierwohl. Überraschenderweise erweist sich der Koeffizient für Gewässer-
schutz als nicht signifikant. Darüberhinaus zeigt die Studie, dass ökolo-
gische Wahlmotive wesentlich wichtiger sind als das ökonomische Wach-
stum. Auch hier erweist sich der Schätzer zudem als nicht signifikant.
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Zu beachten ist allerdings, dass kein einziges Politik-Motiv so stark ist,
wie die Identifikation mit einer Partei. Da dies jedoch nur für die weni-
gen Personen gilt, die sich mit einer Partei identifizieren, sind die Parteien
auf zusätzliche Stimmen angewiesen. Dazu müssen sie sich entlang des
poltischen Raumes bewegen. Besonders Tierwohl und Klimaschutz sind
dabei Felder von hoher Sensibilität.
9.2 The Price for Happy Pigs: Private and Col-
lective Willingness to Pay for Animal Wel-
fare in Germany &
About Bus Drivers and Happy Pigs: Col-
lective and Private Willingness to Pay for
Animal Welfare
Die den beiden Kapiteln zugrunde liegende Studie befasst sich mit der
Finanzierung höherer Tierwohlstandards. Ausgangspunkt ist der Befund,
dass existierende Studien (Liljenstolpe, 2008, 2011; Lagerkvist and Hess,
2011; Clark et al., 2017) von der Annahme ausgehen, Tierwohl sei ein
privates Gut bzw. Attribut eines privaten Gutes. Dabei ist unklar, wie Trit-
tbrettfahrerprobleme behandelt werden. Daher lautet das Kernargument
dieser Studien, dass der Markt bei der Bereitstellung von Tierwohl ver-
sagt. Aus diesem Grund schlagen wir einen theoretischen Rahmen zur
Finanzierung von Tierwohl (und anderen öffentlichen Gütern) vor. Dabei
folgen wir der Studie von Uehleke and Hüttel (2016) und berücksichtigen
neben dem Trittbrettfahrerproblem auch die Umverteilung von staatlichen
Budgets zugunsten eines öffentlichen Gutes. Der empirische Teil besteht
dementsprechend aus zwei Discrete Choice Experimenten. Zunächst wird
nach der privaten Zahlungsbereitschaft für drei Haltungssystemkompo-
nenten (Platz pro Tier, Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten und Stallklimatisier-
ung) in der Schweinemast gefragt. Daran schließt dann ein zweites Ex-
periment an, in dessen Rahmen die Befragten entscheiden sollen, welche
staatlichen Ausgaben aus den Bereichen Sicherheit, Bildung oder öffent-
licher Personennahverkehr zugunsten der Tierwohlfinanzierung gekürzt
werden sollen. Dies ist die kollektive Zahlungsbereitschaft.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen zunächst, dass die Zahlungsbereitschaft-
en heterogen sind. Sie variieren nicht nur anhand sozioökonomischer
Merkmale, sondern auch hinsichtlich der Einstellungen zum Thema Tier-
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wohl. Zudem zeigen sich klare Muster bezüglich der Haltungsstandards
und der Quelle ihrer Finanzierung: Am wichtigsten ist dabei die Klima-
tisierung von Ställen. Hier zeigt sich im Durchschnitt eine Zahlungsbere-
itschaft von 3,03 Euro pro Kilogramm Schlachtgewicht. Am zweitwichtig-
sten ist der Platz pro Tier, für den die Zahlungsbereitschaft im Durchschnitt
2,25 Euro beträgt. Vergleichsweise weniger wichtig sind die Möglichkeiten
zur Beschäftigung. Für diese wurde eine Zahlungsbereitschaft von durch-
schnittlich 1,50 Euro gemessen. Darüber hinaus konnte eine Diskrepanz
zwischen der privaten und der kollektiven Zahlungsbereitschaft heraus-
gearbeitet werden. Letztere entspricht dabei lediglich einem Bruchteil der
privaten Bereitschaft für bestimmte Haltungsstandards mehr zu zahlen.
Im Allgemeinen existiert allerdings ein positiver Zusammenhang zwischen
beiden Zahlungsbereitschaften.
9.3 Possible Democratic Policy Failure in Sus-
tainability?
Measuring German Voters’ Policy Beliefs
Ausgangspunkt dieses Kapitels ist die Rolle der sogenannten policy be-
liefs (Akerlof, 1989; Caplan, 2001, 2002, 2007): Das Verhältnis zwischen
Politik und den beabsichtigten Ergebnissen ist komplex. Um diese Kom-
plexität zu verringern, wenden Laien naive mentale Modelle an. Diese
Überzeugungen können aufgrund psychologischer Faktoren verzerrt sein
und unterscheiden sich daher von Expertenwissen (den echten politischen
Technologien). Wie Caplan (2001) argumentiert, können verzerrte Be-
liefs dazu führen, dass ineffiziente Politiken umgesetzt werden und somit
ein basisdemokratisches Politikversagen auslösen. Mit dieser Studie wer-
den die Konzepte der vorhergegangenen Kapitel zusammengeführt, um
einen Ansatz zur Messung von Wählerbeliefs zu entwickeln. Basierend
auf einer Cobb-Douglas Produktionsfunktion werden die Kostenelasitiz-
itäten für Tierwohl sowie Klima- und Gewässerschutz abgeleitet. Die em-
pirischen Bestandteile des Ansatzes sind Discrete Choice Experimente
und ein probabilistisches Wählermodell.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Beliefs der Wähler variieren. So ent-
sprechen die Kostenelastizitäten des Klimaschutzes im Durchschnitt 1,37,
2,83 oder 4,3. Dies ist abhängig von der gewählten Kostenelastizität für
das Tierwohl. Generell gilt dieses Muster auch für Gewässerschutz, allerd-
ings bleiben die Beliefparameter hier nahe der 1. Ein zweiter Befund
ist, dass eine geschlechterspezifische Heterogenität vorliegt: Für Männer
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wurden im Durchschnitt signifikant höhere Kostenelastizizäten gemessen.
Darüber hinaus zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Wähler der FDP, SPD und
Unionsparteien im Allgemeinen höhere Beliefs haben. Drittens wurden
neue Politikpositionen bzw. Zielvorstellungen simuliert, indem die Param-
eter systematisch variiert wurden. So zeigte die Erhöhung der Tierwohl-
Kostenelastizität, die in dieser Studie als Referenz fixiert wurde, dass
die Wähler im Durchschnitt 0,692 statt zuvor 1,174 Milliarden Euro als
Regierungsausgaben für Tierwohl bevorzugen. Somit hängen die Tier-
schutzausgaben stark davon ab, wie die zugrunde liegenden Beliefparam-
eter in Bezug auf Kosten und Effizienz ausfallen. Diese Kostensensibilität
wurde auch für Klima- und Gewässerschutz gemessen.
9.4 Belief Formation in German Farm Animal
Politics:
An Illustrative Example From A Stakeholder
Network Survey
Auf konzeptioneller Ebene ist Tierwohl realtiv komplex und umfasst eine
Vielzahl von Aspekten der Gesundheit, physischen Funktionalität, des na-
türlichen Verhaltens und des psychischen Zustandes (Fraser, 2008). Da-
her spielen sogenannte policy beliefs eine Schlüsselrolle in der Tierwohl-
politik. Sie erlauben es den politischen Akteuren, komplexe Sachzusam-
menhänge zwischen Politik und Ergebnis zu vereinfachen. Sind diese Be-
liefs verzerrt, so können sie jedoch zu Politikversagen führen (Caplan,
2001). Gleichzeitig wird die Rolle von Stakeholdern in der Implemen-
tierung von Politiken immer wichtiger. Bisherige Arbeiten (vgl. etwa Heise
and Theuvsen, 2017; Verbeke, 2009; Ventura et al., 2015) haben sich je-
doch eher auf den Vergleich von Stakeholder-Bewertungen konzentriert.
Daher tragen sie leider nicht dazu bei, den Prozess der Belief-Bildung
besser zu verstehen. Somit ist nicht bekannt, wie Stakeholder - und somit
auch politische Entscheider - ihre Beliefs bilden bzw. aktualisieren. Diese
Lücke wird ein Stück weit geschlossen, indem diese Studie einen Anal-
yserahmen der politischen Partizipation mit entsprechenden Netzwerk-
daten verknüpft, um die Kommunikationseffekte in der deutschen Nutztier-
Politik zu quantifizieren. Letztere werden anhand von Bewertungen des
Stall-TÜVs veranschaulicht.
Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Experten-Netzwerk der deutschen
Nutztierpolitik relativ dicht ist: Mehr als 26 Prozent aller möglichen Verbin-
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dungen werden realisiert. Darüber hinaus konnten wir die Gruppen “Land-
wirtschaft und Tierproduktion” sowie “Tierschutz” als die Haupttreiber des
beliefbildenden Prozesses identifizieren. Gleichzeitig zeigt sich der Fleis-
chsektor als besonders offen für externes Wissen. Demgegenüber ist es
die Gruppe “Landwirtschaft und Tierproduktion”jene, die am meisten auf
ihre eigene Expertise vertraut. Ihre Eigenkontrolle liegt im Durchschnitt
bei 0,853. Diese strukturellen Effekte führen im Ergebnis zu einer Kon-
vergenz der Stall-TÜV-Bewertungen. Der Median verschiebt sich von 3
(“unentschlossene” Position) zu 3,2 (Verschiebung in Richtung “eher nüt-
zlich”).
9.5 Communicational Lobbying and
German Animal Welfare Regulation: A Net-
work Approach
Diese Studie stellt eine Erweiterung des Kapitels 6 dar. Der theoretis-
che Rahmen ist wiederum die netzwerkbasierte Theorie des informational
lobbying (Henning et al., 2019). Auf empirischer Ebene befasst sich die
Studie mit drei weiteren Fragen der Tierschutzregulierung. Wie im Bere-
ich des Umweltrechts haben sowohl der Bundesgesetzgeber als auch die
Bundesländer das Recht, ein Gesetz umzusetzen, das es Tierschutzgrup-
pen ermöglicht, vor Gericht gegen Tierschutzverstöße zu klagen (Kloepfer,
2016). Darüber hinaus stellt sich die Frage nach dem Nachweis der Sach-
kunde zur Tierhaltung, wie er durch den WBA (2015) vorgeschlagen wird.
Die nationale Strategie für die Haltung von Nutztieren beinhaltet eine sol-
che Überprüfung (BMEL, 2017). Ein weiteres Thema ist das Verbot des
Transports lebender Tiere in Ländern außerhalb der EU, wie es von Tier-
schutzgruppen (Bündnis für Tierschutzpolitik, 2017) gefordert wird. Als
methodische Erweiterung zum vorherigen Kapitel werden die Ergebnisse
auf ihre statistische Signifikanz hin überprüft. Daher wird ein bayesianisch
geschätztes ERGM verwendet, um zuerst Determinanten des das Netzw-
erk generierenden Prozesses zu identifizieren. Basierend auf den Schätz-
ergebnissen werden in einem weiteren Schritt 10.000 Netzwerkkonfigura-
tionen simuliert.
Unsere Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, dass in dem realisierten Net-
zwerk die landwirtschaftlichen Erzeuger die Haupttreiber des Experten-
wissens in der deutschen Nutztierpolitik sind. Tierschutzorganisationen
scheinen dabei ihr Gegenpol zu sein, wenn es um Wissenskommunika-
tion geht. Die ERGM-Ergebnisse spiegeln diese Muster wider. Für po-
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tentielle Sender von Informationen wurden positive Parameter identifiziert,
wenn sie zu einer der beiden Gruppen gehören. Darüber hinaus sind
auch die Koeffizienten für politische Agenten als Wissensnachfrager pos-
itiv, was bestätigt, dass sowohl die gesetzgebenden Akteure als auch die
Exekutive Wissens-Nachfrager sind. In Bezug auf die empirischen Beliefs
konnten wir zeigen, dass die empirische Daten im Allgemeinen den sim-
ulationsbasierten entsprechen. Dies gilt insbesondere für den Sachkun-
denachweis in der Tierhaltung sowie das standardisierte Prüf- und Zulas-
sungsverfahren, für die die Mittelwerte nahezu perfekt übereinstimmen.
Auf Gruppenebene sind nur wenige Mittelwerte nicht signifikant. Daher
betrachten wir die auf Interviews basierenden Ergebnisse insgesamt als
statistisch robust. Darüber hinaus zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Gruppe
der öffentlichen Verwaltung je nach Netzwerkkonfiguration leicht in ihrer
Position zu verschieben ist. Im Allgemeinen zeigt die Beliefänderung, dass
Gruppen, die eine Politik mit einer neutralen 3 bewerten, Gruppen sind, die
in beide Richtungen bewegt werden können. Vergleicht man den Bereich
der Delta-Mittelwerte pro Gruppe und Simulation mit der angegebenen
Eigenkontrolle, also dem Gewicht interner Expertise, so zeigt die Studie,
dass die Wertebereiche für Gruppen mit geringer Eigenkontrolle breiter
sind.
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A.1 Discrete Choice Models
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are based on discrete choice models. This sections
describes the econometric modelling approaches.
A.1.1 Random Utility Framework
Discrete choice models are the appropriate econometric model for deci-
sions between alternatives. These decisions appear as data with discrete
dependent variables (Greene, 2009). Thus, they are used for both, mod-
elling economic preferences (see Hanley et al., 2001) as well as proba-
bilistic models of voters’ behaviour (see Adams et al., 2005; Enelow and
Hinich, 1984b; Thurner, 1998; Thurner and Eymann, 2000).
The theoretical foundation of discrete choice models is the random util-
ity theory. Assume a rational, i.e. utility maximizing, decision maker i in
situation t who has to choose between a set J of alternatives. The utility of
alternative j is denoted by Uitj. Alternative j is chosen if its utility is higher
than the utility gained by alternative j′, hence
Uitj > Uitj′ . (A.1)
This utility consists of two components: Vitj refers to the deterministic part
of voter i’s utility, which is based on observable characteristics. In contrast,
εitj is the unobserved stochastic error component (Hensher et al., 2015).
Hence,
Uitj = Vitj + εitj. (A.2)
Note that Vitj is a linear combination of a n × 1 vector of n explanatory
variables x and a n× 1 vector of parameters β:
Vitj = βx. (A.3)
Observing the particular choice j leads to the conclusion that its utility
is the maximum of set J (Greene, 2012), hence the probability to chose
alternative j is
Pitj = Prob(y = j|it) = Prob(Uitj > Uitj′) = Prob(Uitj − Uitj′ > 0). (A.4)
A.1.2 (Nested) Conditional and Multinomial Logit Mod-
els
Both, conditional and multinomial logit models require the assumption that
the stochastic component εitj is independent and identically distributed
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with Gumbel (type 1 extreme value) distributions (Hensher et al., 2015).
Based on this assumption, McFadden (1974) proposes the conditional logit
model of the form
Pitj =
eVitj∑
j e
Vitj
(A.5)
=
e(β0+
∑
n βnxitnj)∑
j e
(β0+
∑
n βnxitnj)
where xitnj refers to the nth attribute of alternative j in choice set t for
decision maker i. The attributes vary among alternatives in the choice set.
Furthermore, β0 corresponds to the alternative specific constant (ASC)
and is also estimated like parameter βn. If one wants to take individual
characteristics into account, the multinomial logit model has to be used. In
particular, a k × 1 vector z of individual characteristics may now describe
the observable part of utility:
Pitj =
eVitj∑
j e
Vitj
(A.6)
=
e(
∑
k αkjzitk)∑
j e
(
∑
k αkjzitk)
where zitk is the kth characteristic of individual i in choice situation t.
Please note that parameters α vary among alternatives. Using both kind
of models (Greene, 2009) leads to
Pitj =
eVitj∑
j e
Vitj
(A.7)
=
e(β0+
∑
n βnxitnj+
∑
k αkjzitk)∑
j e
(β0+
∑
n βnxitnj+
∑
k αkjzitk)
.
An extension of these models is the nested multinomial logit model
(NMNL). It is used if the underlying independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) assumption only holds for subsets of all alternatives (Greene, 2009;
Hensher et al., 2015). In particular, choices are partitioned into a set of B
branches. The probability to chose alternative j now corresponds to
Pitj = Pitj|b × Pitb, (A.8)
with
Pitj|b =
eVitj|b∑
j e
Vitj|b
(A.9)
Pitb =
e(λbIVitb)
e(λbIVitb)
. (A.10)
224
Note that b refers to the branch containing alternative j. Pitb is the proba-
bility to chose branch b. The utilities of alternatives in branch b are sum-
marized in inclusive value IVtb (McFadden, 1984).
A.1.3 Latent Class Models
The models mentioned above assume that preferences are homogeneous
among decision makers. In contrast, the latent class model takes pref-
erence heterogeneity into account. The population of choice makers (for
example voters) is divided into Q unobservable segments, i.e. classes
(Swait, 1994). Membership in class q is not deterministic, but probabilistic.
Moreover, it depends on a l×1 vector s of l individual characteristics of the
decisions maker. Following Boxall and Adamowicz (2002) and Greene and
Hensher (2003), one can write the corresponding membership likelihood
function as
Miq = γ0 +
∑
l
γqsil, (A.11)
with the class membership constant γ0. Hence,
Piq =
eMiq∑Q
q=1 e
Miq
. (A.12)
Accordingly, choice models now depend on the classes:
Pitj|q =
eVitj|q∑
j e
Vitj|q
(A.13)
=
e(β0|q+
∑
n βn|qxitnj+
∑
k αkj|qxitk)∑
j e
(β0|q+
∑
n βn|qxitnj+
∑
k αkj|qzitk)
Using A.12, the probability of individual i to choosing alternative j in situa-
tion t finally corresponds to
Pitj =
Q∑
q=1
PiqPitj|q. (A.14)
A.1.4 Probabilistic Models of Voting Behaviour
Probabilistic models of voting behaviour consist of three components:
• policy motives (V POLij ),
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• retrospective voting (V RETROij ) and
• non-policy voting (V NONPOLij ).
The policy motive component is based on the assumption that voters are
rational utility maximizing decision makers. They evaluate platforms of
competing parties regarding the perceived utility (Downs, 1957). Accord-
ing equation A.1, they vote for the party from which they expect the highest
utility. An extension of this theoretical model are the spatial models of vot-
ing behaviour based on Hotelling (1929). Voters as well as parties are
assigned along one or more policy dimensions, i.e. policy issues. Let
xin denote the voter position and cijn the perceived position of party j in
policy issue n. Following equation A.1 a voter chooses the party next to
his own position. This is the party with the smallest distance to the voter
(Adams et al., 2005; Enelow and Hinich, 1984a). The deterministic policy
component of utility corresponds to
V POLij = −
∑
n
βn
√
(xin − cijn)2. (A.15)
At the econometric level,
√
(xin − cijn)2 is modelled as a party attribute.
The retrospective motive (Fiorina, 1981) refers to the evaluation of the
governmental performance. Therefore, voters make use of observable in-
dicators or state of satisfaction with situation:
V RETROij =
∑
k
βkzik, (A.16)
with zik as the evaluation of issue k by voter i. Several non-policy motives
are part of V NONPOLij . For example, loyalty to a party is an influential factor
of a voter’s decision (Bartels, 2000). Moreover, attributes of a party like
sympathy for a candidate as well as socio-structurally class membership
can drive voting behaviour (Schoenfeld, 1982; Schoen, 2014). Hence,
V NONPOLij =
∑
m
βmcjm +
∑
s
βszis, (A.17)
where variable zis denotes the characteristics of a voter and wmj party
characteristics. All in all, the deterministic component corresponds to
Vij = V
POL
ij + V
RETRO
ij + V
NONPOL
ij . (A.18)
This corresponds to a model integrating behavioural aspects into a spa-
tial framework (Adams et al., 2005). Thus, the overall deterministic part
described in equation A.18 is usually used in the model A.7.
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A.1.5 Discrete Choice Experiments and WTP Measure-
ments
Within the random utility framework, discrete choice experiments (DCE)
are used to “assess people’s preferences or decisions in hypothetical sit-
uations” (Colen et al., 2016, p. 672). Beside the random utility theory, the
characteristics of value theory (Lancaster, 1966) is the theoretical founda-
tion of this approach: The core idea is that people benefit from character-
istics of the good and not from the good itself. Hence, goods are described
by certain attributes. Since the 1990s, DCE have been applied for evalu-
ation in environmental economics (see Hanley et al., 1998). Agricultural
economists also use the approach in varying fields like the European CAP
(for an overview see Colen et al., 2016, p. 672-674) and animal welfare
(for example Liljenstolpe, 2008). Researchers have to decide about
• the number of attributes,
• number and content of their levels as well as
• their description
when applying DCE (Hanley et al., 1998). Attribute levels may be quan-
titative or qualitative (Hensher et al., 2015). Furthermore, the number of
alternatives per choice set has to be considered. In order to avoid forc-
ing unwanted decisions, DCE designs should also include an opt-out op-
tion (Auspurg and Liebe, 2011). This also increases proximity to reality.
Another question refers to the labelling of alternatives. A DCE is a la-
belled experiment if the alternatives have different names (for example
brand names of cars). In contrast, unlabelled experiments consist of al-
ternatives with generic names (for example “A” and “B”). As pointed out
by Hensher et al. (2015), the decision whether to apply a labelled or un-
labelled experiment is not a trivial one. Rather, unlabelled experiments
have two main benefits (Hensher et al., 2015, p. 205-207): First, not all
alternatives within the overall set have to be used. Second, unlabelled ex-
periments do not contain a name that might simultaneously serve as an
another attribute and hence, might be correlated with other attributes and
thus fail the IID assumption. For the purpose of chapters 3 and 4, unla-
belled experiments are sufficient since the DCE describe legal framework
as well as budget redistribution schemes. A last note on the overall design:
Let L be the number of Levels and A the number of attributes. For unla-
belled experiments the number of all possible alternatives is LA (Hensher
et al., 2005). Hence, the number of total alternatives increases with the
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number of attributes and levels. In most cases, such a full factorial design
can not be distributed to the participants of a survey. Rather, a fractional
factorial design is applied and the participants are partitioned into several
blocks and certain choice sets are assigned to each block (Auspurg and
Liebe, 2011).
The calculation of WTP is straightforward. In a conditional logit model,
WTP corresponds the marginal rate of substitution between attribute k and
costs (Hensher et al., 2015). Hence, the WTP for attribute k is
WTPk = −
βk
βc
, (A.19)
where βc refers to the cost attribute coefficient. Hence, this is the average
WTP of the whole sample. In a latent class approach, the individual WTP
for individual i can be calculated. Given class membership probability Piq
from equation A.12 as well as the average WTP in class q
WTPk|q = −
βk|q
βc|q
(A.20)
one can calculate the individual WTP
WTPik =
Q∑
q=1
PiqWTPk|q. (A.21)
A.2 Social Network Analysis
Methods and models described in section A.1 rely on attributes of alter-
natives and an actor’s characteristics. In contrast, social network analysis
(SNA) focuses on the social structure between individual actors, e.g. peo-
ple or organizations. Hence, the researcher is interested in relational char-
acteristics. This kind of network analysis has its origins in psychology and
is widespread in empirical sociological work (Newman, 2010). A variety
of studies makes use of SNA in order to investigate elite policy networks
(Henning, 2009; Leifeld and Schneider, 2012; Pappi et al., 1995). Based
on work of Golub and Jackson (2010) as well as Acemoglu and Ozdaglar
(2010), Henning and Hedtrich (2018) suggest a framework of belief for-
mation. This informational lobbying (Henning et al., 2019) in stakeholder
networks complements classical political support networks. This model
was applied in chapters 6 and 7.
Consider the set S of n actors. Actor pairs (i, j) ∈ S might establish a
certain relation r from a set of possible relations R. Please note, that this
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dyad is the smallest unit in SNA (Jansen, 2006). The most simple formal
representation of a relational network of actors is the n× n sociomatrix M.
Hence, element mij indicates whether row actor i and column actor j have
an established tie. Note that one has to distinguish between directed or
undirected networks. The former refers to a network, where row actor i es-
tablishes a tie towards column actor j, while j not necessarily establishes
the same tie to i. If mij 6= mji, it is an asymmetric relation. In contrast,
mij = mji describes a symmetric relation. Giving support is a classical
example for this kind of networks. In an undirected network, mij = mji.
Hence, if there is a tie from i to j, there also is a tie from j to i. A good
example is a network of friendships. Furthermore, social networks may be
represented as graphs. While the actors appear as vertices, their relations
occur as edges or lines (Newman, 2010). If self selection in a network is
allowed, possible relations corresponds n2. If self selection is not allowed,
one ends up with n× (n− 1) possible connections.
Network data can be collected in several ways. For the studies of
part II, personal interviews including corresponding network questions were
conducted. In particular, the networks have been constructed by asking
from two perspectives: sender and receiver. Hence, confirmed networks
(Pappi et al., 1995) have been constructed. Starting point was a list of
potentially relevant interest groups and political organizations (executive
and legislative). Based on this list, personal interviews were conducted
with representatives of the listed organizations. Target groups of the first
interviews were the most important groups of agribusiness as well as an-
imal protection. Additionally, a relational method (Jansen, 2006, p. 73)
was applied: At the beginning of the interview’s network part, a reputation
question was asked first: Interviewees had to identify all influential orga-
nizations based on the provided list. If an organization was missing, they
were allowed to add it to the list. Hence, the indegree centrality of this
reputation network was calculated:
di =
∑
j
xji (A.22)
Network boundaries were then constructed using this reputational mea-
sure. In particular, organizations where di = 0 have not been considered.
Exponential Random Graph Models (ERGM) (Wasserman and Patti-
son, 1996; Snijders et al., 2006) can be used to model network generating
processes. Using a priori defined network statistics, ERGMs are able to
represent the structure of networks and the according drivers. Beyond
endogenous variables, they allow to consider exogenous variables. Let y
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denote a n × n adjacency matrix on a set of n actors. Then yij = 1 indi-
cates that there is a directed tie from i to j and yij = 0 that there is no tie1.
With s(y,X) one can describe a vector of network statistics. It consists of
endogenous as well as exogenous covariates. Exogenous variables are
denoted with X and correspond to attributes at edge and node level. They
enter the model either as
∑
j(
∑
i yij)Xj,
∑
j(
∑
i yji)Xj for edge attributes
or
∑
i
∑
j yijXij for nodal attributes. The ERGMs probability density func-
tion corresponds
Pr(y|X) = exp {θs(y,X)}∑
ỹ∈Y exp {θs(ỹ, X)}
, (A.23)
with θ = (θ1, . . . , θQ). Furthermore,
∑
ỹ∈Y exp {θs(ỹ, X)} is the normalizing
constant summing over all possible network configurations denoted as Y
(Henning et al., 2019). This ensures that A.23 is a probability distribution.
Henning et al. (2019) argue that parameter estimation in ERGM frame-
work comes as a challenge because of the normalizing constant being
intractable. This applies even for networks of moderate size and is due to
the enormous number of possible realizations in Y. Following the literature
(see Snijders, 2002; Hunter and Handcock, 2006), Bayesian estimation us-
ing Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques can be used to handle
this problem. Hence, estimated parameters appear as sample moments
for a sample drawn from the posterior distribution. Equation (A.23) can be
rewritten as a conditional logit (see Goodreau et al., 2009; Cranmer and
Desmarais, 2011):
ln
[
Pr(yij = 1, Y Cij |X)
Pr(yij = 0, Y Cij |X)
]
= θδ(yij, Y
C
ij , X), (A.24)
where Y Cij denotes all dyads other than yij and δ(yij, Y Cij , X) denotes the
vector of changes in the sufficient statistics when yij changes from 0 to 1.
Hence,
Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X) =
Pr(yij=1,Y Cij |X)
Pr(yij=0,Y Cij |X)+Pr(yij=1,Y Cij |X)
=
exp{θδ(yij ,Y Cij ,X)}
1+exp{θδ(yij ,Y Cij ,X)}
.
(A.25)
Subsequently, effects on the probability given in A.25 (resulting from changes
in δ(yij, Y Cij , X)) can be quantified by
∂Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X)
∂δ(yij, Y Cij , X)
= Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X)(1− Pr(yij = 1|Y Cij , X))θ (A.26)
1Self ties are not allowed, so yii=0.
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to get marginal effects. Since individual marginal effects are locally de-
fined, they depend on all network statistics derived as partial derivatives at
a specific point (see Henning et al., 2019, pp. 83-84).
Informational (or communicational) lobbying refers to the idea of influ-
ence through belief updating (Henning et al., 2019). Beliefs determine the
preferences according certain policies. Updating these beliefs takes place
through an updating mechanism (Henning and Hedtrich, 2018). Beside
observational learning, communicational learning corresponds to such a
mechanism. It takes into account that the social structure in which an
actor is embedded is a key driver of learning (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar,
2010). This structure appears as a local directed network and is reflected
in the n×n socio-matrix MC . If mCij > 0, there is an established tie where i
sends information to j. M̄C denotes the row stochastic matrix of MC ′ with
elements m̄ij > 0 indicating that i pays attention to j (Golub and Jackson,
2010). Moreover, t = 1, 2, ..., T denotes the communication round and Ã
the political beliefs. In particular, Ã0i reflects agent’s initial beliefs while Ãri
denotes beliefs in communication round r. Hence,
Ãr+1i = m̄ii Ã
0
i +
∑
j 6=i
m̄ijÃ
r
j . (A.27)
Note that m̄ii denotes an actor’s weight that he or she puts on his/her own
expertise. If calculating
m̃ij =
mij
(1−mii)
(A.28)
equation A.27 can be rewritten to
Ãr+1i = mii (Ã
0
i + (1−mii)
∑
j
m̃ij Ã
r
j . (A.29)
Here (1−mii) corresponds to the aggregated weight for all of i neighbours.
Following Henning and Hedtrich (2018), A.29 can be rewritten in matrix
notation to identify stationary points of final beliefs:
Ã = [I − (1−mdiag)M̄ ]−1 ∗mdiag ∗ Ã0, (A.30)
with the network multiplier Matrix
M̂ = [I − (1−mdiag)M̄ ]−1 ∗mdiag. (A.31)
Element m̂ij corresponds to the multiplier effect, taking direct and indirect
effects of j’s initial belief on i’s final belief into account. The model corre-
sponds to the Friedkin-Model (Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990, 1997).
231
Bibliography
Daron Acemoglu and Asuman Ozdaglar. Opinion Dynamics and Learning
in Social Networks. Dynamic Games and Applications, 1(1):3–49, oct
2010. doi: 10.1007/s13235-010-0004-1.
James Adams, Samuel Merrill, and Bernard Grofman. A Unified Theory of
Party Competition. Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 2005.
Katrin Auspurg and Ulf Liebe. Choice-Experimente und die Messung
von Handlungsentscheidungen in der Soziologie. Kölner Zeitschrift
für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, 63:301–314, 2011. doi: 10.
1007/s11577-011-0136-3. URL http://link.springer.com/article/
10.1007/s11577-011-0136-3.
Larry M. Bartels. Partisanship and voting behavior. American Journal of
Political Science, 44(1):35–50, 2000.
Peter Boxall and Wiktor Adamowicz. Understanding Heterogeneous Pref-
erences in Random Utility Models: A Latent Class Approach. Environ-
mental and Resource Economics, 23(4):421–446, December 2002.
Liesbeth Colen, Sergio Gomez y Paloma, Uwe Latacz-Lohmann, Mari-
anne Lefebvre, Raphaële Préget, and Sophie Thoyer. Economic exper-
iments as a tool for agriculturalpolicy evaluation: Insights from the eu-
ropean cap. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics, 64:667–694,
2016.
Skyler J. Cranmer and Bruce A. Desmarais. Inferential Network Analysis
with Exponential Random Graph Models. Political Analysis, 19(01):66–
86, 2011. doi: 10.1093/pan/mpq037.
Anthony Downs. An Economic Theory of Democracy. Harper and Row,
New York, 1957.
James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich. The Spatial Theory of Voting: An
Introduction. Cambrigde University Press, New York, 1984a.
James M. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich. Probabilistic voting and the im-
portance of centrist ideologies in democratic elections. The Journal of
Politics, 46(2):459–478, 1984b.
Morris Fiorina. Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1981.
232
Noah E. Friedkin and Eugene C. Johnsen. Social influence and opinions.
Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 15:193–205, 1990.
Noah E. Friedkin and Eugene C. Johnsen. Social positions in influence
networks. Social Networks, 19:209–222, 1997.
Benjamin Golub and Matthew O. Jackson. Naive Learning in Social Net-
works and the Wisdom of Crowds. American Economic Journal Microe-
conomics, 2(1):112–149, 2010.
S.M. Goodreau, J.A. Kitts, and M. Morris. Birds of a feather, or friend of a
friend? Using exponential random graph models to investigate adoles-
cent social networks. Demography, 46(1):103–125, 2009.
William Greene. Discrete choice modeling. In Terence C. Mills and Kerry
Patterson, editors, Palgrave Handbook of Econometrics Volume 2: Ap-
plied Econometrics, pages 473–556. PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, Bas-
ingstoke, 2009.
William H. Greene. Econometric Analysis. Pearson, 7th edition, 2012.
URL http://stat.smmu.edu.cn/DOWNLOAD/ebook/econometric.pdf.
William H. Greene and David A. Hensher. A latent class model for discrete
choice analysis: Contrasts with mixed logit. Transportation Research
Part B: Methodological, 37(8):681–698, September 2003.
Nick Hanley, Robert E. Wright, and Vic Adamowicz. Using choice exper-
iments to value the environment. Environmental and Resource Eco-
nomics, 11:413–428, 1998.
Nick Hanley, Susana Mourato, and Robert E. Wright. Choice modelling
approaches: A superior alternative for enviromental valuation. Journal
of Economic Surveys, 15(3):435–462, 2001.
Christian Henning and Johannes Hedtrich. Modeling and evaluation of po-
litical processes: A new quantitative approach. In Development Policies
and Policy Processes in Afrika, pages 139–173. Springer International
Publishing, 2018.
Christian Henning, Christian Aßmann, Johannes Hedtrich, Julian Ehren-
fels, and Eva Krampe. What drives participatory policy processes:
Grassroot activities, scientific knowledge or donor money? – a compar-
ative policy network approach. Social Networks, 58:78–104, jul 2019.
doi: 10.1016/j.socnet.2019.03.001.
233
Christian H. C. A. Henning. Networks of Power in the CAP System of
the EU-15 and EU-27. Journal of Public Policy, 29(Special Issue 02):
153–177, 2009.
David A. Hensher, John M. Rose, and William H. Greene. Applied Choice
Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1st edition, 2005.
David A. Hensher, John M. Rose, and William H. Greene. Applied Choice
Analysis. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2 edition, 2015.
H. Hotelling. Stabilitiy in competition. The Economic Journal: The Journal
of Royal Society, 39:41–57, 1929.
David R. Hunter and Mark S. Handcock. Inference in Curved
Exponential Family Models for Networks. Journal of Computa-
tional and Graphical Statistics, 15:565–583, 2006. doi: 10.1198/
106186006X133069. URL http://amstat.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/
10.1198/106186006X133069.
Dorothea Jansen. Einführung in die Netzwerkanalyse. VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 3 edition, 2006.
Kelvin Lancaster. Change and innovation in the technology of consump-
tion. American Economic Review, 56(2):14–25, 1966.
Philip Leifeld and Volker Schneider. Information Exchange in Policy Net-
works. American Journal of Political Science, 56(3):731–744, July 2012.
Carolina Liljenstolpe. Evaluating animal welfare with choice experiments:
An application to swedish pig production. Agribusiness, 24(2):67–84,
2008. doi: 10.1002/AGR.20147.
D. McFadden. Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior.
Frontiers in econometrics, P. Zarembka (ed.), Academic Press: New
York:105–142, 1974. URL http://www.econ.berkeley.edu/reprints/
mcfadden/zarembka.pdf.
Daniel L McFadden. Econometric analysis of qualitative response models.
Handbook of Econometrics, 2:1395–1457, 1984.
M. E. J. Newman. Networks an Introduction. Oxford University Press,
2010.
Franz U. Pappi, Thomas König, and David Knoke. Entscheidungsprozesse
in der Arbeits- und Sozialpolitik. Campus, Frankfurt/Main, 1995.
234
Harald Schoen. Handbuch Wahlforschung, chapter Soziologische Ansätze
in der empirischen Wahlforschung, pages 169–239. Springer Fachme-
dien Wiesbaden, Wiesbaden, 2014.
David Schoenfeld. Partial residuals for the proportional hazard regression
model. Biometrika, 69(1):239–241, 1982.
Tom A. B. Snijders. Markov Chain Monte Carlo Estimation of Exponential
Random Graph Models. Journal of Social Structure, 3, 2002.
Tom A. B. Snijders, Philippa E. Pattison, Garry L. Robins, and Mark S.
Handcock. New Specificatons for Exponential Random Graph Mod-
els. Sociological Methodology, 36(1):99–153, 2006. doi: 10.
1111/j.1467-9531.2006.00176.x. URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.
1467-9531.2006.00176.x.
Joffre Swait. A Structural Equation Model of Latent Segmentation and
Product Choice for Cross-sectional Revealed Prefernce Choice Data.
Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 1(2):77–89, 1994.
Paul Thurner and Angelika Eymann. Policy-specific alienation and indif-
ference in the calculus of voting: A simultaneous model of party choice
and abstention. Public Choice, 102:51–77, 2000.
Paul W. Thurner. Wählen als rationale Entscheidung. Die Modellierung von
Politikreaktionen im Mehrparteiensystem. Oldenbourg Scientia Nova,
1998.
Stanley Wasserman and Philippa Pattison. Logit models and logistic re-
gressions for social networks: I. An introduction to Markov graphs and
p∗. Psychometrika, 61(3):401–425, 1996. doi: 10.1007/BF02294547.
URL http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF02294547.
235
